



**DELHI UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY**

# DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Cl. No. V79:1904:N4. H2

Ac. No. 46385

Date of release for loan

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of one anna will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.





TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS  
OF LATIN AMERICA

## THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

*The Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial and non-political body, founded in 1925 to facilitate the scientific study of the peoples of the Pacific Area. It is composed of National Councils in eleven countries.*

*The Institute as such and the National Councils of which it is composed are precluded from expressing an opinion on any aspect of national or international affairs; opinions expressed in this study are, therefore, purely individual.*

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT AND PUBLICATIONS OFFICE  
129 East 52nd Street, New York

# TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA

By  
ANITA BRADLEY

*An Introductory Essay  
and Selected Bibliography*

I P R INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH SERIES

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS  
NEW YORK

1942

*All Rights Reserved*  
*First published in the United States*  
*January 1942*

Produced by Photo-Offset in the United States

## PREFACE

This essay with selected bibliography has been prepared for the Institute of Pacific Relations in an attempt to stimulate further study, especially by scholars in the United States and Latin America, of a problem which is almost certain to attract great public interest during and after the present war with Japan. It must be stressed that lack of time and of funds for travel have made it impossible for the author to treat the subject as exhaustively as she would have wished and as it deserves. All that has been attempted is to state some of the problems calling for research and to present a preliminary, admittedly incomplete, list of the books and articles available for reference. It is hoped that this modest start will aid other scholars in making more intensive inquiries. The Institute of Pacific Relations itself hopes later to publish a more detailed report on the position of Japanese in Peru and Brazil.

This book was being printed in Shanghai when Japan went to war with the United States. It has been possible, however, to reproduce the book from the proofs by photo-offset process in the United States, and to add a revised introduction. Though it is issued in the I. P. R. International Research Series neither the International Secretariat nor the National Councils of the Institute accept responsibility for statements of fact or opinion expressed in the book. For all such statements the author alone is responsible.

New York  
January 12, 1942

W. L. Holland  
*Research Secretary*





## INTRODUCTION

The following essay was written and its conclusions drawn before the European War was carried into the Pacific. It sought to indicate in a sketch of the history of Latin American trans-Pacific relations, a clue to future contact both in trade and in colonization. There appeared some reason to believe from this survey of past conditions and present trends that the future would witness an increasingly important exchange between the countries on both sides of the Pacific. Such clues are, of course, not nullified by the vast changes implicit in this present war; when viewed in short range relation to the war rather than to the more conclusive adjustments of peace, they assume an old and readily recognized pattern.

There were those centuries when the great Spanish galleons, laden with the precious cargoes they brought from Asia to the New World, dominated the Pacific trade lanes. European nations considered it worth their while to engage in devastating wars that would open a way to this trade. They found it worth an adherence to new views and new ideologies as well.

In the shifting influences of centuries, it appeared likely that during the twentieth, the countries of the Pacific would, to a very great degree, determine the future of that area. But the period of the galleon trade and the years immediately following witnessed the transfer across the Pacific of many little-known commodities, among them rubber, quinine, cassava. Such transplanting occupied men's thoughts but little, for the drama and profits in silk and, somewhat later, in coolies filled most minds. But as some of these inconspicuous commodities grew to monopolize world needs, wealth and power shifted to those who controlled their production. There is little reason to enlarge upon the momentary significance of the control of some of these commodities, other than to note that the momentum for such control has once again been initiated in Europe.

Excepting the period of galleon trade, the movement of men from the Far East to Latin America, has thus far outweighed the importance of the shipment of goods. The dwindling significance of the trade in silk was followed in Latin America by the exploitation of mines and of new agricultural lands. Thus, in the nineteenth century, the Pacific became important once again for a traffic, not in materials but in men. Chinese coolies were transported by the thousands to make Latin American mines and fields productive, largely for their European conces-

sion holders. Accounts of the shocking conditions to which these workers were subjected brought an end to this traffic in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The number of Chinese entering Latin America declined considerably during the following years. Japanese immigration, however, showed a marked increase as a result of a colonization and emigration program sponsored and subsidized by the government of Japan. To-day, Japanese and, to a considerably lesser extent, Chinese are seen everywhere in Latin America, even in places so remote that they appear hardly to have moved beyond early Spanish influences. In Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Cuba, Oriental immigrants form large and important communities, communities important enough to have stirred those age-old antagonisms usually directed against prospering aliens.

Japan has watched the status of her nationals with a jealous concern and has been instrumental in removing restrictions aimed at persons of Asiatic origin. But this action on Japan's Orientals in Latin America. It has been an insistence that Jap-part has not been a struggle to achieve an equal status for all anese nationals be granted the privileges of the most-favored groups.

Although subject to increasing restrictions during recent years, once admitted, the Oriental immigrant has been, in the eyes of the law, as assimilable alien, free to attend schools, join clubs and marry natives of his new country. Until very recently, he was free to follow whatever occupation he chose. One can only speculate on the effect that the privileges of citizenship have had upon the manner in which the Oriental immigrant has entered into the life of the community where he has settled. What significance this may have in the turn of present events is a matter for even greater conjecture.

In the nineteenth and first years of the twentieth century, the volume of trans-Pacific trade bore little resemblance to the fabulous collections of jewels and fine fabrics that made up the galleon cargoes or to the profits to be had from the coolie traffic. It appeared however, in 1941, that world events were again focussing attention on the Pacific. The European War, by interrupting established trade channels across the Atlantic, seemed to forecast a renewed importance to the old Pacific trade lanes — an importance which was apparent at first in commodities but which might well have extended to workers since immigration into Latin America from Europe had been cut off.

A new trade opportunity appeared to have opened for those Latin American markets that remained unsupplied while war consumed most of the economic strength of the great European trading nations. Japan was the only Far Eastern country with an economic foothold in Latin America. In spite of the fact that she was entangled by war in China, Japan waged a continuous campaign of activity designed to place her on a more secure basis in Latin America. Japanese concessions, though small, were beginning to dot the map of Latin America; investments in factories, in fishing and agricultural companies were growing. Distances between Japan and Latin America were being halved by the fast Japanese ships making that run. Trade exhibits and good-will missions moved back and forth across the Pacific in increasing numbers. As relations between the United States and Japan grew more difficult, Japanese investments were transferred from the United States to Latin American countries.

But, at this writing, the future of Latin American relations with Japan and with all the countries of the Pacific area, has become part of the policies, the economic controls and the shifting fortunes of war. Central America and the Caribbean countries have declared war against Japan and the other members of the Axis. Mexico and Colombia have broken off diplomatic relations. Reactions vary in the remaining Latin American nations, even though most of them have indicated a willingness to be bound by Article 15 of the Resolutions of the Havana Conference of American Foreign Ministers. Article 15 declares that any act of aggression by a non-American state against an American state will be considered an act of aggression against all the American republics. The same article provides for consultation with the object of arriving at concerted hemispheric defense measures. Such a consultative meeting is to be held in Rio de Janeiro on January 15th, 1942. That conference and, more particularly, the next few months of war must prove, once and for all time, whether the Latin American nations intend to give validity to the idea of Pan-Americanism and of hemispheric solidarity.

San Francisco,  
January 8, 1942.

# CONTENTS

PREFACE	v
INTRODUCTION	viii
Chapter I. EARLY TRANS-PACIFIC CONTACTS:	
The Manila-Acapulco Trade	1
Chapter II. JAPAN'S ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT TRADE WITH NEW SPAIN	13
Chapter III. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY IN LATIN AMERICA'S TRANS-PACIFIC TRADE	18
Chapter IV. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN LATIN AMERICA'S TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS	23
Argentina	31
Uruguay and Paraguay	34
Brazil	34
Chile	35
Peru	37
Ecuador	38
Bolivia, Columbia, Venezuela	39
Mexico	40
Other Central American Countries	42
Future Possibilities	42
Chapter V. ASIATIC IMMIGRATION AND COLONI- ZATION	46
The Coolie Traffic	46
Recent Immigration and Colonization	50
Brazil	51
Peru	58
Mexico	60
Other Countries of South America	62
Emigration Policies	65
Oriental Immigration Policies of Latin American Governments	67
Policy of the Brazilian Government	69
Occupational Restriction	71
Chapter VI. POLITICAL RELATIONS	73
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	83
1. EARLY TRANS-PACIFIC CONTACTS	
Silk Trade between China and New Spain — Estab- lishment of the Galleon Trade — The Chinese in Manila, their importance in early Trans-Pacific trade.	83
Organization of the Spanish Colonial System and of Spanish Colonial Trade; its Effect on Trans-Paci- fic Commerce	85

Conditions in the Philippines and their Significance for the Trans-Pacific Trade	86
The Buccaneers in the Atlantic and the Pacific	86
Trade Between Japan and New Spain	86
Description of the Ferias, Popularity of Oriental Wares in the Cities of New Spain and Peru	88
Franciscans in the Spanish Colonies and in the Orient	89
Spanish and Mexican Dollar in China	89
2. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY	
Crop Transplanting	90
Clipper Ships and the Pacific Trade	90
3. TWENTIETH CENTURY TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS:	
TRADE	91
Latin American Trans-Pacific Trade—General	92
Argentina	94
Brazil	95
Peru	95
Chile	95
Mexico	96
Other Latin American Countries	96
4. COLONIZATION AND IMMIGRATION	
The Coolie Trade	97
Orientals in Central America	100
Mexico	100
Orientals in South America: Brazil	101
Other South American Countries	104
5. OCCUPATIONAL RESTRICTIONS	105
6. EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES	106
7. POLITICAL RELATIONS	107
APPENDIX I. Trade Statistics	109
Table 1. Trade of Argentine with Specified Trans- Pacific Countries	109
Table 2. Trade of Mexico with Specified Trans-Pacific Countries	110
Table 3. Trade of Peru with Specified Trans-Pacific Countries	110
Table 4. Trade of Chile with Specified Trans-Pacific Countries	111
Table 5. Trade of Brazil with Specified Trans-Pacific Countries	111
APPENDIX II. Asiatics in Latin America	
Table 1. Number of Japanese in Latin American Countries	112
Table 2. Number of Chinese in Latin American Countries	113
APPENDIX III. Reading List	114



## CHAPTER I

### EARLY TRANS-PACIFIC CONTACTS: THE MANILA-ACAPULCO TRADE

Events throughout the world, both economic and political, give to the history of early trans-Pacific relations something of the quality of a historical portent. International experiences seem to have moved full circle. Current thought appears curiously reminiscent of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Once again, there is the phenomenon of trade as the result of state initiative and state patronage. Once again, monopolies and chartered companies set up under state sponsorship are *privileged to dominate all trade*. Old theories on *spheres of influence* that result in setting aside certain areas as the special preserve of one nation have led to new acts of coercion. The idea that a state can become powerful enough to compete with others only through the possession of commodities finds expression in a belief that possession is only to be achieved through seizure. Recent totalitarian theories of colonies fall little short of the early notions that the good of the investing countries was alone to be considered. Dense populations have once again become valuable as forces by which military and commercial preponderance can be maintained.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the so-called trade jealousies replaced religion as a cause of war. The Papal division of the world into Spanish and Portuguese spheres in the fifteenth century and the subsequent growth of the idea of the *mare clausum* served but to aggravate these rivalries. Elizabeth of England spoke for all when she questioned the right of the "Bishop of Rome" to divide the land and the seas of the world for the advantage of two countries. When finally war, in defiance of Papal patronage, seemed the only way to consolidate economic and political power, Spain and Portugal were forced to yield



place to Holland, to Britain, to France. The Spanish colonial system, the Continental system of Napoleon were complete expressions of the dogmas and theories of the times. The present German system and the Japanese concept of a New Order in East Asia are the inheritors of the schemes and policies developed by European countries well over three hundred years ago.

Early trans-Pacific contacts were determined largely by these sixteenth and seventeenth century theories. Trade across the Pacific declined as Spain's coercive power lay heavy over the colonies. Whenever controls or restrictions were relaxed, there followed boom years for the American dependencies. Spain's attempt to canalize trade and maintain a geographical exclusiveness provoked a challenge by other trading nations. This led to war, to the forays of pirates and buccaneers and ultimately to the destruction of Spanish control not alone over trade but over her colonies. The history of early Pacific trade thus becomes an account of the struggle of Spain against foreign refusal to accept the idea of spheres of influence and to submit to the closing of commerce in certain areas. It is an account of Spain's struggle with her colonies' unwillingness to acquiesce in a system of privilege and monopoly in which the benefits fell to a government-sponsored minority.

The earliest attempts at trade between the Spanish dependencies and the countries of the western Pacific were made not long after the Conquistadores laid claim to the Americas for the Spanish Crown. Somewhere to the west of the Philippines, which had already been discovered, lay the great Moluccas, source of the lucrative spice trade, then virtually monopolized by the Dutch. Even were this trade to be wrested from the Dutch by the Spaniards, the old trade routes could no longer be travelled in safety because of the depredations of the Turks. Access to the rich "spiceries" of the East as well as a safe route lay to the west across the great expanse of ocean. And thus it came about that the Spanish possessions in America early found themselves thrust into a trans-Pacific traffic, designed originally to establish Spanish dominance over the world's great spice islands.

Legaspi was sent from New Spain in 1564 to found a settlement in the Philippines. There was some hope that the islands might themselves prove to be rich in spices. At best, they would serve as a base from which to harry Dutch trade. But much to Spanish disappoint-

ment, there were few spices other than cinnamon in the islands. While Legaspi worked to lessen the disappointment that his first reports occasioned, he made yet another discovery. Manila in those years carried on a fairly extensive trade with neighboring countries—with India, Siam, Borneo, China, Japan and the Moluccas. From all of these lands, junks came laden with goods. Those from the north were of particular interest. They came in large numbers with silks, woolens, porcelains, perfumes and iron-ware. During the seasons of favorable winds, Chinese junks filled the bay. There followed days of great haggling and trading. Once the wares had been sold, the junks, well laden with cargoes of white and yellow wax, with some gold and cotton cloth, sailed away on the prevailing monsoon.

The popularity and price of these wares, and of silk in particular, caused the Spaniards to pause in their search for spices. And before many years had passed, silk had replaced pepper as a barometer of trade. Letters of merchants were filled with an excited contemplation of the great profits to be made. Reports of viceroys and officials urged the importance of continuing a trade that yielded the Crown attractive revenues. In the collection of minutes known as the *General de Parte*, in the National Archives of Mexico, there are permits of the many ships that sailed between Acapulco and Manila in the first third of the seventeenth century.

Along the whole western coast of Latin America, Chinese silks were everywhere in evidence. The Manila galleon which brought these fine cloths, jewels, perfumes and other trinkets from the Far East to New Spain during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was awaited with the liveliest interest. Churchmen found in the cargoes materials for the beautiful vestments that added splendor and drama to the great church ceremonies; the ladies saw in the galleon materials new and extravagant gowns for the many fiestas that filled their days; merchants and officials were aware that for every ducat invested in a galleon cargo, "a man might count on six hundred." This eagerness for the arrival of the galleons was not confined to those within the colonies, for freebooters had heard tales that the "Manila ship did often return from Acapulco with ten millions of dollars." To harry Spanish trade in the South Seas became the supreme adventure of all daring seamen.

Accounts of viceroys and travellers to Mexico in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries tell of attire which for elaborateness and ornamentation eclipsed that of the grandees of Spain. "Both men and women are excessive in their apparel, using more silks than stuffs and cloths," wrote one.<sup>1</sup> Even the clothing of "the baser sort of people" was of silk and fine China linen. Precious stones added to the "vain ostentation." "A hatband and rose made of diamonds in a gentleman's hat" was common, and a "hatband of pearls" was "ordinary in a tradesman." On the Calle de Mercadores (Street of the Merchants) in Lima, Oriental wares filled the shops. In Potosi, in the bonanza days when the great Andean silver mines promised unending riches, "the ladies had jewels and dresses for each fiesta. . . . The mestizas wore sandals and belts of silk and gold." It was the silver of the Cerro de Pasca mines that paid for these Oriental luxuries.

Whether great quantities of goods from the Orient reached the colonies on the Atlantic is not at all certain. But according to Spanish decree, access to the colonies located in the regions that are now Argentina and Paraguay was by way of the Andean route. It is highly probable, therefore, that the animal trains crossing the high Andes from Peru carried Chinese goods to the eastern seaboard.

Royal sanction for the Chinese-Philippine trade with New Spain, Peru, Guatemala and Tierra Firme was given on April 14, 1579. Such large quantities<sup>2</sup> of goods were brought into the colonial markets that when the fleet arrived at Vera Cruz with manufactures from Spain, it often found that the needs of the people had been supplied with cheaper and equally desirable wares. Silks from China undersold those from Spain in the markets of Mexico and Peru; and the demand for Spanish manufactures fell off alarmingly. In a memorial, written in 1637 by Grau y Monfalcon, Procurator-General of the Philippines at the Court of Madrid, it was pointed out that the silks from China were "more even and elegant for delicate and smooth fabrics" than those from Spain. Of

<sup>1</sup> Gage, Thomas, *A New Survey of the West Indies*.

<sup>2</sup> The bulk of the imports consisted of silk (loose and twisted, in skeins, reeled on spindles, and thread) and cotton textiles. From the skeined silks and thread, velvets, veils, headdresses, trimmings, taffetas were manufactured. Manufactured silks (plain and figured velvets, satins, damasks, programs, taffetas, headdresses, stockings) were also imported by way of Manila.

the cotton textiles, it was reported that linen was used by the Indians and Negroes because it was cheap and because they could not afford to buy those sent from Spain. The same report added that at least 14,000 persons in Mexico, particularly in La Puebla and Antequera, were supporting themselves by manufacturing the raw silk imported from China. This had largely replaced the weaving of materials from the raw silk produced in Mexico. As a matter of fact, the native silk industry was virtually wiped out, for competition with Oriental goods was proving impossible, as regards both quality and price of materials.<sup>3</sup>

To the Chinese this trade was important largely because it brought them supplies of silver.<sup>4</sup> To the Japanese it promised added information on shipbuilding that would be useful in the establishment of a great Tokugawa merchant marine and on newer methods of silver refining, much needed if the silver mines that had been discovered in Idzu, Sado and elsewhere were to be developed. But to the merchants of Spain, this meant competition that threatened to cut off a great part of their trade with the New World. It meant that great quantities of silver, which might otherwise have reached Spanish coffers, were being exported by Peru and Mexico as payment for the cargoes that were brought from the Orient. There were few articles in the New World upon which a commodity exchange with the Far East could be developed. There was, of course, little concern in Spain over the

<sup>3</sup> A letter, written in 1586 by the Viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis de Villa Manrique, read in part: "Although figured materials are most usually not so fine as those from Spain, some are good; and those that are not, are of such a price, that considering the price of those that come from Spain, there is no comparison because . . . the damask is better than the taffeta (that comes from Spain) and costs hardly half as much. The same holds with regard to all other cloth. The raw silk is very good and profitable . . . As it is made, it is better than the native product. Your Majesty's customs also receive greater increase . . ."

<sup>4</sup> From the sixteenth century on, the most widely circulated of silver dollars imported into China was the Spanish dollar (the Carolus or Pillar). There is some indication that Peruvian, Chilean and Bolivian coins were also current. The accounts of foreign mercantile houses were kept in the Spanish dollar until 1856. With the loss of the American colonies, Spain stopped sending Carolus dollars to China. The Spanish dollar was superseded by the Mexican dollar between 1850 and 1860. F. E. Lee, *Currency, Banking and Finance in China*, p. 18, states that during the Napoleonic War about three-fourths of the trade of China was paid for in Carolus dollars.

destruction of colonial industry. As a matter of fact, that suited Spanish colonial policy. But the loss of trade to the merchants of Seville was quite another matter. It was due to the protests of these same Spanish merchants, protests that were echoes of the Mercantilist theories which dominated European thought, that Philippine commerce was limited to a fixed annual amount.<sup>5</sup> The protests, which emanated largely from Seville, were not without further effect for in 1582 trade between the Orient and Peru was forbidden. In 1591, this prohibition was extended to include Guatemala and Tierra Firme. Decrees issued and reissued in the following years merely reworded the old restrictions.<sup>6</sup> At length, all trade with the Orient was confined to New Spain, Acapulco alone being designated as the port of call for all trans-Pacific ships. There was thus but one way of getting goods from the Orient into Peru and other coast points—by trans-shipment from the Manila galleons in the harbor of Acapulco, to vessels known as Lima ships. As a matter of fact, the merchants of Seville went further and demanded as early as 1619, that "all trade with the Orient be forbidden. This, however, was not achieved until almost another hundred years had passed.

Bancroft points out that shipments to Peru of prohibited goods were made quite openly. At the end of the seventeenth century, Peruvian ships sailed regularly to the Puerto del Marques, a few miles north of Acapulco, and there took on the forbidden merchandise. In spite of all regulations and prohibitions designed to keep the Peruvian market a monopoly of the Spanish traders, the demand for Chinese silks led to a trade so extensive that the Spaniards complained that the King of

<sup>5</sup> A decree of 1593 (enforced in 1604) limited the trade between Mexico and the Philippines to 250,000 escudos per year for exports from Mexico and to 500,000 for imports from Mexico, to be carried in two ships. The plan was to allow 150 families in Manila to export Chinese merchandise, the greater part consisting of raw silk and cotton bolls to be manufactured in Mexico. A decree of 1720 suppressed the trade in manufactured silks.

<sup>6</sup> A decree of 1604 read: "inasmuch as Chinese stuffs have increased to excessive proportions in Peru, notwithstanding so many prohibitions expedient to our royal service, the welfare and utility of the public causes and the commerce of those and these kingdoms, therefore we order and command the viceroys of Peru and New Spain to prohibit and suppress, without fail, this commerce and trade between both kingdoms by all the ways and means possible." The above decree was issued and reissued at intervals even as late as 1706.

China could build a palace with the Peruvian silver bars that had been carried to his country because of this traffic, without the ships "having been registered and without the King of Spain having been paid his duties."<sup>7</sup>

The decrees designed to curb this trade not only designated the channel of trade and limited the quantities shipped but also forbade all direct traffic between the merchants of Mexico and those of the Philippine Islands. The only persons in Mexico who were to share in this trade were those who were known as the *Manileños*, the agents on the American coast of the Spaniards in the Philippines. In 1591 a decree signed by the Royal Council of the Indies held that residents of New Spain wishing to engage in this Pacific trade were required to live in the Philippine Islands for a period of ten years. In 1604, an additional prohibition forbade Mexicans from even making business trips to the Islands unless they agreed to live in the Philippines for at least eight years. However, in spite of these measures, Mexican merchants continued to send money to Manila to be invested in the galleon trade.<sup>8</sup> Since the officials of the galleons were appointed from Mexico, they themselves frequently carried the money. It became quite usual for the galleons to carry cargo far in excess of that shown in the ship's papers. Thus, a large part of this trade was carried on between the American dependencies and China.<sup>9</sup>

It was the Spanish policy to monopolize the trade with her colonies and to limit the profits of that trade to the king and to his Spanish-born subjects, thus preventing all gold and silver from falling into foreign hands. To this end, a series of controls were set up. Intercolonial

<sup>7</sup> The Manila import duty on Chinese stuff was three per cent. This was increased to six in 1606. There was an export duty of two per cent on goods sent from Manila to New Spain. At Acapulco an additional ten per cent was collected. Thus the contraband trade meant the loss of a tidy sum to the Crown.

<sup>8</sup> One report current in 1686 was that the Viceroy Galve himself had sent out two ships to Manila with money and merchants, and that these men continued on to China where they established factories, leaving materials to serve as models for Chinese silk weavers.

<sup>9</sup> In a letter from Ayala to Philip II, he protested against this direct trade, saying that if it were permitted, the Philippines would become depopulated and ruined, since the principal support of the settlement was the merchandise from China and the profit which resulted from sending the goods to be sold in New Spain.

trade between Mexico and Peru was forbidden; that between Manila and the American dependencies was limited to a fixed annual amount, and during short intervals was altogether suppressed. Direct trade between Spain and the New World could be carried on only through certain specified channels. A *Casa de Contratación* (House of Trade) was established in Seville and for a brief time in Cadiz. Until 1790, in which year the *Casa* was abolished, the merchants of Seville regulated all trade that touched the colonies from Europe and by their power thus limited Pacific commerce.

All ships going to the New World were required to be registered in Seville with the House of Trade. Somewhat later, the fleet and galleon systems were developed. Once a year, two fleets left Seville for the American colonies. One was destined for Vera Cruz with cargoes for Central America, the other for Puerto Bello on the Isthmus of Panama with materials for South America. On the Pacific side, there were two galleons a year, one eastbound with the highly-prized wares of the Orient, the other west-bound with cargoes of silver to be invested in the next galleon cargo. It was part of the general system of control to centralize trade in a few towns. On the Atlantic side, there were Vera Cruz and Puerto Bello; on the Pacific, Manila and Acapulco. Thus Manila became the repository for merchandise from all lands of the Far East and Acapulco, the great New World market.

The completeness of the trade control that was made possible by this system of licensing ships and of designating trade centers requires little discussion. The New World, for a time at least, became the special trading preserve of the powerful group of merchants in Seville, for only by maintaining a monopoly market could any buyers be found for the high-priced Spanish manufactures.<sup>10</sup> Some concessions, however, had to be made to the Spaniards of Manila and thus the galleon trade was sanctioned. In the years that followed this permission,

<sup>10</sup> The administrative system of the colonies strengthened this control. Until the latter half of the eighteenth century, Manila was considered part of the Audiencia of New Spain. A subsidy of four million pesos from Mexico and one million from Peru were needed to meet the administration of the Antilles, Florida, Venezuela, Chile and the Philippines. As the eighteenth century drew to a close, however, there was a growing feeling in the Philippines that it should depend on itself rather than on a Mexican subsidy.

protests were laid before the King unceasingly—demands for lesser galleon shipments from the Sevillians, petitions for greater cargoes from the Philippines. In between these two groups were the Spaniards in the colonies who were denied a share in the profits of the trade carried across either ocean. But the colonists were not thus easily coerced; they were bent on having not only the cheaper wares from the Orient but also a goodly portion of the profits of the great Pacific trade. Anxiety to control this trade led to a struggle for commercial supremacy between Spain and her colonies which lasted throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries. It led to a contraband commerce that became greater than that carried on through legitimate channels. It led to collusion between colonials, colonial officials and foreign smuggling enterprises.

The trade in Manila was, of course, organized for the benefit of the Spaniards resident there. While they fought the limitations imposed by Seville, they were equally determined to permit no intrusion upon their privileges from the American side.<sup>11</sup> But in spite of all the laws that limited this trade with New Spain to Spanish-born citizens of the Islands, the Chinese merchants in Manila had a considerable hold on the galleon trade. One account states that there were 20,000 Sangleys or Chinese<sup>12</sup> resident in Manila during the seventeenth century and adds that the Spaniards themselves lent their names to the Sangleys of Manila and to the Portuguese of Macao. The trade with the American side was at times enjoyed by the Chinese to the virtual exclusion of the

<sup>11</sup> Every Spaniard in Manila was entitled to a share in the galleon cargo according to his position in the community. The right to ship was known as possessing a *boleto* or ticket. The distribution of the *boletas* was determined by a committee which met in the town hall. This committee was composed of the governor, four of his officials and eight citizens. Each *boleto* gave the holder space in which to ship a specified amount of cargo on the galleons. A great speculation in tickets was carried on. Small holders sold theirs at very high rates to merchants and speculators, often receiving from one to three hundred pesos for a single *boleto*. The Church Corporation, known as the Pious Fund, lent money to investors at interest rates ranging from 25 to 50 per cent.

<sup>12</sup> According to the *Encyclopedia Sinica*, there were 20,000 Chinese in Manila in 1602 and only 800 Spaniards. By 1639, the number of Chinese had increased to 33,000 in spite of the massacres that had taken place in the intervening years, the imposition of a poll tax and restrictions on the numbers allowed to take up residence in the Islands.



Spaniards in Manila. The Bishop of the Philippines in 1590, describing the Chinese in the Parian (the name given to the Chinese market district in Manila which eventually became the silk mart of the Pacific), wrote that the "Sangleys, who were not born as fools, begin to understand the Spaniards' disposition and to take advantage of their lack of prudence, thus becoming richer." As Chinese activity increased throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, resort was had to prohibitions, exclusions and even to massacre.

In connection with the many complaints emanating from Manila, it is perhaps well to recall the fact that the Spaniards there were interested in little other than the galleon trade. Travellers wrote over and over again of the lack of development of the islands. Agriculture lagged even behind its slow development in America. Although there were some quantities of iron and gold to be found, they were not mined "either from the indolence of the natives or the insignificance of these to the Spanish, affording too little profit in their commerce with Acapulco to deserve attention." All activities that would decrease the privileges of the Spaniards were suppressed. All business enterprise was confined to the galleon trade. Thus, if a galleon or access to galleon trade were lost, everything was lost for that year.

Disputes and petitions shuttled back and forth across the Pacific. In 1697 a petition was granted permitting an increase in the galleon trade. The east-bound and west-bound cargoes were to be 500,000 and one million pesos respectively. But in 1718 the merchants of Seville had their moment, for a decree was issued shutting off all imports of Chinese silk into New Spain. Trans-Pacific trade was to be permitted in linen goods, porcelain, wax, cinnamon and other commodities not produced in Spain. This ban was lifted in 1724; the old *permiso* was re-established and continued until well on toward the end of the century.

The galleon trade lasted until 1815, but it had seen its best days long before that time. The blow to this commerce did not come alone from the contraband trade that was carried on by the colonials. Foreign nations were determined to take by force what Spain refused to grant willingly. Foreign attacks on trade were so telling that during the nine years immediately preceding 1706 no galleons reached the colonies.

Drake started the game of galleon hunting, not without the blessings of the Queen. Francis I ordered the French "to proceed against the

Spaniards and Portuguese . . . until the said Spaniards and Portuguese shall suffer trade to be free within the bounds of the said lands and seas of the Indies and of America." In the late seventeenth century, Louis XIV encouraged French sailors to venture into the Pacific. It was reported that 165 French ships made Pacific ports in the period between 1695 and 1751.

The Dutch were no less difficult. They sacked Lima and Guayaquil; they made their forays from a pirate cove about eight miles from La Paz in Lower California, known as the Bay of Pichilingue. The deep-voiced guttural speech which earned for the Dutch the name of Pichilingues left a not easily forgotten memory along the entire Pacific Coast. As a matter of fact, the cocoa trade of Caracas was for a time in the hands of Dutch smugglers.

It is quite likely that the Chinese and Japanese also had their part in the pirate raids. There were many Chinese and Japanese among the crews of the galleons, and it is not unreasonable to assume that some of them, when taken from the captured galleons, were set to work on the pirate ships.

For a time, the Spaniards managed to keep their ocean routes secret, thus making it necessary for the freebooters to lay in wait close to the home shores. But in 1743 Anson captured the *Cavadonga*, on which he found the Spanish manual of the Pacific. From this time on, the trade routes which the Spaniards had followed were known to all. There was thus no safety anywhere in the great expanse of ocean.

The European wars as well as these pirate attacks were robbing Spain of her mastery of the seas. Attempts were made to salvage trade by liberalizing the old decrees, but Spain was too greatly involved in the European conflicts and not even the chartering of the Royal Philippine Company<sup>13</sup> could keep the colonies within the orbit of Spanish control.

In the Spain of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was little trace of the power that had made possible the great ventures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Within the country there was civil war, a weak government and finally French intervention. The Bourbon Family Compact (1761) involved Spain in the wars between England and France. Spain was exhausted not alone by these wars

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter III.

but by those that had preceded. When in 1763 Manila was seized and held by the British, it was obvious that Spain's theories of colonial control and spheres of special interest had been proven ineffective. Spain lost her colonies between 1810 and 1825. The European wars, the French Revolution, Napoleon, and revolution within the colonies drove thought of the Pacific trade into the background. It fell to the Yankee clippers to keep the trade lanes open during a great part of the nineteenth century.

## CHAPTER II

### JAPAN'S ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT TRADE WITH NEW SPAIN

Iyeyasu, the great Tokugawa shogun of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, held theories on trade that had little in common with those held in the powerful empires of his world. His notion that trade between countries could only result in good to all groups entering into such an exchange was clearly out of that well-defined circle of thought which actuated the monopolistic ventures of Spanish merchants and officials. And even when it seemed to Iyeyasu that some agreement might be reached, the accustomed stress on gold and silver thrust the trade issue to one side.

An annual carac sailed between Macao and Japan. This represented the great commercial enterprise of the merchants in Macao, just as the Manila galleon did of the Spanish traders in the Philippines and in New Spain. Chinese junks carried large quantities of this merchandise from Macao to Manila. There was also a direct trade, largely confined to carrying rice from Kyushu to the Philippine Islands. But there was little profit in this commerce. It needed extension—at least to the point where the gains to be had might reach provinces dominated by other princes.

Iyeyasu's trade interests are indicated in the correspondence that he exchanged with the governor of Manila.<sup>1</sup> The missionaries who were

<sup>1</sup> In the *Archives of the Indies* and the *Gaiban Tansho* are to be found the letters on the relations between Japan and New Spain. In 1599 Iyeyasu wrote that Spanish ships would be welcome in the ports of the Kwanto (his provinces) and that he wished to trade with New Spain. He asked that ship's carpenters, sailors and pilots be sent inasmuch as he wished to build ships according to Spanish models. This

allowed to preach in Japan proved of some assistance in carrying on this correspondence. What Iyeyasu wanted was not religion but foreign trade and foreign instruction along certain lines. While it was clear that the religious rivalries and intrigues did little to recommend the new preachings to Iyeyasu, certain commercial advantages suggested themselves by this rivalry between the Jesuits and the Franciscans. The favors he granted them were largely in proportion to their instrumentality in bringing merchant ships to Japanese ports. Up to 1609 the Jesuits were in the ascendant, for Iyeyasu was dependent upon the Portuguese for foreign merchandise. Later, when there seemed some hope of trade with New Spain, the Franciscans were granted special privileges. However, Iyeyasu not only made overtures to the Spaniards, but after chance had brought Will Adams to his shores, he encouraged the Hollanders and later the English in order to break the monopoly on Japanese trade held by the Portuguese.

As a result of an exchange of letters, the Audiencia decided to send ships to the Kwanto in 1602; and after 1608 ships went back and forth annually between Uraga and Manila. But as was to be expected, little was accomplished in fostering a direct trade with New Spain since that was counter to all Spanish policy. However a storm and shipwreck promised success to Iyeyasu's long-cherished scheme. In 1609 the annual galleon, with the acting viceroy of the Philippines, Don Rodrigo Vivero y Velasco, on board, was forced to seek refuge in Japan.<sup>2</sup> This was an opportunity not to be lost. The question of trade was opened and, after considerable time spent in requests and counter-

overture was welcomed in view of the fact that Hideyoshi in 1592 had sent an embassy to demand subjection of the Islands to Japan. In a later correspondence (1601), Iyeyasu indicated that the number of junks sailing to Manila would be limited and that the Japanese pirates, against whom the suspicion of the Spaniards was not ill-founded and who were responsible for capturing the cargo of the Manila galleon *San Felipe* in 1596, had been punished.

<sup>2</sup> Don Rodrigo had embarked for Acapulco on the *San Francisco*. Two smaller ships, the *Santa Anna* and the *San Antonio*, accompanied the *San Francisco*. A typhoon separated the ships. The *San Francisco* was wrecked about 40 miles from Yedo. The *Santa Anna* was driven ashore, the *San Antonio* alone managing to continue her course. The Prince of Satsuma, who was anxious for foreign trade, visited the viceroy and looked after his men. Later Don Rodrigo was taken to Iyeyasu.

requests, an agreement was concluded between Iyeyasu and Don Rodrigo.<sup>3</sup>

A short time later, on August 1, 1610, Don Rodrigo and his men were returned to New Spain. The ship, the *Santa Buena Ventura*, was manned by a Japanese crew of eighty. On it were twenty-three Japanese tradesmen, the first Japanese merchants to enter Mexico.<sup>4</sup> These men spent five months in New Spain and returned with a cargo of cloths, wines and velvets. The money advanced by Iyeyasu to Don Rodrigo and the value of the Japanese ship were also invested in Mexican goods.

The following year, the first and only embassy to be sent from Mexico to Japan was dispatched. In contrast to Iyeyasu's interest in fostering trade, the reasons prompting this voyage were reports of a new El Dorado, of islands rich in gold and silver which, according to some Portuguese sailors, had been seen somewhere off the coast of Japan. Sotomayor and Vizcaino, like others of their kind, indicated but slight interest in the Japanese wish to establish trade and to bring in skilled Spanish workmen.<sup>5</sup>

Accounts of the mission in the *Documentos Inéditos* of the Archives of the Indies indicate that even more arrogant demands were made of Iyeyasu.<sup>6</sup> However, the Japanese, still eager to add this new trade to

<sup>3</sup> Vivero in his interview with Iyeyasu preferred three demands: that the Christian fathers be granted the right to preach and as much security as was guaranteed the Buddhist monks; that a welcome and safe-conduct be extended vessels from Manila; and that the Dutch, who were enemies of Spain, be refused the protection of the Emperor of Japan. Iyeyasu agreed to all save that concerning the Dutch. He suggested that ships going to New Spain should winter in Japan.

<sup>4</sup> The same ship carried an envoy to the court of Madrid, with letters and gifts to Philip III. It was not till 1613 that three Franciscans were sent to acknowledge these gifts. They did not reach Japan till 1615, at which time Iyeyasu, suspicious of the motives of Spanish missionaries and traders, refused to receive them.

<sup>5</sup> The Japanese who sailed with Vivero to familiarize themselves with the route to New Spain and with the nature of the trade that could be established reported on their return that the Spaniards had thanked them for coming, had received them with great celebration, but had added that "the two countries are far apart and the navigation difficult. Pray do not trouble to return".

<sup>6</sup> The Spaniards wished to be permitted to survey the coasts of Japan, to sell their wares wherever they pleased. They asked that Spanish ships should not be subjected to search; that the Dutch be forbidden to trade in Japan and that the Spaniards be allowed to send warships to burn Dutch vessels.

the growing Japanese commerce, agreed to permit the Spaniards to survey the Japanese coasts and to allow Spanish ships to sell their cargoes wherever they pleased without being subjected to search. "

The Spaniards, intent on finding this new El Dorado, were allowing a trade opportunity to slip by. Iyeyasu, on the other hand, recognized the implications of the situation. His letter to Suden in 1612 reiterated his desire for a trade agreement. "If ships were to come every year," he wrote, "and exchange the valuable commodities of our two territories, even the best government cannot equal the benefit that will ensue to the land and its people." He continued to make clear his lack of interest in the religion that was being preached by the Franciscans.<sup>7</sup>

Nothing came of this mission from New Spain. The Spaniards did not find their gold and silver mines; neither did they succeed in shutting the Dutch out of Japanese trade. The Council of the Indies in 1612 did report that it was advisable to open trade with Japan via Mexico, and a year later it decided to send one ship from New Spain to Japan each year. But sanction did not arrive from Spain and the scheme lapsed. The ship that carried Sotomayor and Vizcaino back to New Spain had in its holds a cargo of goods from Sendai and Yedo. But, beyond that, no trade developed.

One further attempt deserves to be mentioned, that made by Date Masamune, Prince of Oshiu. It reflects more than anything else the powerful influence of the Franciscan monks who were largely responsible for this last venture to gain trade concessions. A mission was sent by Date Masamune to Spain and to Rome by way of Mexico in 1613. The leaders of this group appeared before the powerful merchants of Seville. They sought the Pope's support in urging trade concessions from the Spanish merchants. But the Sevillians were in no danger of losing their hold on trade, and as yet nothing had happened in world events to shake the Spanish pursuit of the usual trade and colonial

<sup>7</sup> The letter makes quite clear Iyeyasu's estimate of foreign dealings in Japan. ". . . But this is a divine country. Since the beginning, it has revered the gods and respected the Buddhas. . . . Is not this the way of benevolence, duty, etiquette, knowledge and sincerity. But the religion which your honored country uses has tendencies of quite a different kind. There seems to be no affinity with anything in this land. . . . On reflection, it seems better to cease from it and employ it no more. But the mutually profitable trade that will follow the arrival of merchant vessels is in the highest degree desirable. . . ."

policies. Date Masamune's mission returned to Japan in 1620, with the knowledge that no sanction for a direct commerce with New Spain was to be found in Spain, in Rome or in the New World. This occurrence marked the end of a twenty-year attempt to create a Japanese trans-Pacific trade.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The manner in which the Spaniards conveyed their final refusal is told in a letter dated Dec. 6, 1615, which appears in the *Diary of Richard Cocks*, Vol. 2, p. 274. Richard Cocks was then head of the so-called "English House" in Japan. His letter reads in part: ". . . A ship arrived at Quanto . . . out of New Spain . . . and brought . . . broad cloth, Kersies, perpetuanos [woolen cloth], and raz de Milan [linen cloth] which they offer at a low rate; but I think it is the last that will ever be brought from thence, for it is said, the Spaniards made proclamation with eight drums at Aguapulco and other partes that, upon payne of death, there should never any more Japons come nor trade into New Spayne and that both they and all other strangers of what nation soever should forthwith avoid out of all partes of New Spaine. But in requitall hereof, the Emperour of Japan hath made proclamation, in payne of death, that never hereafter, any Japon shall trade or goe into New Spaine, and commanded the fryres or padres which came in this ship should avoid out of his dominions. . . ."



### CHAPTER III

#### THE NINETEENTH CENTURY IN LATIN AMERICA'S TRANS-PACIFIC TRADE

During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, world events forced retreat upon Spain. One after another the trade barriers, both inter-colonial and foreign, were raised but not without further attempts to retain those limitations that had represented avenues of trade most profitable for Spain. These changes indicated little in the matter of a shift in ideology on the part of Spanish policy makers. Years of internal unrest and foreign wars had weakened Spain. But the capture of Manila by the British in 1763 was climactic in its effect upon the accustomed thinking regarding colonies.

Beginning in 1774, a series of changes were introduced. Intercolonial trade between the dependencies on the American side was permitted. Four years later the Indies, with the careful exception of the important trading areas—Venezuela, New Spain and the Philippines—were opened to foreign trade. Another decade had to elapse before New Spain was declared open and still an additional year before Manila was included. However, the foreign ships touching the Philippine Islands were to deal only in Asiatic goods. It was obvious that trans-Pacific trade was to be set aside for Spanish merchants as long as possible.<sup>1</sup>

The decline of the Atlantic trade turned the attention of Seville to the Pacific. This last effort was no attempt to limit the Pacific trade but a plan to extend the old monopoly of Seville to the Pacific and to

<sup>1</sup> In 1821, when Mexican independence was being fought, Manila came directly under the control of Madrid. Its trade was diverted to Barcelona and Seville. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 quite definitely drew the Philippines into the European orbit and Manila ceased to have further significance as the trade center for trans-Pacific commerce.

absorb the commerce carried on between Manila and New Spain. A chartered agency, the Royal Philippine Company (*Real Compania de Filipinas*), was formed. This company was designed to monopolize all Philippine trade whether it was carried by way of the Cape of Good Hope or South America. Agents were established in Mexico City, Vera Cruz, Lima and Buenos Aires. Permission was granted company agents to import 800 tons of Asiatic goods into New Spain by way of Vera Cruz. In 1803 these trading privileges were extended to include Peru. Some effort was made to humor those who had up to this time enjoyed the Philippine traffic. The old agents in Mexico were to be allowed to purchase 3,000 shares of the company stock. Four per cent of the profits were to be set aside as a fund for the development of the Philippine Islands. But in spite of these concessions, all the old trade abuses rose again.

During these years, gold and silver from Peru and Mexico continued to be the American commodities most in demand in Asia. Small quantities of copper, cochineal and cacao were shipped from Mexico; some copper and cacao from Peru, cacao from Guayaquil. Silk and tea made up the bulk of the cargoes from Asia. Before the end of the eighteenth century Manila cigars had been added to the items exported from the Philippines.

The Royal Philippine Company dragged on an uncertain existence until 1834. But it failed for the very same reasons that had doomed the galleon trade. It meant high prices, a limited output and profits confined to a small and privileged group. Moreover, the hold upon colonial markets of non-Spanish European traders cannot be discounted. As early as 1700 it was said that the foreign trade with the American colonies exceeded that carried on through legitimate channels. The accounts of visitors and residents in the early nineteenth century appear to indicate that this trade far outstripped that intended by the meager privileges granted from Spain.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Stevenson, an Englishman who spent twenty years in South America, wrote in 1820 describing his impression on entering a house in Lima. "Almost every object reminded me of England. The windows were glazed with English glass; the brass furnishings and the ornaments on the commodes were English; the chintz or dimity hangings, the linen and cotton dresses of the females and the cloth coats, cloaks, etc. of the men were all English. . . . Coarse nankeens, cottons and a

The nineteenth century opened with revolution everywhere in the Spanish colonies. The entire economic life, particularly foreign trade, was disrupted. These were years astir with the aspirations and hopes that marked the leadership of such men as Bolívar, Miranda, Sucre, Hidalgo, O'Higgins, Iturbide and Primero. With revolution within the colonies, the galleon trade at an end, and the Royal Philippine Company dragging out a precarious existence, the Pacific was left to foreign ships. The clippers of England and America—the copper ore barques, the guano and coolie ships, the nitrate boats—took over the carrying trade of the Pacific. The Yankee ships, with most of the world closed to them after the American Revolution, acquired considerable importance in maintaining this traffic. The field was virtually theirs, for British ships made Chile and Peru from Europe. The Dutch in Java had made one attempt to trade with the colonies as early as 1774. In spite of the fact that permission from Spain was refused them, two ships crossed the Pacific in 1776 and traded with the Guadalajara coast. This appears to have been the only such attempt made. French interest in the Pacific had practically ended with the eighteenth century.

Traders from the east coast of the United States established a triangular system of exchange. From their home ports many sailed to the northwestern coasts of the Pacific and took on a cargo of furs, which were then carried across the Pacific. Others searched the South American ports for cargoes that could be carried to Hongkong, Canton or Whampoa and there exchanged for tea and silk. Tea was brought to Mexico and Peru. Buenos Aires became a port of call for all Yankee ships as they rounded the Horn from China. In 1819, a typical year, approximately \$263,000 worth of merchandise was carried from Canton to South America. This, of course, was little when compared with the great traffic of the galleon days.

---

few other articles were supplied by the Philippine Company. Spain sent some iron, broadcloth, Barcelona prints, linen, writing paper, silks and ordinary earthenware. From the Italians, they had silks and velvets; from the French, linens, lace, silks and broadcloth; from Germany, linens, common cutlery and glass . . . Silks, damask (crimson), ribbons and good velvets are in great demand". Stevenson, W., *Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years' Residence in Chile, Peru and Colombia*.

The Californian and Australian gold booms for a time eclipsed the Pacific traffic. But when the bonanza days seemed at an end, the clippers once again gravitated to the South America - China runs. Great profits were to be had from the traffic in Chinese coolies who were greatly in demand on the sugar plantations of Cuba and on the guano fields of the Chincha Islands.<sup>3</sup>

It should be recalled at this point that the dwindling Pacific trade was due not alone to the events that were taking place in the colonies or even to European politics. The Industrial Revolution had transformed some of the European countries, and England in particular, from agricultural to manufacturing nations. The China and India trade offered attractive markets for western manufactured goods. But perhaps more than that, China was fast becoming an outlet for Indian opium which Europeans forced upon it with increasing pressure. Opium replaced silver as the great commodity of the China trade. The Opium Wars reduced China to a political and economic position that was not far removed from that endured by the Latin American lands during their colonial experiences. A Pacific trade with Spanish America was fostered only as it benefitted European concession holders. The sugar plantations, and the guano lands were largely in the hands of Europeans. The coolie traffic was initiated by these same groups in their search for workers. But it can hardly be said that the profits in this trade fell only into European hands.

A small Pacific trade continued throughout the first difficult years of independence and until the World War (1914-18). Silk goods, spices, tea, Manila cigars, hemp continued to be exported from the Netherlands Indies, from China and from the Philippines. Small quantities of guano, copper, nitrates, silver, salted beef as well as other items were agricultural to manufacturing nations. The China and India trade across the Atlantic that the bulk of the great Latin American export crops was directed. It was not until the World War, with its sudden stoppage of credits and shipping facilities, the losses resulting from submarine attacks and the almost complete disappearance of the stream of immigrants that made up the much-needed labor force, that Latin American attention turned once again to the Pacific.

<sup>3</sup> The coolie traffic is discussed under Colonization and Immigration, Chapter V.

Before turning to present-day Latin American problems, it is perhaps well to mention an important exchange which receives very little notice in most chronicles of those dramatic years which marked the trade in silk and in laborers. A much less conspicuous but considerably more significant interchange had taken place between Latin America and the Far East. Small quantities of produce, inconspicuous packets of seed, the cultivation of which was taught largely by the monks who went to preach in the Philippines, were carried across the Pacific. The importance which sweet potatoes, maize, the mandioca, peanuts, pineapples, tobacco have achieved as food and trade articles needs no discussion here. The sweet potato is still known in the Philippines by its Aztec name, *camote*. The mandioca (cassava) has become the principal root crop in parts of the Philippines and in the Netherlands Indies. Tobacco, cacao, sisal hemp and peanuts are grown commercially in the Far East. Quinine and cocaine, now important in the trade of the East Indies, were native to Peru. But perhaps the most spectacular exchanges were those of rubber and bananas. The great rubber plantations of the world are now not in Brazil but in southeastern Asia. The greatest commercial plantations of bananas are not to be found in the lands of their origin in Asia but in Central America and in the West Indies.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN LATIN AMERICA'S TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS

Throughout the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century, the countries of Europe—Spain, Holland, England, France—struggled for control of the Pacific. New powers—Russia, China, Japan, the United States—rose in the second half of the nineteenth century. While *European interests continued to dominate the trade of these as well as the Latin American nations*, it became increasingly clear as the century drew to a close that the future of the Pacific area would be given direction by the acts and pressures exerted by these new powers.

It was not until the World War (1914-18) that the countries of the Pacific figured with any importance in Central and South American trade. It was during these years that trade with the United States took on significance and that commerce with the other countries of the Pacific, Japan in particular, increased considerably. In spite of the fact that European nations recovered most of their trade in the years following the conclusion of the war, the United States and Japan remained increasingly important factors. Trade figures together with a recognition of the complementary nature of the exchange with Japan seem to indicate that Japanese imports have become permanent factors in Latin American markets. In 1907 commerce between Japan and the countries of Central and South America reached a scant two million yen. By 1938, this sum totalled close to 346 million yen, almost fifty times the high point of the twenties. The unusual increase of 1937 and 1938 was perhaps not unconnected with the Brussels Conference. It is possible that the threat of sanctions against Japan by the countries in session—the United States, Great Britain, France, China and their dependencies—led to an attempt on the part of Japan to shift purchases

away from those countries that might make a boycott effective. Trade totals fell sharply towards the end of 1938 and throughout 1939 but by that time import and export controls were operative in Japan as well as in Latin America and the threat of a boycott seemed to have been dissipated.

One obstacle in Latin America to an important trans-Pacific trade has been the concentration within the countries of Central and South America upon a few great export items. These commodities have not fitted into the consumption habits of the people across the Pacific. In some instances, the same crops (e.g. wool, wheat, meat, cotton, coffee) have been important in both groups of countries. More important is the fact that some of the internal economic problems which confront the Latin American nations are very nearly duplicated in the countries of the western Pacific. Except for Japan, manufactures are the imports most in demand in the western Pacific even as they are in the countries of Latin America.

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH JAPAN  
(AS PER CENT OF TOTAL TRADE OF EACH COUNTRY)  
*Imports from Japan*

	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
Argentina (c)	4.1	3.6	3.3	3.7	0.8	2.1
Brazil (c)	0.9	1.2	1.6	1.3	1.5	2.4
Bolivia (d)	3.1	5.3	6.6	7.0	(a)	..
Chile (c)	3.7	2.9	2.6	2.5	3.8	5.8(b)
Colombia (e)	5.5	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	..
Ecuador (b)	17.6	8.7	3.2	7.4	5.2	..
Paraguay (g)	14.5	13.8	13.7	16.2	(a)	..
Peru (c)	5.2	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.1	..
Venezuela (h)	1.8	3.8	3.4	2.0	(a)	..
Mexico (c)	1.1	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.0	2.2(b)
Costa Rica (i)	6.9	7.8	8.2	6.2	5.1	..
Cuba (j)	2.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.0	..
Guatemala (k)	4.7	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.8
Honduras (l)	10.6	7.6	14.5	9.2	6.0	..
Nicaragua (m)	6.4	2.6	4.3	1.6	0.9	..
Panama (n)	11.7	15.7	14.2	9.3	9.8	..
El Salvador (o)	0.1	0.1	0.14	0.03	0.05	..

*Exports to Japan*

	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
Argentina (c)	1.0	1.6	1.0	1.2	0.7	1.5
Brazil (c)	0.5	4.3	4.7	4.6	5.4	5.7
Bolivia (d)	(a)	(a)	(a)	0.3	(a)	
Chile (c)	0.8	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.8	3.7(b)
Colombia (e)	0.02	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.02	
Ecuador (b)	4.8	1.8	3.8	2.4	3.9	
Paraguay (g)						
Peru (c)	2.9	4.2	1.0	0.6	2.4	
Venezuela (h)	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.1	(a)	
Mexico (c)	1.6	2.4	1.2	0.4	1.2	1.6(b)
Costa Rica (i)		0.1	0.6	1.2	0.6	
Cuba (j)	0.02	0.1	0.04	0.1	0.00	
Guatemala (k)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.00	
Honduras (l)		0.0	0.04	0.3	0.1	
Nicaragua (m)	0.1	2.9	4.8	2.0	0.5	
Panama (n)		0.01	0.02			
El Salvador (o)	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	

(a) Information not available.

(b) January—September.

(c) For sources see trade tables, appendix I.

(d) *Anuario de Comercio Exterior*, 1935, 1936, 1937; *Economic Review of Foreign Countries 1939 and 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.

(e) *Anuario de Comercio Exterior*, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939.

(f) *Resumen Estadística del Comercio* 1935, 1936; *Commerce Yearbook*, 1938; *Special Circulars*, No. 394, 400, Dept. of Commerce.

(g) *Anuario de Comercio Exterior*, 1936, 1937; *Commerce Yearbook*, 1938.

(h) *Anuario de Comercio Exterior*, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939.

(i) *Anuario Estadístico*, 1935, 1936; *Revista del Banco Nacional*, Mar. 1938; *Economic Review of Foreign Countries 1939 and Early 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.

(j) *Anuario de Comercio Exterior*, 1936; *Commerce Yearbook*, 1938; *Special Circulars*, No. 394, 400, Dept. of Commerce.

(k) *Boletín de Comercio e Industria*, Dec. 1936; *Commerce Yearbook*, 1937, 1938; *Economic Conditions in Guatemala in 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, International Reference Service, Feb. 1941.

(l) *Boletín de la Cámara de Comercio*, Dec. 1936; *Commerce Yearbook*, 1937, 1938; *Economic Review of Foreign Countries 1939 and Early 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.



Another obstacle of principal importance is the fact that the countries of the western Pacific have concentrated upon a few great export commodities, the production of which has been largely geared to the needs of specific countries. China is the only one of this group in which about three-fourths of the exports are made up of a long list of commodities, each of which represents not over one per cent of the total trade. Over seventy per cent of Australia's exports consists of wool, meat, hides and flour. Rice is the important crop in Burma, Indo-China and Siam. This one article comprises from seventy to seventy-five per cent of the total exports. Over four-fifths of Philippine trade consists of coconut oil, copra, abaca (hemp) and sugar. The Philippines and the Netherlands Indies ship about one-third of the sugar entering into world trade. Rubber is a leading export in several countries—the Netherlands Indies, British Malaya, Indo-China, Borneo and Ceylon producing by far the greater part consumed throughout the world. In the remaining countries, in the Netherlands Indies and Malaya, from sixty-five to seventy-five per cent of the foreign trade is made up of a small number of articles. In the Netherlands Indies these items are coffee, petroleum, tobacco, rubber, sugar and tea; in Malaya they consist of rubber and tin. Although Japan is the only nation in this group that exports manufactures, seventy-five per cent of these same manufactures are made up of the products of the silk, pottery and cotton industries.

Quite naturally, in view of the limited internal development, there is in these countries a concentration upon a few major imports. Even in the case of countries which import a wide variety of commodities, this same limitation is to be seen. About half of Japan's imports are made up of cotton, wool, wood, iron (including machinery), and foodstuffs (wheat, beans, peas). A like proportion of China's imports consists of foods (rice, sugar, wheat flour), textiles or their raw materials, iron, steel and machinery.

- 
- (m) *Memoria del Recaudador General de Aduanas y Alta Comision*, 1936, 1937; *Economic Review of Foreign Countries 1939 and Early 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.
  - (n) *Anuario de Estadística*, 1935, 1936, 1937; *Economic Review of Foreign Countries 1939 and Early 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.
  - (o) *Anuario de Estadística General*, 1935, 1936, 1937; *Economic Review of Foreign Countries 1939 and Early 1940*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.

Thus far the trade of Latin America with the countries of the western Pacific has been small. For the year 1937-38, Australia's trade with all Latin America did not exceed 0.3 per cent of her total trade with foreign countries, excluding the British Empire, and including the Empire, the proportion was only 0.1 per cent. It is of interest to note that in this same year Australia's imports from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were well in excess of her exports to them. In the case of Peru, exports from Australia were very much greater than the imports. Within the last few years, Thailand (Siam) has sent rice in small quantities to Peru, Colombia and Cuba; Java has sent tea to the Argentine, Chile, Brazil and Peru.

China's trade with the Latin American countries has been greater in volume than that of any other Far Eastern country except Japan. In spite of this, China's trade with all Latin America comprised less than half of one per cent of her total foreign trade in 1935. In that same year, the greatest proportion for a single country was represented by the trade with Cuba which accounted for but 0.09 per cent of China's exports. The percentages for the total trade of individual Latin American countries are hardly more impressive. Argentina's imports from China, which were greater than those of the other countries, represented in that same year about one per cent of Argentina's total foreign trade. Peru's exports to China have formed less than one-tenth of one per cent of that country's trade since 1930. Chile's dealings with China account for a still lower fraction of her trade. In the years between 1936 and 1938, China's purchases from Brazil were less than 0.4 per cent of all Brazilian exports. In her trade relations with these countries, China's balance has thus far been favorable in all cases except that of Brazil.

China's imports have consisted largely of wheat and tanning materials from Argentina; raw cotton and small quantities of coffee from Brazil; cereals, still wines in bulk and nitrates from Chile; zinc from Mexico; petroleum from Venezuela and Curaçao; raw cotton from Peru; sugar from Cuba; cow bones from Argentina and Colombia. Her exports consist largely of tea, wood-oil, embroideries, peanuts and peanut oil, potteries, earthenware and a lengthy list of miscellaneous items.

Since Japan has manufactures to sell, her trade with Latin America far surpasses that of all the other countries of the western Pacific.

There is not a single Latin American nation, however small, that does not carry on some commerce with Japan. In South America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela are Japan's best customers. In Central America, they are Mexico, Panama, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Curaçao. Most of Japan's purchases come from Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru and Mexico.

Cotton textiles hold a predominant place in the exports from Japan to Latin America. In 1935 they made up 51.1 per cent of all Japanese exports to South America and 34.7 per cent of the goods sent to Central America. In 1937 these percentages fell, but only slightly. Rayon yarns and textiles make up the second largest group while silk tissues,

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA  
(AS PER CENT OF TOTAL JAPANESE TRADE) (a)

<i>Imports</i>						
	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940(b)
Argentina	0.7	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.4	..
Brazil	0.2	1.7	1.7	1.7	2.5	..
Chile	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	..
Uruguay	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.1	..
Peru	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.2	..
Mexico	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.2	..	..
South America	1.7	4.1	4.3	3.4	3.9	3.0(c)
Central America	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.1	1.1(c)
<i>Exports</i>						
	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940(b)
Argentina	1.2	0.9	1.3	0.7	0.2	..
Brazil	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	..
Chile	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	..
Uruguay	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	..
Peru	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	..
Mexico	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.2	..
South America	1.4	2.6	3.5	2.2	1.8	4.3(c)
Central America	2.9	1.5	1.7	1.0	1.2	0.3(c)

(a) *Japan Yearbook*, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940/41.

(b) *Oriental Economist*, Feb. 1941.

(c) January-June 1940.

machinery, pottery, brushes and toys are sent in varying amounts. The Sino-Japanese war has, of course, cut off the shipment of products from Japan's heavy industries.

Japan's imports consist largely of raw cotton and coffee from Brazil; wool from Argentina and Chile; nitrates from Chile; wheat, hides and skins from Argentina; copper and cotton from Peru; raw cotton, lead and zinc from Mexico.

While the total trade in absolute figures has not been great, quantities of single items have in the last few years taken on some significance. But more indicative of the growth of this trade is the fact that in some countries (among them Argentina and Chile) there has been considerable agitation against the admission of manufactures from Japan. Protectionist groups have sought to establish the fact that Japanese products—textiles, rubber goods and electric light bulbs in particular—undersell domestic manufactures even after the costs of transportation and import duties have been met. The present trade takes on added significance when it is realized that purchases of Japanese wares on the part of Latin American consumers have been largely the result of their low prices and of the low earnings of the vast majority of Latin Americans. The popularity of these imports does not, therefore, represent the rise of a new market as a result of improved consumption standards. It seems rather to indicate that they temporarily fill a need which these countries may later be able to supply themselves. There are already signs of domestic production stimulated in order to shut off the imports of some of these materials.

However, in spite of the unimpressive percentages of goods coming from Japan and in spite of the arguments advanced by protectionists against the admission of cheap manufactured wares, the Latin American countries have thus far been valuable to Japan as alternative sources of raw materials and as markets for manufactured wares. There is the possibility that with the expansion of native industries and the consequent reduction of exportable surpluses of raw materials, the markets for Japanese goods will further narrow. There is, however, little reason to believe that the market for Japanese goods will vanish altogether. Changed living conditions in Latin America will usher in new tastes. As a matter of fact, the markets in the larger countries are already changing rapidly. It is reasonable to assume that new manufactures

will be needed to meet these changing demands and that Japanese manufacturers will accommodate themselves to new situations.

Trade figures (see Appendix) indicate that Japan, like many other countries including those of the western Pacific, has carried on a very one-sided exchange with Latin America. Materials have been shipped into the markets of Central and South America while there have been few purchases to balance accounts. The unilateral nature of this trade has led to the introduction of many restrictions and controls in an effort to secure a balanced trade with the countries of the western Pacific. This explains the many abrogations of trade treaties and most-favored-nation clauses that were a not infrequent phenomenon in Latin American trans-Pacific relations during 1934 and 1935.<sup>1</sup> This explains the increased tariffs levied on goods coming from the western Pacific. For example, an Ecuadorean decree of April 1939 lists among countries subject to a fifty per cent surcharge: China, Japan, Java, the Straits Settlements and New Zealand.<sup>2</sup> In April 1940 the surcharge on Japanese textiles was increased to seventy-five per cent. Cuba's multiple tariff grants minimum rates to countries whose imports from Cuba equal sixty-five per cent of their exports to Cuba; intermediate rates to those that purchase between forty and sixty-five per cent and maximum rates to those countries that buy less than forty per cent. In 1938 and 1939, Japan, China, Sumatra, Java, New Zealand and the Philippines were all subject to maximum rates. Australia alone of the western Pacific countries was allowed minimum rates.

Japan's efforts have been directed toward the development of a more balanced trade interchange. The various import controls have made the usual unilateral trade impossible since 1933. Since that year, Japan has sought reciprocal trade arrangements by which she has agreed to buy cotton, rubber and coffee from Brazil, wool and meats from Argentina, and nitrates from Chile.

<sup>1</sup> In 1934 Peru renounced the treaty made with Japan ten years earlier; Cuba, Colombia and Chile renounced theirs in 1935; Guatemala and El Salvador enacted new tariff laws; Argentina and Uruguay asked for new treaties.

<sup>2</sup> In 1933 Ecuador instituted a system of exchange control. However, at present that country employs a system of import licensing and surcharges. Ecuador's differential duty subjects a country whose trade is unfavorable to Ecuador by more than 30 per cent to a differential surcharge up to 75 per cent of the duty on imports from those same countries.

- a. The war in Europe may offer a great opportunity for Japan in Latin American markets. Imports from Europe have, for the most part stopped. Many of the articles from Germany and Italy have been described as being of the five-and-ten-cent store variety which Japanese factories could easily supply, if only the war in China were settled. Japanese trade missions have gone to one Latin American country after another in an effort to study the needs of those markets. In May 1940 a trade conference of Japanese foreign service representatives in South America was held in Rio de Janeiro. Japanese colonists and settlers have been a means of increasing exports from some of the Latin American countries. Experiments in crop diversification carried on in these colonies have largely been determined by the needs of factories in Japan, thus in a measure setting up a basis for a reciprocal exchange.

A more detailed review of trade with a few major countries follows.

*Argentina.* In general, the countries across the Pacific have not figured greatly in Argentina's trade. A little over one per cent of her export and ten per cent of her import trade is carried on with the countries of Asia. This latter figure includes the jute, textiles and hemp brought over from India. The jute bagging used for grain bags and in the slaughtering plants has been an important item of trade. Commerce with Japan is, of course, much larger than that with any of the other countries, accounting for 4.1 per cent of imports and 1.6 per cent of the exports in the years (1935 and 1936 respectively) of Argentina's greatest trade with Japan.

Argentina, on the other hand, has become Japan's best South American customer. While purchases have not been great in terms of absolute figures, they have represented an appreciable share of Japan's sales to all South American countries, approximating thirty-nine per cent in 1939 and thirty-three per cent in 1938. Argentina as an importer of Japanese products first appeared in 1912, at which time some \$699,000 worth of Japanese goods were brought into the country. The commodities sent in that year were silk and lacquered wares and in particular those articles which figured largely in the earlier trade of Japan—such as rice, tea, camphor, mattings, etc. The character of this trade has shifted almost completely both in relation to Argentina as well as to the other Latin American countries. In addition to textiles, rubber and electrical manufactures as well as a great variety of lesser articles like

ceramics, cement, etc. are now sent from Japan. The volume is not always important but the price, according to reports, is invariably attractive. Various terms have been coined by opposition groups—all somewhat similar to the *precios de remate* designation which is intended to imply that prices are such as are featured at auctions or bargain sales, thus leaving competitors with no chance or hope of trade.

There is not a single year between 1910 and 1938 that shows a favorable balance for Argentina in her trade with Japan, and between 1933 and 1935, imports were four times as great as exports. Because of the unfavorable balance, the Argentine government announced in 1934 that all further imports from Japan were to be paid for within the sphere of the exchange control law and that transfers of unsettled bills, based on shipments prior to 1934 were to be disallowed.<sup>3</sup> This meant that future settlement of trade contracts would have to be arranged on a basis of equivalent value in imports or payment in London and New York funds. Japanese traders able to handle business in this manner were limited to those in the very large concerns—the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Kanematsu and a few others. Small Japanese business men who had developed markets in Argentina when the low exchange rates gave them a definite advantage, were hard hit.

In spite of these measures, imports from Japan continued to increase even throughout 1938, in which year they comprised seventy-seven per cent of the entire trade between the two countries. Trade figures for 1939, the first year in which exports and imports were balanced, show the effects of the working of the trade controls. Further effort to maintain this balance is no doubt largely responsible for the barter deal arranged in March 1940 at which time trade was fixed at an annual total of thirty million yen, which was considerably above the low point reached in 1939. According to this agreement, Japan was to take some 6,000 tons of wool, 4,000 tons of frozen and canned meats and a like amount of casein. Japan, in turn, was to receive special concessions in the matter of priority permits for chemical products, iron and steel, electrical and other manufactured items usually purchased from the United States and Europe.

Textiles have thus far made up the bulk of Argentina's purchases from

<sup>3</sup> It was reported in *Trans Pacific*, Nov. 16, 1933, that the unsettled bills amounted to three million yen.

Japan, comprising in 1937 over seventy-three per cent of all goods from that country. The barter agreement makes an obvious attempt to extend exchange to other articles. Up to 1935, Argentine exports to Japan consisted of small quantities of wheat, corn, flax. These items made up over two-thirds of the value of all shipments, the remainder consisting of quebracho extract, some hides, skins and wool. In the next three years, this trade grew due largely to the purchases of corn and wool. The trade boom in these commodities and particularly in wool-buying was practically wiped out in 1938 upon the renewal of the Australian-Japanese agreement.<sup>4</sup> The potential importance of Manchuria and Mongolia as sources of wool for Japan will also affect trade not alone with Argentina but with the other wool-exporting countries of Latin America, namely Uruguay and Chile.

Before 1935 Great Britain dominated the import market for cotton textiles. After that year, however, Japanese textiles were brought into the country in increasing quantities until in 1937 Japanese goods accounted for over twenty-eight per cent of textile imports as compared with about thirty-eight per cent for British cotton materials. Thus between them, Great Britain and Japan have held the Argentine textile market for the last five years.

Argentina sells wheat flour in return for sisal, tea, rubber and some petroleum from the Netherlands Indies. Wheat flour as well as quebracho extract are sent to China and to the Philippines in return for small quantities of hemp, copra and a varied list of Chinese exports. But the trade is as yet extremely small.

<sup>4</sup> The Japanese-Australian trade agreement which expired on June 30, 1938 obligated Japan to import annually approximately 533,000 bales of wool. Japan has been unable to fulfill this agreement since the consumption of wool in Japan during her costly China war is only about half of normal. The new agreement which was to run through June 1939 provided for the continuation of the wool and textile quotas. Under this arrangement, Japan was to issue permits for the import of wool from Australia to the extent of two-thirds of its imports from all other countries. There was the further provision that Australian allotments of wool would be increased to three-fourths if Japan were to import more than 500,000 bales annually. In addition, Japan agreed to import wool to the amount of the difference between 600,000 bales and the amount actually imported by Japan during the eighteen months when the previous agreement was in force. In June 1939 it was agreed to extend the agreement for another year, but since the outbreak of the European war the situation has been changed again by the British government's action in buying up the entire Australian wool output.



*Uruguay and Paraguay.* Uruguay is a pastoral country, sixty per cent of its area being given over to stock-raising. Wool, meat, hides and skins make up the bulk of the exports; foods, coal and oil as well as manufactures (textiles in particular) comprise the greater part of the imports. Japan alone of the trans-Pacific countries carries on any appreciable trade with Uruguay, but it was not until 1934 that this exchange achieved any importance. In 1936 and 1937 shipments to Japan were far in excess of imports from that country. In 1938 a drop in Japanese wool purchases reduced exports from Uruguay just as it did from Argentina and Chile.

Although stock-raising is of some importance, Paraguay is in the main an agricultural country. Before it was replaced by cotton, yerba mate was the principal export. A wide variety of commodities, such as tobacco, quebracho, lumber, indigo and animal products, are shipped abroad. A large percentage of Paraguay's imports are from Argentina, but cheap cotton textiles, some machinery and chemicals are sent from Japan. In 1937 forty per cent of Paraguay's imports came from Argentina, fourteen per cent from Japan.

*Brazil.* While Argentina has turned increasingly to industrialization in an effort to readjust her economic situation to world change, the Brazilian government has moved in yet another direction and has initiated a program of giving support to both agriculture and mining in an effort to further crop diversification schemes and the development of her national resources. Within the last few years, this policy has had a substantial effect on foreign trade. Raw cotton in 1939 comprised 21.5 per cent of all Brazilian exports and has in a measure offset the losses due to the drop in coffee prices. Sixty per cent of this cotton was bought by Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. In the same year China too became an important cotton customer, buying close to fifteen per cent of the total amount. This, no doubt, went largely to Japanese mills in China. Rice is no longer on the list of Brazilian imports and is even being exported in small but increasing quantities. Coffee continues to be the principal export; cotton and cacao hold second and third places. Under a policy of increased internal development, imports such as coal, steel products, hardware, machinery, chemicals, drugs, railway machinery are of course of prime importance.

A small proportion of Brazil's foreign trade, about four per cent, is carried on with the countries of Asia; and of this amount, about eighty per cent is exchanged with Japan. Japanese goods were first introduced into Brazil shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. However, the growth of this trade as in the case of all Latin America has been slow because the articles sent from Japan—toys and other small luxuries—were beyond the purses of the great majority of Brazilian wage-earners, and because coffee made up so considerable a percentage of Brazil's foreign trade. However, trade has increased since 1934, exports to Japan in 1937 and the years following being more than twenty times the value of those sent in 1934.

Brazil is Japan's most important South American source of supply, selling between 1936 and 1938 from thirty-nine to fifty-one per cent of all Japan's South American purchases. Raw cotton forms about ninety per cent of Japan's imports from Brazil. In 1939 the twenty-four per cent of the Brazilian cotton crop which Japan purchased exceeded for the first time the share taken by Germany. Rubber, carnauba wax, castor seeds, lubricating oils, hides, leather, coffee for domestic use and for re-export are also sent to Japan. Japanese concession holders in Brazil, as has already been indicated, are to a considerable extent adjusting their activities to Japanese import needs.

Trade with Brazil during the last three years has formed less than two per cent of Japan's total imports and less than half of one per cent of her exports. Similarly, Japan's share in Brazil's import trade has been small, though of increasing importance. It consists of a long list of miscellaneous items, the most important of which are woolen yarns, woolen piece goods, silk yarns and caustic soda, only two items having as yet reached a value of half a million United States dollars. Some porcelain tableware, iron and steel wire, common lamps, toys, etc. are also imported. The development of the Brazilian textile industry has reduced the importance of cotton cloth, thread and yarn as import commodities.

Trade with the remaining countries of the western Pacific is small. China, as a new cotton customer, has already been mentioned. Small quantities of carnauba wax, Brazil nuts and preserved meats are sent to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

*Chile.* Up to the World War, Chile's foreign trade depended almost

completely on the nitrate market. The World War and the aid to shipping provided by the opening of the Panama Canal created a boom in Chile's nitrate trade. With the collapse of this market in the thirties, Chile's foreign commerce fell to an unprecedented low and turned national attention to the need for increased industrialization and trade diversification. In spite of this, nitrates and copper still comprise the bulk of Chile's foreign trade, mutton and wool ranking next as articles of export, although some agricultural products such as beans, dried fruits and wines are also being exported. Chile's import needs resemble those of most Latin American countries, iron and steel products, machinery and textiles being the principal items.

The United States, Great Britain and Germany, up to 1939, absorbed two-thirds of Chile's foreign trade. Of the minor trading nations, France, Italy and Japan have been the most important. In 1929 and the preceding years, imports from Japan represented less than one-tenth of one per cent of the country's total imports; ten years later, Japan was supplying four per cent of the total. Exports to Japan lagged far behind, not quite reaching two per cent of Chile's total exports in 1939.

Japan is the only country whose trade with Chile has increased since the low point in the crisis years following 1929. However, imports from Japan are almost exclusively made up of textiles and have been the object of a considerable attack from the industrial groups within the country and from competing trader nations. Japanese prices are low, frequently under those of domestic manufactures and considerably under the prices of similar imports from other countries.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Estadística Chilena, Sinopsis 1937* gives the following comparative prices:

Commodity	Source	Pesos per kilo
Cotton osnaburgs	United States	2.60
	Japan	1.60
Cotton print fabrics	United States	6.20
	Great Britain	6.00
	Japan	3.76
Dyed cotton fabrics	Great Britain	5.70
	United States	4.13
	Japan	2.82
Light bulbs	United States	12.68
	Germany	10.94
	Japan	2.57

There has been a renewed Japanese interest in Chilean animal and mineral products. Japan's purchases of copper bars in 1937 reached two million pesos, equalling in value the amount of the two preceding years. While Chilean figures for nitrates are not available, Japanese data indicate that in 1936 nitrate imports comprised fully forty-four per cent of all Japanese purchases made in Chile. In 1938 this amount decreased by almost half.

The quota on imports from Japan has kept exports and imports fairly close to a balance since 1933 and has caused Japanese businessmen to cast about for other Chilean articles of trade such as beans, salt and dried fruit.

Aside from trade with Java, which consists almost entirely of tea, the foreign trade of Chile with the remaining trans-Pacific countries is negligible. Some dried fruit, rice, tea and soya oil are purchased from China, Chile in turn sending wine and other agricultural products. From Australia and New Zealand have come sheep for breeding purposes since in Chile, as also in Argentina and Uruguay, an extensive program has been initiated to improve the quality of the wool produced.

*Peru.* Trade with the Far East was an early development in Peru. Not only silk from China but woods from the Philippine forests have built many of the altars and shrines still to be seen in Peruvian and Ecuadorian churches. Trade continued during the period of nitrate and guano exploitation—a trade in laborers rather than in goods. But with the exhaustion of the great guano deposits and the cession of the nitrate lands to Chile, sugar, cotton, copper and petroleum were developed as export commodities.

It was not until the thirties that trade with Asia began to increase. In spite of this, less than one per cent of the Peruvian export trade was carried on with Asia (principally Japan) up to 1934. In that year, there was a marked increase—2.2 per cent of all Peruvian trade going to the Far East, and 1.7 per cent to Japan alone. India supplies eighty-five per cent of the jute cloth and bagging imported into Peru.

Shipments to Japan have been largely made up of raw cotton and wool. In 1935 about eight per cent of Peru's industrial vegetable products (almost all cotton) was sent to Japan and in the following year, this quantity increased to eleven per cent, Japan thus becoming Peru's third-best cotton customer. In 1938 fifty-eight per cent of Japan's

•

Peruvian purchases were made up of cotton (white *tangüis*), copper ores, alpaca wool and lead bars comprising the remaining purchases.

In general, Peru's imports from the trans-Pacific countries have been greatly in excess of her sales to them. Only in the case of Japan do they represent substantial amounts, accounting to six per cent of the total Peruvian imports in 1934. This was largely due to the sale of cheap cotton cloth, the purchase of which has since fallen off because of the many restrictions designed to protect domestic industries and to balance foreign trade.

Textiles are still the chief commodities purchased from Japan. Between 1935 and 1937 Japan supplied about twenty-seven per cent of the bicycles and velocipedes, about half of the rubber balls, phonograph instruments and Portland cement, and a third of the toys purchased in Peru.

China buys some cotton (white *tangüis*) from Peru and sells her tea, cotton and silk manufactures, and peanuts. The trade with Java consists almost entirely of tea and spices. Rice from Thailand has been imported in increasing amounts since 1935. Some hemp is imported from the Philippines, and tallow fat, waste wool and wheat from Australia and New Zealand. Hongkong buys sugar from Peru and sends, among other products, preserved fish, rice and cotton manufactures. At one time, Peruvian rubber was imported into Australia in large quantities but this trade has been considerably reduced. With all of these countries, the problem of balancing their exports to Peru with purchases made in that country remains as yet far from solution.

*Ecuador.* Ecuador's list of exports includes a long series of articles, among them rubber, cinchona, kapok, cotton, toquilla straw. While cinchona and toquilla straw for Panama hats are important, cacao and tagua nuts make up the bulk of Ecuador's export trade.

Small quantities of the commodities mentioned find their way across the Pacific, though tagua nuts and petroleum are the most important. The button industries of the United States, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and England have long been supplied by Ecuador's "vegetable ivory". Within the last few years large shipments have been made to Japan. Since 1938 petroleum shipments have headed the list of exports to Japan. In 1939 over two-thirds of Japan's imports from Ecuador were crude oil, though the quantities were small.

On the other hand, Japanese textiles have found a ready market and a large sale. Ecuador is easily accessible to Japanese ships and the low price of the materials has been less affected by distance or by Panama Canal rates in this instance than in that of other Latin American countries.

*Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela.* In Bolivia very little economic activity is carried on beyond the exploitation of the mineral resources. Agriculture is even less developed than it is in other countries. Hence, the most necessary foodstuffs and manufactures must be brought into the country. In the case of Bolivia's trade with the countries of the western Pacific, it is less a question of bilateralism than of finding some basis of reciprocity. An illustration is seen in Japan's attempt to find the basis of a trade exchange. It is reported that about 200 tons of antimony are exported annually to Japan. Wherever arrangements for the exchange of antimony and other minerals for Japanese manufactures have successfully been made, exports of the commodities in question have increased. However, the difficulties in getting foreign exchange which have been experienced by Japanese firms are restricting trade expansion.

Colombia and Venezuela along with Bolivia and Chile are the four mineral nations of South America. Colombia carries on a small trade with each of the trans-Pacific countries. Tea, rice, spices, hemp, various roots and bark, and some manufactures are imported from China, Java, Indo-China, Thailand and the Philippines. Fair quantities of lard, wheat and food products are imported from Australia and New Zealand, along with copra which is collected in Australia and New Zealand from the Pacific islands. In return, Colombia exports coffee, tagua, petroleum, zinc, iron, platinum, mica.

Rice imports into Colombia have increased considerably. In 1935 and 1936 approximately forty-one and seventy-eight per cent of the rice consumed in the country was brought in from Thailand. In 1937 Indo-China took first place, supplying seventy-one per cent of the rice imports. While Colombia, like most of the Latin American countries, grows some cotton, additional amounts of cotton and cotton waste are purchased in China.

Japan sends greater quantities of imports than do all of the other countries combined. Dyed and printed cotton cloths and cotton threads comprise the bulk of these supplies.

Since the World War South America has become important as a producer and shipper of petroleum. Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador in 1935 produced close to thirteen per cent of the world's supply, Venezuela alone accounting for ten per cent. Over seventy per cent of the oil of Venezuela is sent to the Royal Dutch Shell and the Standard Oil Refineries in Curaçao and Aruba. Japan's purchases from Curaçao have increased since the outbreak of the war in China. Small shipments are made to China, New Zealand and Australia also. The fact that this oil must be shipped through the Panama Canal presents an extra cost item to the countries across the Pacific.

Venezuela's foreign purchases, like those of neighboring countries, consist chiefly of foods and manufactures. In 1937 Japan supplied 19.5 per cent of all the textiles imported into the country. This made up over three-fourths of all Japanese sales to Venezuela in that year. The trade agreement (1939) between Japan and Venezuela, under which certain global quotas were assigned to specific commodities, did not prove satisfactory to Venezuela in the matter of establishing a reciprocal exchange. In 1940 notice was served for its abrogation by the government of Venezuela. Later, however, the treaty was extended to October of that year.

*Mexico.* Mines (silver, lead, zinc, gold and copper) and oil wells were in 1939 responsible for over seventy-seven per cent of Mexico's export trade. Silver alone comprised about one-third of the total. There are, of course, commercial crops which are exported in fairly large quantities—coffee, bananas, sugar, chick-peas and hemp. Local industries, encouraged for the first time under the Diaz regime, have made some progress in textiles, tobacco, paper, lumber and beverages, but plants are small and many of the materials, both raw and semi-processed, must be imported.

In 1939 exports to the United States accounted for seventy-four per cent of Mexico's trade, and imports from the United States approximated sixty-six per cent. Germany, with roughly thirteen and five per cent for both categories, stood in second place. Thus it is obvious that trade with the Pacific countries is not extensive. However, there is between Mexico and some of the trans-Pacific countries the basis for a valuable complementary trade since the foodstuffs that Mexico imports are to be found across the Pacific and since many of the mineral products pro-

duced in large quantities in Mexico are not duplicated on the other side. Purchases made by Australia and New Zealand have thus far been almost entirely confined to petroleum derivatives. Since 1931 wheat and flour imports into Mexico have been negligible due largely to the increase in Mexican wheat acreage and the expansion of the milling industry. Dairy products have been reduced within recent years due to the establishment of modern dairies. But edible fats, lard and lard substitutes such as coconut and sesame oils remain some of Mexico's leading imports. While exports to the Philippines are as yet insignificant, purchases of copra from the Islands are beginning to reach a fair total.

Japan is still Mexico's important Far Eastern trading nation, but the business has rarely been more than two per cent of Mexico's total trade. Imports are largely silk yarns, hydrogenized animal fats, celluloid, electric light bulbs, and caustic soda. Zinc, cotton and lead are the principal items sent to Japan. In 1936 cotton comprised close to two-thirds of Japan's total purchases in Mexico. This trade, however, fell off considerably in the following years, and lead and zinc now account for practically all of the exports to Japan.

Before 1940 Japanese purchases of petroleum or petroleum products were of little importance. As a matter of fact, such purchases decreased between 1937 and 1939.<sup>6</sup> In part, the explanation for this drop may be found in the lack of pipe-lines running to Pacific ports and the lack of adequate shipping facilities following upon the expropriations. Thus far, Mexico is still able to ship oil only from the Gulf ports of Tampico and Minatitlan. If, as plans suggest, large oil supplies are concentrated in the Pacific port of Salina Cruz, Mexican oil may rival that of California on Japanese markets. It is of interest to note that Mexican shipments of oil to California rose considerably during 1939 as did California shipments to Japan.

Figures for the first eleven months of 1940 indicate a marked increase in shipments of crude oil to Japan and a smaller rise in the quantities of gasoline. Crude oil totals reached 2,961,000, and gasoline, 21,000

<sup>6</sup>In 1938 Japan purchased 13,426 cubic meters of crude oil valued at 237,774 pesos, and in 1937 and 1938, even smaller quantities of gasoline, valued at 17,950 and 27,003 pesos respectively. During 1939 gasoline purchases dropped to 18,268 pesos, while crude oil totals were not even listed. Data from *Revista de Estadística*, Dec. 1939, July 1940.



pesos.<sup>7</sup> Much of this has been trans-shipped from American Gulf ports. While these increases are noteworthy in terms of former Japanese purchases and as an added means of establishing a basis for a reciprocal trade, they do not as yet figure significantly in the total of Mexican oil exports.

*Other Central American Countries.* The trading position and ability to import of the six small countries of Central America and of the Caribbean island countries except Cuba is largely geared to the trade in coffee. In some instances, as in Costa Rica and Honduras, bananas form an important secondary crop. Attempts have been made to increase the production of bananas and to help stabilize economic conditions as a result of the declining prices and the decreased demand for coffee. Nicaragua has developed cotton and gold production.

Within the last few years, and especially in 1939, the markets of these countries were flooded with Japanese textiles. This situation led to reprisals in the form of high tariffs. Cargoes of scrap iron, small shipments of resin, some cocoa and gold have not served to balance the great excess of imports from Japan. At present, Central American trade with Japan is falling off, not alone because of import controls but because of a lack of free exchange adequate to meet Japanese commitments. In some cases, as in Honduras, Japanese firms have been demanding a cash advance of twenty-five per cent before making shipments.

*Future Possibilities.* Speculation as to the future shifts in Latin American trade interest is very nearly impossible in view of the fact that war has caught up the countries across the Pacific as well as those across the Atlantic. It is, however, highly probable that European trade will diminish as a result of the outbreak of war in 1939 and in consequence of the projected solidarity of the western hemisphere which has taken the significant form of United States loans and grants for crop-diversification experiments to be carried on within the Latin American countries. Trans-Pacific influences have in the past been negligible but may perhaps increase as a result of those very forces that are undermining European pressures.

Curiously enough, the very dislocations of the World War, by

<sup>7</sup> *Revista de Estadística*, April 1941

making necessary readjustments in the internal economies of the Latin American countries, may bring about something of an equilibrium. Changes in trade and in capital movements may well prove of greater permanence than those resulting from the 1914-1918 decline, in view of an articulate nationalism which is spreading throughout most of the twenty republics. The increased exchange that is being carried on between the Latin American nations is in itself an important trade shift. In 1937 Brazil bought fourteen per cent of her imports from Argentina; Bolivia, thirteen per cent; Peru, eight, and Paraguay, as much as forty. Mexico's knitted goods have found a market in the small Central American nations. Glass manufactures from Chile are replacing those formerly sent into Peru from European countries.

It is not unlikely that such reorganization will later lead to an increase in the small volume of trade with the countries across the Pacific. Just as cotton production was fostered partly with a Japanese market in view, so it is probable that other trans-Pacific needs will give a certain stimulus in the matter of crop and commodity diversification. Illustrations of such production are to be found in the guarana exploitation of Brazil and in the development of Argentine flaxseed to be used not as at present for its oil alone but for its fibres to be woven into materials.

The bulk of Latin American imports, as has already been indicated, consist of food, clothing and the manufactures of heavy industries. In only the A.B.C. countries and in Mexico is the industrial development of any importance. In none of them is the production of foodstuffs adequate for the needs of the people. Thus, for some time to come the manufactures, the foodstuffs, the vegetable and animal fibres produced in the trans-Pacific countries should be able to find a market in Latin America.

As far as heavy industries are concerned, the Latin American countries lack coal, especially good coking coal. Chile has deposits of a soft coal which supply most of her domestic needs. Brazil's deposits are being developed with the aid of high protective tariffs. There is some iron ore in Brazil, Chile and Peru; Brazil in fact exports small quantities of iron ore. Argentina, which lacks most of the industrial minerals, has developed a small but important industry in reworking old iron and steel. However, large amounts of both iron and steel are imported for domestic manufacture. It is perhaps conceivable that coal from

Australia and even Indo-China might find a growing market in Latin America, if industrial development continues and shipping facilities are improved.

The problem of trade is complicated not alone by foreign controls but by the racial groups in some of the republics and by the question of purchasing power. In those countries where European immigrants make up large proportions of the population, the people turn naturally to Europe for the articles to which they are accustomed. But old tastes and customs have been known to alter under the pressure of restrictive trade policies and import controls. An increased purchasing power can come about only as the result of considerable social change within the countries and that remains a problem for the future in the western Pacific as well as in Latin America. Australia may find herself shut out of large sales to Latin American countries because of her own greater costs of production, but as for the Far Eastern countries, low cost production combined with proper organization might conceivably open a greater market to them.

The development and nationalization schemes that are being carried on in Latin America are being watched with considerable interest across the Pacific. In the Philippines, where the old Spanish religious influence lingers even though the secular ties have disappeared, a newly fostered sense of kinship has directed particular attention to developments in the American nations. The cooperative societies of Mexico, the nationalization of certain industries in Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador, which are designed to limit foreign participation, are watched not only for their significance as to internal developments but with an eye to new markets. Research that is being started in paper products, dyes and cellulose has in it the basis of a future interchange. Argentina's wool, because of difference in quality, is as yet no threat to the Australian product, even on Latin American markets. Local production of vicuna and alpaca wool in Peru and other Andean countries meets some of the domestic needs but has not eliminated the demand for foreign wool.

There is, of course, the important matter of ships and freight rates. Increased shipping facilities present a problem, the solution of which must of necessity precede any trans-Pacific trade expansion. Tramp steamers, ships from Australia and from the Netherlands Indies cross the Pacific at irregular and infrequent intervals. Thus far, however,

the Japanese alone have established direct runs from the Far East to South America. One route reaches South America by way of the Atlantic via South Africa to Argentina, Brazil, the Caribbean ports and then through the Panama Canal to the coast of California and across the Pacific to Japan. Other ships cross the Pacific and make the west coast ports of South America. Speed has been greatly increased and the sailings regularized, shippers in Brazil and Argentina being able to count on a Japanese ship each month. Equally important is the fact that freight rates have been kept low, largely because of government subsidy. For the present, however, it must be admitted that the prospects of increased shipping services are poor, both because of Japan's shipping shortage caused by the demands of the China war and because of the withdrawal of most of the British, Norwegian, Dutch and other European tramp shipping from trans-Pacific trade and the increasing indiligation of United States ships for defense purposes.

## CHAPTER V

### ASIATIC IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION

#### *The Coolie Traffic.*

During the first years of independence, the new Latin American republics were absorbed by the confusion within their borders. It fell to the Yankee Clippers and in a lesser degree to other ships to keep the Pacific trade lanes open. But more important than the traffic in materials during the nineteenth century was the part played by the countries across the Pacific in supplying laborers for the great Latin American plantations.

The search for workers was nowhere so vigorously pushed as in Cuba and Peru. Travellers to Havana in the first years of the nineteenth century were impressed by the extensive lands planted with sugar cane and coffee and, as more than one wrote, "watered with the sweat of African slaves." In Peru the many small islands along the coast were dotted with mounds. The Peruvian farmers had always been aware of the value of the guano deposits in these mounds but European concession seekers were the ones to exploit them. Labor in Cuba was not adequate to meet the needs of the plantations; the great masses of Indians in Peru could not adapt themselves to the hard work of the guano islands. China, with its tremendous man-power, seemed to afford an unending supply of patient and enduring labor. In 1847 a Spanish company induced 800 Chinese coolies to go under contract to Cuba. This was the beginning of a trade, profitable alone for the shipowners and agents who speculated in human cargo and for the holders of the sugar and guano lands. The ports of China—Macao, Canton, Hongkong—became the Mecca for all ships. American, French, British, and Spanish vessels as well as others belonging to Peru, Cuba, Chile, and El Salvador were all bent on sharing in the new trade boom.

It has been estimated that between 1847 and 1874, in which year the traffic was suppressed, from a quarter to a half million laborers were sent to Peru, Cuba, Chile and the Hawaiian Islands. A second report indicates that between 1849 and 1874 there were 87,343 coolies in Peru alone, and that during the first twenty years of the trade, 114,081 coolies were landed in Cuba. Though there is some mention of Japanese indentured labor sent to the coast of Peru,<sup>1</sup> and though workers from India were brought over in large numbers, the above figures refer almost completely to Chinese laborers. As a matter of fact, the traffic in Indians continued long after the Chinese coolie trade was suppressed. Throughout the Caribbean Islands, a great proportion of those at work in the sugar-cane fields are still "East Indians."

The history of this trade is an unending account of the sufferings and horrors of the long ocean voyage on board the coolie ships and of years of unrelieved toil in the countries to which the workers were sent. Very few coolies went willingly or with any knowledge of the life in store for them. Their recruitment was accomplished through purchase, outright kidnapping or what has been curiously described as "moral persuasion." Chinese and Portuguese man-buyers haunted China's inland waterways. There was little safety for villagers and fishermen along the coasts. But by far the largest group was recruited from among those unsuspecting Chinese who were tempted to gamble at licensed establishments, where according to pre-arrangement they lost more money than they possessed and as a consequence were "morally persuaded" to make good these losses through work.<sup>2</sup>

The coolies brought together in these ways were held at the depots or barracoons in Macao until a favorable opportunity arose for disposing of them to the speculators who were loading vessels for Cuba and Peru.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Enock, C. R., *Peru*, p. 290. Martin, F. Percy, *Peru of the Twentieth Century*, p. 42, gives an estimate for 1896 which indicated that there were 900 Japanese and 15,000 Chinese in Peru in 1896. Akers, Chas. Edmund, *A History of South America*, p. 545, makes the statement that some 800 Japanese were introduced for plantation labor, presumably at the end of the nineteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> Mayers, Denny and King, *Treaty Ports Of China and Japan*.

<sup>3</sup> Including head money and working expenses, each coolie (according to *Treaty Ports of China*) cost from twenty-five to thirty dollars and was transferred, together with the contract he had signed, for from sixty to seventy dollars. The expense of shipment, insurance, etc. increased the cost per head to something under \$200 or £45.

Some semblance of legality was given to arrangements whereby the coolies were taken to Cuba. Contracts were drawn up between the workers and the Spanish consul, who acted for the contracting firm. These contracts, however, were assignable without the consent of the worker, thus making it possible for the coolie to be sold to one master after another under circumstances that differed very little, if at all, from the conditions that had prevailed when African slave labor tilled Cuban fields.<sup>4</sup>

Those coolies who were sent to Peru did not even have the nominal safeguard of a contract and were openly sold into slavery. A Peruvian decree of 1855, emancipating the Indians, resulted in the importation of Chinese in even greater numbers, since demands for a dependable labor supply were thus greatly increased.

It was not till 1856, nine years after the traffic had started, that an ordinance was introduced by the local governments on the Chinese side for the purpose of regulating the terms of the contract entered into between the coolie and the emigration agent. Somewhat later, in 1865, the Chinese government drafted a new code of regulations. An emigration convention held during the following year attempted to reduce the contract to a five-year period and to assure the coolies free return passage. However, ratification was not forthcoming from either the British or the French governments. In 1873 and 1874 the port of Macao was closed to this trade. This act was protested by the Spaniards and the Peruvians who were greatly affected by the new order. But appeals for aid had been before the Chinese government in Peking for some time, and in spite of foreign protest the trade was not revived.

<sup>4</sup> Ninety per cent of the workers were sent to the sugar plantations, the remainder to truck gardens and to the tobacco and coffee plantations. The contracts usually ran for eight years. Before 1860, a coolie whose work contract had expired could purchase letters of domicile and was thus free to follow any occupation he chose. But in 1860 a royal decree withdrew this privilege of becoming a free citizen. Within ten months after completing his contract, the coolie was expected to sign up for re-engagement or leave the island. A regulation stating that a coolie who had worked at one of the work depots for a year (after leaving the plantation) was to be given free transportation to China was ignored. Since very few coolies could manage to save enough for the return passage, they of necessity agreed to re-engagement.

The report of a commission appointed by the government of China in 1873 to investigate conditions on the plantations to which the coolies were sent gave substance to the many accounts that had reached China. The report, published in 1876, indicated that of the 40,413 coolies in Cuba at the time, eighty per cent had been kidnapped or decoyed. It pointed out what relatively small numbers of the coolies in Cuba ever managed to return to their homes in China. Of the 114,081 who had been sent to the island between 1847 and 1867, only 53,502 escaped life servitude.

EMIGRATION OF INDENTURED LABORERS FROM CANTON TO PERU <sup>5</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>
1849	75	1852	1,350
1850	1,465	1853	2,070
1851	1,163	1854	1,233

EMIGRATION OF INDENTURED LABORERS FROM MACAO TO <sup>6</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Havana</i>	<i>Peru</i>	<i>Others</i>
1856	2,253		240
1857	6,753	450	180
1858	8,913	300	321
1859	7,695	321	953
1860	5,773	2,098	248
1862	752	1,459	325
1863	2,922	3,738	325
1864	4,469	6,243	325
1868	8,835	3,371	.
1869	4,124	4,876	.
1870	1,064	12,343	.
1871	5,706	11,377	.
1872	8,045	13,809	.
1873	6,307	6,709	.. .

<sup>5</sup> Canton was important as a center of emigration from 1848 to 1852. Later, Hongkong and Macao were important in this traffic. Ferenczi, Imre, *International Migrations*, Vol. I, pp. 926-8.

<sup>6</sup> Ferenczi, *loc. cit.*



It was not until 1874 that a treaty was negotiated with Peru and not until 1877, three years after the Macao traffic had been stopped, that a new agreement was made with Cuba.<sup>7</sup> Both countries agreed to respect the right of an individual to change his home voluntarily and to treat the Chinese within their countries as subjects enjoying the same rights as those of the most-favored nations.

### *Recent Immigration and Colonization*

Each of the Latin American countries counts among its inhabitants immigrants from the countries of the western Pacific. But only those from the Far East, China and Japan in particular, have formed communities of any size. Chinese and Japanese are found everywhere, not alone in the large and easily accessible industrial and agricultural centers but even in those mountain districts where other than Spanish influences seem hardly to have penetrated.

Before the nineteen-twenties, obstacles (in the form of legal restraints) to the absorption of the Oriental immigrant in the life of the community were rare in Latin America. The exclusion laws of the United States had little parallel in the countries to the south. Thus the immigrant was free to follow any occupation he chose, to become a citizen, to marry natives of the country, attend its schools and join its social organizations. Inter-marriage was not uncommon. On the other hand, it is not certain that the immigrant groups have merged into the life of the Latin American communities in a degree suggested by the absence of legal restrictions.<sup>8</sup> The separatism of the Oriental immigrant, as well as the altered government policies in connection with immigration and occupational pursuits which have matured more recently, have a multiplicity of causes, many of them forced and not always prompted by actual needs.

<sup>7</sup> In 1877 the Chinese population was estimated at 44,000. By 1899 this had fallen to 14,863. In the following year the Spanish government required all Chinese whose contracts had expired to leave the island or to sign up for further work.

<sup>8</sup> It is of interest to note that in spite of the Mexican laws permitting naturalization, only 1,040 Chinese and 248 Japanese had acquired Mexican nationality according to the 1930 census. Among the women there were 44 Chinese and 36 Japanese. Most of the women acquiring Mexican nationality were those who had lost their own through marriage to Mexican men.

After the coolie traffic had been suppressed, the Chinese and Japanese came, largely as laborers on contracts of from two to six years, to regions that required their particular adaptability to pioneer work. More recently they have come as unrecruited individuals to engage in retail trades and in farming. Brazil, is the only country in which a large majority of the immigrants from the Orient are agricultural workers of one type or another.

It is against the shift in occupations, from agriculture to industry and trade, that many of the recent immigration and occupational restrictions have been directed. The so-called anti-Oriental policies in the new immigration and labor laws of the various governments are less the result of group antagonism than of competition felt by native workers in sections where the levels of living are not too different. It is not friction caused by higher and lower wage standards as in the case of the United States, but competition between workers with living standards that are in many respects similar.

The principal centers of Oriental immigration in Latin America are Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Cuba. There are more Japanese in Brazil than in the United States.<sup>9</sup> The colonies of Japanese in Peru and of Chinese in Mexico and Cuba are important when compared with the total numbers of foreign-born in those countries.

*Brazil.* The first Asiatic colony to be established in the New World was one of Chinese tea growers brought to Brazil in 1812. Humboldt wrote of the numbers of Chinese and Malays who had entered New Spain during the period in which the silk trade flourished. There were Manila Chinese in Cuba. Japanese too had crossed the Pacific as merchants and as members of galleon crews. However, the immigration of tea planters into Brazil was the first immigrant enterprise sponsored and organized by a Latin American government. The tea plants were introduced at the suggestion of the Count of Linhares who was prime minister to the Portuguese King, then in exile forced upon him by the successes of Napoleon. The Portuguese knew little about the care of

<sup>9</sup> Of the 997,115 Japanese residing in foreign countries in 1936, 229,465 were in South America. Of this number 193,057 were in Brazil. *Japan Yearbook*, 1938-39, p. 54.

tea plants and were no doubt prompted less by the thought of establishing a new enterprise than by a desire to enjoy the tea that had long been popular throughout Europe. Expert Chinese workers were brought into the country. Even the word for tea, *cha*, was taken over into the Portuguese language from the Chinese. Tea continued to be cultivated in a small way in the states of São Paulo and Minas Geraes well into the last half of the century. But the Chinese tea growers had turned to commerce and the retail trades long before then. Chinese immigration into Brazil has at no time been numerically significant. In the fifty years after 1883, only 1,581 Chinese entered the country.

The year 1899 marked the beginning of organized Japanese immigration to South America, the first workers being sent to Peru on contract.<sup>10</sup> While the majority of Chinese workers were brought into South and Central America during the nineteenth century, the great stream of Japanese immigration belongs properly to the twentieth. In 1908<sup>11</sup> the state of São Paulo in Brazil, in its search for plantation laborers, contracted with a Japanese agency (the *Kokoku Shokumin Kaisha*) for 781 workers. The laborers were distributed over six plantations with the understanding that the contract was to last not longer than six months.<sup>12</sup> The state of São Paulo offered inducements to the new immigrants. It paid part of the passage money; it promised that workers arriving before the coffee harvest would have rent-free houses and freedom from taxes for a stipulated period. In spite of these concessions, the first venture did not turn out well. The Japanese complained about the living conditions and especially about the charges made for supplies by the company stores. There was rioting and a general unwillingness to arrive at an amicable adjustment of the disputes. As a result, 421 of the original number withdrew. Some found work on new plantations; others drifted to the cities or to the railroads then in process of construction. An offer of somewhat higher wages

<sup>10</sup> Japanese entered Mexico in the 1880's.

<sup>11</sup> The pioneer of contract immigrants to Brazil was the immigration company established in 1898 at the instance of the Lissa Corporation. This failed and that of 1908 represented the second attempt to foster Brazilian immigration.

<sup>12</sup> The wages were to range from 2 to 2½ milreis per day. The piece-work rate varied between 450 and 500 reis per hamper.

from the sugar mills of Argentina attracted 160 laborers who were thus among the first Japanese to settle south of the Plata.<sup>13</sup>

In the 1930's Brazil became the outlet for the greatest Japanese immigration. In 1934, 22,960 persons representing eighty-two per cent of the total number of Japanese emigrants for that year, sailed to Brazil, by far the greater number being destined for the state of São Paulo.<sup>14</sup> In fact, of the 173,420 who were in Brazil on October 1, 1935, ninety-three per cent were to be found in that one state, the majority engaged on the coffee plantations. A report of the Migration Committee of the International Labor Office states that, of the Japanese immigrants who entered São Paulo between 1908 and 1935, 93.18 per cent have remained as permanent settlers.<sup>15</sup> This is without doubt to be explained by the organization of Japanese emigration. Few, if any, Japanese enter Brazil without having had some preparation to fit them for their life in the new country and without having in advance a set destination and work.

The great impetus to Japanese immigration came with the World War. The stream of workers from Europe suddenly stopped; there was an acute labor shortage throughout all of Latin America and particularly in Brazil. Until well toward the close of the nineteenth century, slave labor had gathered the coffee harvests. Following the suppression of slavery, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese workers were found to be well suited to the difficult and trying work. The revenue

<sup>13</sup> Toraji, Iriye, *History of the Development of Japanese Overseas* (in Japanese), Vol. 2, gives an account of these early work and living conditions and details some of the complaints against the plantation stores.

<sup>14</sup> The Philippine Islands, which accounted for only 1544 emigrants became Japan's second largest emigration outlet in 1934. *Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook*, 1938, p. 42

<sup>15</sup> "Immigration and Settlement in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay," Report of Permanent Migration Committee of the International Labor Office, *International Labor Review*, Feb. 1937. According to this report, the percentage of permanent settlers is higher for Japanese than for other immigrant groups, including even the Portuguese who head the lists of foreign arrivals in Brazil. The figures for other immigrant groups are given as follows:

Portuguese	41.63 per cent	Rumanians	69.92 per cent
Italians	12.94 " "	Yugoslavs	75.95 " "
Poles	55.53 " "		

of the country hinged largely upon the coffee crop, and workers had to be found. Three Japanese emigration companies<sup>16</sup> saw an opportunity in this situation and, after organizing the Brazil Emigration Society (*Brazil Imin Kumiai*), approached the government of São Paulo with a proposal to transport five thousand contract workers for a period of four years. The government entered into an agreement with these agencies and granted concessions that opened the way for the permanent settlement of Japanese after the term of contract labor had been fulfilled. These concessions placed Japanese immigration upon the same basis as that entering from Europe, conceding to the Japanese the very important privilege of leasing and owning land.<sup>17</sup>

The formation of the *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* (International Development Company) in 1917 was particularly important in that it organized Japanese emigration and brought it under a single control. The role played by the government of Japan in sponsoring and subsidizing both emigrant and company agency, in urging the organization of emigration societies throughout the many island prefectures, made this movement of workers across the Pacific part of a consistent government colonization policy.<sup>18</sup> Almost immediately, the numbers leaving for South America increased. Six years later a scheme of giving grants for the journey by sea helped those who had lost everything in the earthquake of 1923 to find new homes. In 1932, during the agricultural depression, government grants once again enabled the starving peasants to go to Brazil. Up to 1933 the *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* enabled 133,732 Japanese to leave the country. Of this total, 113,000 were settled in Brazil.

<sup>16</sup> These three companies were the Oriental Emigration Company (*Toyo Imin Kaisha*), the South American Emigration Company (*Nambei Shokumin Kaisha*) and the *Morioka Imin Kaisha*.

<sup>17</sup> Partly-paid passage from Japan, free railway passage through the state of São Paulo and the privilege of being quartered at government immigration houses were also granted. These with the land ownership privilege were more generous than concessions obtained by the Brazil Emigration Company, founded in 1912 by Prince Katsura, Baron Shibusawa and others with a capital of one million yen. At that time, they were given 12,500 acres of land and were obliged to bring 2,000 families to the country within five years of signing the contract.

<sup>18</sup> In 1917 the Japanese government offered each emigrant a bonus of eight yen. In 1934 the Japanese Minister of Colonization revealed that the government subsidy averaged 1,300-1,400 yen per family. Toraji, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 390.

During the interval between the two great disasters mentioned above (from 1923 to 1933) the numbers benefitting from the government grants reached almost 110,000; the subsidies, totalled 16,364,000 yen.<sup>19</sup>

In 1928 Japanese colonization schemes moved beyond São Paulo into the unsettled regions far in the interior of the country—into the states of Amazonas and Pará. A mission of inquiry sent by the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company in 1926 had found the land suitable for cotton growing.<sup>20</sup> The new settlements in Acara and Monte Alegre, developed on a two and a half million acre concession are measures of the thoroughness of this mission's investigation.

Excluding these new settlements, Japanese colonization in Brazil has expanded from São Paulo in the form of a triangle with the states of Minas Geraes, Matto Grosso and the northern part of Parana as its points. Coffee, sugar and cotton are the great staples. Even in Minas Geraes, which was the El Dorado of early settlers, cattle ranges and coffee plantations have quite dispelled the importance of the mines. It is reported that 2,450,000 hectares are owned by Japanese. The land in Minas Geraes, São Paulo and Espírito Santo is for the most part held in small units, the total area included in these holdings covering approximately 490,000 hectares.

Along the coastal region of the state of São Paulo, near the town of Registro (formerly the Colonia Japoneza), the most important center of Japanese colonization has been established. This settlement is a purely Japanese colony. Its manner of living, its schools, its general planning are Japanese. The appearance of the colony suggests a bit of Japan set against a strange Brazilian background. Shuttered houses, clumps of bamboo, a countryside marked off with paddy fields and hillsides terraced with tea shrubs are all reminiscent of Japan and suggest that the new settlers have not attempted to merge themselves into the greater group of Brazilians. The crop combination in the fields is Japanese too and indicates something of the initiative the Japanese have taken in

<sup>19</sup> Ogishima, Toru, "Japanese Emigration," *International Labor Review*, Nov. 1936.

<sup>20</sup> In 1928 Tanaka and the heads of certain firms met with a view to forming a settlement consortium which would cultivate land in the Amazon basin. It was agreed to form a consortium with a capital of ten million yen.

expanding agriculture in this section of the country. In addition to coffee, there are to be seen rice, tea, mulberry, sugar, cotton, tobacco and a great variety of vegetables.

This new enterprise has been largely responsible for the success of the efforts at crop diversification which have been made in São Paulo.

While less than two per cent of the agricultural land in São Paulo is held by the Japanese, 29.5 per cent of the agricultural produce is controlled by them. This has been the development of only a few years, for as recently as 1934 Japanese farmers raised but five per cent of the coffee and eight per cent of the rice. By 1938 and 1939, the new crops had become important. The proportions grown by the Japanese—forty-six per cent of the cotton, fifty-seven per cent of the silk, and seventy-five per cent of the tea—are significant. The effect of Japanese rice growing has been to convert Brazil from a rice-importing to a rice-exporting country.

In Pará and Amazonas, Japanese activities are largely controlled by syndicates which hold concessions from the state governments. Though the Amazon with its innumerable tributaries affords thousands of miles of navigation, there are great areas in these two states that have never been explored or cultivated. The river served only as a highway for carrying the *bollas* of rubber to the port of Pará for transshipment across the Atlantic. Native craft carried their cargoes of Brazil nuts. Valuable timber also was brought down. The state of Pará depended, not so many years ago, upon these shipments from the interior. During poor years there was great financial distress. Crop diversification became the important problem for the state of Pará and exploitation for the Amazonas regions. The sections that are now the sites of Japanese settlement were part of this uncleared and uncultivated area. The wide variety of crops to be seen in the new colonies represent yet another successful effort towards crop diversification, a diversification which, as in the case of the lands to the south, is geared to a ready import market in Japan. An illustration of this is the extensive cultivation of guarana, a climbing shrub that yields a juice from which drugs are made. This is the basis for eurythmine, for which there is a very good market in Japan. A highgrade cotton with a long, resistant fibre is grown in this region and Brazilian cotton exports from this and other areas to Japan

have doubled since 1934. Timber and Brazil nuts as well as other commodities form important exports from these Japanese concessions. Thus the new developments in Brazil are creating alternative sources of supply for manufacturing plants in Japan.

Japanese immigration into Brazil is unlike that of Orientals in the other Latin American countries and perhaps explains why, in spite of the fact that the Japanese have lived in their own colonies away from the life of the country, they have stirred little antagonism. In most of the Latin American countries a great majority of the Oriental immigrants have set themselves up in cities. In Brazil, on the other hand, almost nine-tenths of those gainfully occupied are on plantations and farms.<sup>21</sup> They are not only laborers on contract but are share and independent farmers as well. This shift from laborer to share farmer and even to owner of a small farm is not an unusual progression for large numbers of Japanese settlers. On arriving in Brazil each family,<sup>22</sup> consisting usually of three persons able to work, is placed on a plantation—frequently one belonging to a Japanese company. From 4,500 to 6,000 trees are allotted to a household unit. The family receives a house, a small section of land on which to grow the vegetables necessary for the household, and sometimes a small wage. Usually it requires from four to five years before the young trees yield a harvest of berries. If after that time the family savings are adequate, the household engages in share farming on a contract which often covers another period of from four to six years. From this point, the way to independent farming is not too difficult, though it is significant that only five per cent of the Japanese are landowners and that close to four-fifths of the land held by Japanese in Brazil is in the hands of large syndicates.

The importance of the syndicates in the lives of the colonists is well demonstrated by reviewing briefly the multiplicity of functions that the *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* alone performs. It lends capital to colonizing

<sup>21</sup> According to *Occupational Distribution of Japanese Residents Abroad* (in Japanese), 1937, pp. 89-93, there were 193,057 Japanese in Brazil on October 1, 1936. Of this number 16,111 were engaged in farming, gardening, dairying; 18,141 worked as agricultural laborers. Some 2,400 were engaged in commerce.

<sup>22</sup> A distinguishing feature of Japanese immigration into Brazil is that it is made up of families rather than of unattached individuals. In 1931, 84.2 per cent of the men arriving were accompanied by their families.



companies and organizes industrial enterprises abroad. The company owns extensive tracts of land which are cultivated by the newly arriving Japanese farm workers. Those who are economically able to enter Brazil as independent farmers may buy their land from this same company. The *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* has set up its own factories in which it processes the products of Japanese lands and prepares them for sale or for export. It has been estimated that the annual production of these factories approximates 500,000 yen.

*Peru.* In none of the other countries of Latin America have the Japanese emigration companies had quite the success that they have experienced in Brazil. The program followed has been much the same. Japanese corporations have acquired tracts of land and have engaged in the cultivation of crops that have some importance for the home markets. Small colonies have been planted. But nowhere has the immigration reached proportions at all comparable to that which has moved into Brazil.

In Peru large colonies of Chinese as well as Japanese are to be found. But in marked contrast to the type of settlement described for Brazil, the Oriental immigrants in Peru have moved to the cities. The extensive traffic in coolies during the latter part of the nineteenth century marked the high point of Chinese immigration into Peru, but its suppression did not wipe out the need for workers, and large numbers of Chinese continued to be brought into the country. The numbers assumed such proportions that an executive decree of 1909 forbade the entrance of Chinese having less than 500 Peruvian pounds in cash. Later, through a series of protocols, Chinese immigration was voluntarily suspended.<sup>23</sup> Estimates of the numbers<sup>24</sup> of Chinese in Peru move through a very wide margin. In 1923, the numbers ranged between 50,000 and 150,000.<sup>25</sup> However, an official Peruvian estimate indicated that on December 31, 1938, there were 15,356 Chinese resident in that country. Many of these came originally as contract and free laborers

<sup>23</sup> Martin, Percy F., *Peru of the Twentieth Century*, p. 318.

<sup>24</sup> Since 1876, the date of the last Peruvian census, only general estimates of the population have been made.

<sup>25</sup> McNair, H. F., *The Chinese Abroad*, p. 98.

to the mills and plantations. Large numbers, however, have drifted to the cities, there to engage in the small retail trades.

But it is against the Japanese in the cities of Peru that the resentment of large groups of the population has been directed. The first Japanese, like the Chinese, came as rural laborers. While 1899 is usually given as the year marking the first Japanese immigration into Peru, some accounts state that there were over 900 Japanese working for the British Sugar Company near Cañete at a considerably earlier date.<sup>26</sup> However, it was not until the Russo-Japanese War and the exclusion agitation in other countries that the numbers going to Peru showed any considerable increase. Between 1899 and 1924 Japanese emigration companies brought 17,764 contract and free workers to Peru.<sup>27</sup> Some were engaged in the cultivation of coffee and cotton, in which several Japanese corporations were interested. Large numbers, of course, have continued their work on the farms and plantations. A 1938 report indicated that about 2,000 families are engaged in the cultivation of raw cotton and that the value of their produce is well over one-fifth of the total cotton output of the country.<sup>28</sup>

The most recent official estimate (December 31, 1938) indicates that there are 22,728 Japanese in Peru. Over three-fifths of those gainfully occupied are engaged in commerce and have concentrated in the cities of Lima and Callao. On the streets of Lima, Japanese shops are everywhere in evidence; Japanese advertisements in the daily papers give prominence to the numbers of Japanese engaged in business in that one city. Before the World War there were only four Japanese stores in Lima. Little more than twenty years later, it was said that over two-thirds of the bakeries and saloons and one-half of the barber shops in the Province of Lima were owned by Japanese.<sup>29</sup> One explanation of

<sup>26</sup> Hodges, G. Charles, "Japanese Ambitions in Latin America," *Sunset*, October 1916, pp. 16-17.

<sup>27</sup> Weil, Elsie F., "Training Japanese for Emigration," *Asia*, Nov. 1917, pp. 722-8, states that the T.K.K. service to Chile and Peru has been subsidized since 1908, and that between 1899 and 1908 some 2,000 Japanese were imported into Peru under six-year contracts.

<sup>28</sup> *Trans-Pacific*, June 30, 1938.

<sup>29</sup> Beals, Carleton, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America*, writes that 18,000 of the 30,000 acres under cultivation in Chancay province are held by Japanese.

this unusual turn to small shops has been explained by the fact that many of those who in the earlier years had arrived as laborers without their families, later brought wives to Peru with the express intention of operating independent stores. Barber shops in particular have formed an ever-increasing news item. This may be due to the fact that in other countries, in some of the Central American republics as well as in Chile, hairdressing seems to have drawn large numbers of Japanese. The story is often recounted that in 1904 there was only one Japanese barber shop to be found in the entire city of Lima. Peruvians themselves operated at least seventy. By 1924 only forty-six Peruvian shops were left while the Japanese total exceeded 150. But what seemed even more spectacular than barber shops was the fact that the four shops which in 1904 were operated by Japanese proprietors had by 1924 multiplied to well over two thousand.

In spite of the efforts of the Peruvian Agricultural Development Society (*Peru Takushoku Kumiai*) to distribute the Japanese population throughout the country, this concentration in the cities has persisted. No outbreaks against the shopkeepers similar to those that occurred in Mexico in the early thirties have been reported. The explanation is very likely to be found in the attitude of the Japanese government as the agency sponsoring this settlement.

*Mexico.* In Mexico, the Japanese community is very much smaller than that of the Chinese. The situation of the Japanese in Mexico is a reproduction in miniature of that in Brazil and Peru. While in 1936 somewhat over two-fifths of those in the country were presumably engaged in agriculture, a considerable number of workers so listed were actually occupied in fishing as employees of the *Taiyo Sangyo Kaisha*, which operates largely off the coast of San Diego. However, in Mexico too, there is the Japanese corporation as landowner employing Japanese workers. One such enterprise is the Mexican Industrial Company (*Mexico Sangyo Kaisha*), which cultivates rice on an estate of approximately 1,200 hectares. Most of the Japanese in agriculture are to be found on the sugar plantations and in stock-farming. There is a small number of landowners<sup>80</sup> and a large group engaged in the retail

<sup>80</sup> The *Censo Agro-Pecuario*, 1934, indicates that 47 proprietors of land were of Japanese nationality, 36 of this number in the North Pacific Zone, 6 in the South Pacific.

trade business. The largest single communities of Japanese are those located in Mexico City, Lower California and along the northwest coast.

## JAPANESE IN MEXICO

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i> §
1910*	2,205	2,026	179
1921*	1,823	1,584	239
1930*	4,320†(3)	2,731	1,579
1934†	5,360†(3)	3,246	2,114
1935†	5,245†(3)	3,178	2,067
1936†	4,691†(3)	2,779	1,912

\* *Censo de La Población*, 1930.

† *Japan Yearbook*, 1937, p. 55.

‡ Although the numbers in the country have shown a continuous increase, the numbers leaving Japan and destined for Mexico have fallen off considerably since 1930:

1930—434	1933—85
1931—283	1934—80
1932—149	1935—53

(The 1935 figure was 72 according to *Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook*, 1938, p. 45.)

§ It is of interest to note the changed character of the immigration. In 1910 and 1921 from 87 to 92 per cent of the Japanese entering Mexico were men. The proportion of women rose considerably in 1930 and 1935. This is of particular interest in view of the small number of Chinese women.

The first real stimulus to Chinese immigration into Mexico followed the treaty negotiated between the two countries in 1899. This agreement gave to the Chinese complete freedom to live and work in Mexico and specified that the emigration of laborers with or without their families was to be free. As a result of this, several steamship companies, among them the Chinese Commercial Steamship Company, were organized. There was great need of Chinese workers in the henequen plantations. The voyages of these ships between Mazatlan, Manzanillo and Salina Cruz transported great numbers of laborers from the west coast to the plantations on the Gulf side. Living conditions, the hours of work and the pay have been the subject of frequent writings which detail the hardships of the "slaves" working in henequen in Yucatan in

the first years of the twentieth century.<sup>81</sup> The slaves, of course, had reference to the Chinese and the Koreans as well as native workers.

CHINESE IN MEXICO <sup>82</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>
1900	2,660	2,647	13
1910	13,203	13,118	85
1921	13,472	14,227	245
1930	18,965	16,254	2,711

The Chinese in 1930 formed the second-largest of the foreign groups in Mexico. Almost half of them were engaged in commerce,<sup>83</sup> the largest single community being found in Mexicali in Lower California. Large commercial houses, both wholesale and retail, community club-houses of some pretension, hospitals, all point to the prosperity of a large section of the Chinese community in Mexicali. As a matter of fact, the small businesses of Sinaloa, Sonora, Nayarit and Lower California were dominated by the Chinese. It is to this dominance that the anti-Chinese disturbances of 1931 have been traced. Chinese shopkeepers were offering a competition unwelcome to Mexican merchants. How complete this Chinese control really was in the regions indicated became clear during the rioting that broke out in 1931. The banks in several of the larger towns were forced to close after Chinese accounts had been withdrawn. As a result of this, general provision shops shut down and for a time bartering became fairly general. Estimates of the numbers of Chinese who were forced to flee during these disturbances run as high as 10,000.<sup>84</sup>

*Other Countries of South America.* The Japanese community in Argentina is larger than that in Mexico. There is, however, some

<sup>81</sup> Turner, J. K., "Slaves of Yucatan," *The American*, October 1909, pp. 525-638; Baerlein, Henry, *Mexico, Land of Unrest*, p. 159; Enock, C. R., *Mexico*, p. 325.

<sup>82</sup> *Censo de la Poblacion*, 1930.

<sup>83</sup> The *Censo Agro-Pecuario*, 1934, indicates that there were 101 proprietors of Chinese nationality who held sections of land. Eighty-one of these were located in the North Pacific Zone, that is, in Lower California and Sinaloa.

<sup>84</sup> *New York Times*, October 18, 1931.

significance in the fact that a large proportion of those in agriculture and in manufacturing are for the most part employees of Japanese corporations operating in Argentina.

The laborers who withdrew from the coffee plantations of Brazil were among the first Japanese to enter Argentina. They were hired by a refinery for a wage somewhat greater than that paid them in Brazil. Accounts written in 1909 estimated that there were 331 Japanese and thirty-four Chinese resident in Argentina in that year.<sup>35</sup> Most of the Japanese were day-laborers. By 1936 these numbers had risen to almost six thousand.<sup>36</sup> Details of the types of work followed do not show large numbers in agriculture. On the contrary, they are found in a wide variety of occupations—in laundries, retail stores, pawnshops, commercial houses, banks, and a rather large number in dancing and entertainment establishments.

In 1936 it was estimated that about 1,100 were in agriculture, principally in cotton and tea. Cacao and cinchona bark were being cultivated by them and there was some indication of their intention to expand activities to include sugar cane, stock-raising and forestry. A fishing company organized in 1935 drew some into that industry.

In the other countries of South America, not as yet mentioned, the communities of Oriental immigrants are relatively small. In only two, Paraguay and Colombia, does agriculture claim a large proportion of the workers. In these two countries the functioning of the Japanese company is apparent again. In Paraguay, near Asunción, a Japanese colony was organized in 1936 by the Japanese Emigration Association. This company holds a concession from the government of over 8,000 hectares, on which a majority of the 308 Japanese in the country are settled.

While the government of Colombia is not averse to Japanese immigration and has not placed the same restrictions against the entry of Japanese as have been applied to the Chinese, there are as yet very few

<sup>35</sup> Ferenczi, Imre, *International Migrations*, p. 166, gives the figure for 1909 as 27 Japanese. Alsino, Juan A., *Inmigración en el Priglo de la Independencia*, p. 104, estimates that in 1909, 251 Japanese entered Argentina and 15 left, leaving a total net immigration of 236. The same source indicates that four Chinese entered.

<sup>36</sup> A census of the city of Buenos Aires taken in 1936 lists only 125 Chinese resident in that city.

Japanese settlers in the country. In 1929 the *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* purchased 204 hectares of land near Cali. During the first year ten families of Japanese settled on the land and grew rice, maize and vegetables. An equal number came during the second year. However, the provisional census returns of Colombia indicated that there were but 206 Japanese and 271 Chinese in that country on March 31, 1938.

Accounts mention Chinese and Japanese in Chile in the early years of this century. Many Chinese were brought over as workers in the nitrate fields. Small numbers are still to be found in this work, though many have made their way to the cities and have followed the general practice of their compatriots in opening small retail stores. The Japanese are very well represented in the hairdressing shops of the larger towns.

As early as 1915, the Okuma government of Japan attempted to arrange, through agreement with the government of Ecuador, for the right of free residence and property ownership there for the nationals of Japan. However, settlement in the country has made little headway, only eight Japanese having taken up residence by July 1939.<sup>87</sup> A recent report stated that the Ministry of Agriculture of Ecuador had granted a concession to a Japanese for the planting of 20,000 cinchona trees.

In 1939 there were 800 Chinese in the country. Some of these were laborers who had moved in from Peru; others came directly from China. Once again these immigrants are to be found in the cities where they are proprietors of small shops.

The Japanese who first settled in Bolivia were engaged in agriculture in the Amazon regions. At present, however, two-thirds of them have drifted away from agriculture to the cities. The majority are in the one city of La Paz, where their cooperative credit system and other activities have made some impression upon the industrial life of the city.

The occupational activities of Orientals in Uruguay and Venezuela are but a continuation of the same account. They are shopkeepers, merchants, salesmen and clerks. Thus, in the countries that have seen this settlement in the cities, the immigrant from Asia has contributed little to the solution of the pressing problems of labor shortage in the rural areas.

<sup>87</sup> *Estadística y Censo*, July 1939.

*Central America.* The Chinese have played a more important role in Central American immigration than have the Japanese. As early as 1913 the Chinese in Panama had a virtual monopoly of truck gardening, of the laundries and the provision stores. The Panamanian census of 1930 lists 2,472 Chinese nationals resident in the country, about half of whom were retail merchants trading in rice, silk and groceries. In some of the other small countries, of which Costa Rica may be given as an illustration, the Chinese own small cacao, banana and coffee farms.

The Chinese in Cuba form an important foreign community. The Cuban census of 1931 reported 24,480 in the island. This represents a surprising increase of almost 138 per cent over the number residing there in 1919. Some of these are descendants of those who were brought to Cuba as coolie laborers; others came later as laborers on contract and as independent immigrants. But restrictions against the entrance of Chinese have been enforced almost continuously. The American military government of the island prohibited Chinese entrance in 1902. Only merchants and students were permitted into the country. This regulation remained in force until the need for laborers made necessary the liberalization of some of the old restrictions. However, in 1926 new prohibitions were enacted which refused admission to all but consular officials.

About two-thirds of the Chinese are concentrated in the city of Havana. Newspapers, clubs, theatres, and large business enterprises indicate the importance and size of the Chinese community. Their numbers in the retail trades, laundries, restaurants and truck gardens have been sufficient to stir the anger of those Cubans who are finding Chinese competition hard to meet.

### *Emigration Policies*

Even though a great many Chinese (as in the case of the Sangleys of Manila) emigrated to foreign countries as merchants or laborers, the penalties imposed by the Imperial Government of China on those who sought to leave were not removed until 1870. At that time, the right of a person to change his home and the mutual trade advantages of free migration were at least recognized, although the Chinese government, afraid of the revolutionary spirit which even at that time manifested itself among nationals who had been in contact with foreign cultures, did nothing to promote emigration. It continued to regard



emigration as a compromise with foreign pressure which sought access to China's great labor reserve. While the Chinese government has in a measure protected the position of its nationals in Latin America through treaty arrangements, it has had no policy for the direction or control of emigration. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, has directly sponsored and subsidized emigration to certain countries and has sought, through agreement, to remove restraints placed upon Japanese nationals because of their Asiatic origin.

Emigration as a policy and a problem did not arise for Japan until 1868, when 153 persons went as contract laborers to the Hawaiian sugar plantations. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the detailed control of Japanese emigration was entrusted to Chinese companies. The direction of this emigration in the years that followed was largely to the United States, Hawaii and Canada. However, as these countries increased their restrictions, Japanese emigration turned to Latin America.

Except in the case of a woman married to a foreigner, the expatriation of Japanese subjects who have acquired foreign citizenship was not recognized by the government until 1916. The revision of the Law of Nationality in 1916, and its further amendment in 1924, led to this recognition in certain instances. In South America, expatriation of Japanese is acknowledged by their home government in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.<sup>38</sup>

In the twenties the direct encouragement given to emigration by the Japanese government took the form of subsidies to emigration companies and the organization of prefectural associations under the Emigration Association Law of 1927. An item "expenditure for protection and development of emigration" has been included in the budget since 1923. The *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* alone has received annual subsidies ranging from 100,000 to 250,000 yen. In 1936 over forty private organizations were recipients of government subsidies to carry on the work of encouraging emigration. Subsidies have been granted to steamship companies as well. By a law of 1896, a vessel carrying more than fifty

<sup>38</sup> The number of expatriated Japanese (those whose foreign naturalization is accepted by the Japanese Government, is, however, small:

1929—708	1931—774	1933—1696	1935—451
1930—697	1932—1541	1934—1144	

emigrants destined for certain countries was called an emigrant ship. In 1936 there were ten such emigrant ships owned by the *Osaka Shosha Kaisha*, which were entitled to subsidy.<sup>89</sup>

The organization of emigration associations has moved beyond the formation of large emigration companies. Recruiting societies have been set up in each prefecture and have in turn been combined into the Federation of Emigrant Societies. This Federation, together with the *Kagai Kogyo Kaisha* and the South American Development Company, are the largest enterprises concerned with South American emigration, more particularly that directed to Brazil.

All three organizations arrange for the transportation of the emigrant and his settlement on the land. They act as employers of labor, as landlords to tenant farmers, and as agents for Latin America landowners and for those individuals wishing to go to South America as independent farmers.

There are certain auxiliary agencies, such as the emigrant training centers in Japan and the *Instituto Amazonia* in Brazil, which facilitate the adjustment of individuals in the new country. Each prospective emigrant spends at least ten days in the school in Kobe before his departure for South America. This training school, founded in 1928, is part of the general scheme to foster emigration. In those ten days, the individual is introduced to something of the language and customs of the country to which he has elected to go. Up to 1934, 103,130 persons had spent some time in the Kobe Training Center.

The *Instituto Amazonia* was established to make a study of climatic, agricultural and other conditions essential to a successful settlement program. A central experiment farm and a training school have also been established. In this farm and school, the graduates of the Japan Higher Colonization School are received with the intention of turning them out as model colonists.

#### *Oriental Immigration Policies of Latin American Governments*

Within recent years the various Latin American governments have set up restrictions against free entrance into their countries. Some of these laws are in the nature of blanket exclusions of those "not of white race" or of those belonging to the "yellow race", as in the case of

<sup>89</sup> According to Toru Ogishima, "Emigration of Japanese," *International Labor Review*, November 1936.

Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela and Paraguay. In others, for example Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Bolivia, the excluding clause is directed against the Chinese. In some instances, quotas have been established, as in Brazil. Colombia has set up a capital entrance requirement for Chinese, which amounts to virtual exclusion.

Japan has in most instances attempted to safeguard her subjects against these exclusions. Such safeguards have been accomplished even in countries where the Japanese community is very small. Paraguay offers an illustration of what has been achieved through negotiation. Through an exchange of diplomatic notes in 1920, the government of Paraguay stated that the term "yellow race," which appears in the prohibitory clause of its Immigration Act, did not apply to subjects of Japan. Several treaties of commerce and navigation negotiated by Japan stipulate that Japanese nationals be allowed to move freely in all part of the country wherever subjects of the most-favored nation are authorized to go. The treaties with Argentina (1898), Brazil (1895) and Chile (1896) contain the above provision. The treaties and exchange of notes with Ecuador (1918), Mexico (1924), and Peru (1895) provide that Japanese citizens shall have full right to enter these various countries and reside in them with their families, being thereby placed on the same footing as native subjects, provided that the newcomer complies with the laws of the country of immigration.

The situation of the Chinese is very different from that prepared for its nationals by the government of Japan. In the three countries in which Chinese immigrants are found in fairly large numbers, there are at present restrictions against their continued admission. In the case of Mexico, a *modus vivendi* provisionally regulates the entrance of Chinese into Mexico until the treaty of 1899 shall have been amended. According to this treaty, both countries agree to limit their numbers entering the territory of the other as long as Mexico restricts the immigration of foreign laborers in general. An enactment of 1936 places a property requirement on aliens entering the country. This is directed largely against those in trade unless that trade consists of exporting Mexican products, and by its very nature affects the great numbers of Chinese in the retail trades. Those entering as agricultural colonists are not subject to the general exclusions. This, of course, is of particular interest in view of Japan's emigration policy.

China and Peru have also attempted to regulate their immigration difficulties by means of treaties. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1874 and the protocols of 1909 establish the right of citizens of either country to emigrate to the other. But the Chinese government after 1909 undertook to restrict the emigration of its subjects to Peru by refusing to grant passports to unemployed Chinese attempting to leave for the purpose of finding work.

In Cuba after a series of restrictions which, for brief periods, were relaxed only for the introduction of laborers, a law of 1926 excluded all Chinese other than those in the diplomatic or consular service.

*Policy of the Brazilian Government.* Inasmuch as a very large majority of immigrants from the Far Eastern countries are in Brazil, the policy of the Brazilian Government takes on added significance. The policy has been one of encouragement in the matter of immigration. By a law passed in 1907 the government permitted colonization and promised assistance to voluntary immigrants who were in need of help with their initial equipment. The introduction of immigrants disposed to work in Brazil was also authorized at the cost of the government; it offered subsidies to railroad and steamship companies and other enterprises that regularly brought workers into the country. It was not until 1930 that the Brazilian government for the first time restricted immigration by prohibiting the entrance of third-class passengers, except agricultural workers and those on contract. The question of restriction was frequently raised during the next few years.

The Federal Constitution of May 24, 1933, fixed the number of those permitted to enter the country as two per cent of those that had settled in Brazil during the preceding fifty years. The law of 1934 not only restated the percentage restriction but also forbade residence "in assembly," which meant residence in colonies given over exclusively to groups of one nationality.

The immigration law of 1938 (Article 40) further specifies that in each nucleus or official or private center, there shall be maintained a minimum of thirty per cent of the Brazilian and a maximum of twenty-five per cent of any foreign nationality. If no Brazilians move into these colonies, the minimum may be filled by foreigners. In the above

nuclei the schools, both official and private, are to be directed by Brazilian-born subjects (Article 41). A decree issued by President Vargas in 1939 further tightened control over Brazilian-born children of foreign parents by requiring secondary schools to set up special departments in which military training will be given by Brazilians.

Additional powers were given by the same decree to the Immigration Council, enabling it to bar further closed settlements of foreigners of the same origin in colonization areas of one state. Foreign corporations are barred from acquiring large tracts of land. The effects of the law and of the decree upon the Japanese colonization companies will, no doubt, be very marked.<sup>40</sup>

The two per cent limitation in the 1934 law meant that only three thousand Japanese could enter Brazil in any one year.<sup>41</sup> The law of 1938<sup>42</sup> repeated the quota limitation of two per cent of the number having entered the country between January 1, 1884, and December 31, 1933.<sup>43</sup>

The same article (Ch. 3, Art. 4, Subsection 5) states that when the quota allotted to a single nationality does not reach three thousand persons, the Immigration and Colonization Council can raise it to that limit. Article 16 assigns eighty per cent of each quota to foreigners who are in agriculture or experts in the rural industries. A person entering the country under the above quota is required to follow the profession indicated for a period of at least four years, unless the Council of Immigration and Colonization grants the necessary permission to do otherwise (Article 17). When convenient, the Council is empowered to permit the balance of the quotas to be utilized for the introduction of

<sup>40</sup> The South American Colonization Co. held 2,450,000 acres of undeveloped land; the Brazilian Colonization Co, 612,000, according to a report in *Trans-Pacific*, May 31, 1934, p. 12.

<sup>41</sup> *Trans-Pacific*, May 31, 1934, reported that 23,000 went to Brazil in 1934.

<sup>42</sup> Brazilian Immigration Law, 1938, comprising the Decree Law 406 of May 4, 1938, including modifications thereto contained in Decree Law 639, dated August 20, 1938, together with Decree Law 3010 of the same date.

<sup>43</sup> Excluded from the quota are foreigners married to Brazilian women when the Brazilian woman comes with a Brazilian passport, and minor children and foreigners domiciled in the national territory who have absented themselves from it for a period of not more than two years.

agricultural workers belonging to a nationality whose quota has already been exhausted.<sup>44</sup>

The quotas fixed by the 1938 law<sup>45</sup> for both Chinese and Japanese are:

	<i>Totals</i>	<i>Quota</i>	<i>Agricultural workers</i>	<i>Others</i>
<i>From</i>	<i>1884-1933</i>	<i>2 per cent</i>	<i>80 per cent</i>	<i>20 per cent</i>
Japan	142,457	2,849	2,279	596
China	1,581	31	25	6

### *Occupational Restrictions*

It is not surprising that trade controls and immigration restrictions have been followed by a series of laws limiting the numbers of foreign nationals employed in certain industries. Beginning with Chile and Guatemala in 1925, the policy of restricting the employment of aliens has spread throughout most of the Latin American countries.<sup>46</sup> Only Costa Rica and Paraguay have as yet no legislation of this type.

The proportions of nationals which must be maintained in the personnel of certain industries range from fifty per cent in Cuba to ninety per cent in Mexico.<sup>47</sup> These are not enactments aimed at any single group of foreigners but are designed to admit into the country only those who fill a specific occupational need. Even the exceptions to these laws show how sweeping the exclusions were intended to be. For instance, the laws of certain countries—among them Brazil, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Panama—provide that aliens who have lived in the country in question for a specified number of years or those married to natives or widowed and having children are not subject to the occupa-

<sup>44</sup> This applies to bilateral treaties with countries of emigration. Article 19 of Decree 3010 empowers the government to draw up immigration treaties for the purpose of settling agricultural laborers in the country.

<sup>45</sup> Brazilian Immigration Law of 1938, table No. 1, p. 84.

<sup>46</sup> The legislation now in effect in the various countries was enacted in the following years: Chile, Guatemala, 1925; El Salvador, 1926; Argentina, Brazil, 1930; Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay, 1931; Peru, 1932; Cuba, Honduras, 1933; Panama, 1935; Ecuador, Venezuela, 1936; Bolivia, 1937.

<sup>47</sup> The percentages are as follows: Cuba, 50; Brazil, 66-2/3; Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, 75; Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, 80; Bolivia, Chile, 85; Mexico, 90.

tional exclusions of these laws. In most instances, the number of years' residence required is ten, though in Panama it is as high as twenty.

It is to be expected that the various exclusions would extend to specific fields of enterprise. In Brazil, agriculture and mining are not included in the restricted occupations. It is obvious that the large numbers of agricultural workers who come in on contract or as independent settlers from Japan are still needed to help in the exploitation of vast regions of that country. The law of Venezuela has an agricultural exclusion but it allows the prohibition to be set aside in the case of immigrants directly contracted for or controlled by the federal government.

In practically all of the countries, aliens are barred from engaging in commerce. In Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Peru both agriculture and industry are in the prohibited fields. In all of these countries the small shopkeeper has been hard hit. Cuba makes an interesting exception by exempting family labor from the provisions of the law. This is of some significance, since a large majority of the Chinese are engaged in the retail trades in Havana, and it must be assumed that, according to old custom, a high percentage of family labor is employed.

## CHAPTER VI

### POLITICAL RELATIONS

The World War of 1914-18 brought not only a trade boom with a sense of insecurity to Latin America but also a new sense of importance in international affairs. Those countries that had declared war or had severed diplomatic relations with the Central European powers were invited to the peace conference. Eleven Latin American countries signed the peace treaty and most of them joined the League along with the original formulators of the plan. Eventually, all of the republics with the one exception of Ecuador became members of the League of Nations and thus represented what under other circumstances might have been a formidable one-third of the total membership.

But in spite of the added prestige won through these happenings, discussions that occupied the League members fell far short of anything that touched Latin American interests very closely. Latin American foreign policies and attitudes thus continued to be determined not by the programs of the nations assembled at Geneva but by a consideration of lenders, customers and investors. One after the other, the republics of South and Central America have made efforts to throw off outside political pressures. They have initiated nationalization schemes. Limitations have been placed on the proportion of foreign capital to be invested in specific industries. Tax exemptions have been granted to encourage new enterprises. Notwithstanding all of these attempts, the billions of foreign dollars that have made possible the development of oil in Mexico, of copper in Chile and Peru, of sugar in Cuba and bananas in Central America have introduced outside political pressures that have kept the Latin American nations "on the margin of international life." Expropriation, intended as an extreme expression of this



growing nationalism, has proved no panacea and has served merely to substitute one group of customers for another.

In this lending, investing and trading, the countries of the western Pacific have had little share. Whatever political significance Japan may at times have had has thus far been noticed principally by the effect of her economic interests on the actions of third powers, rather than by any pressure which she alone was able to exert. Treaty agreements with the Far Eastern countries are, however, of long standing, the first one being that entered into by China and Peru in 1874 and marking an effort to check the coolie traffic. In 1892 President Porfirio Diaz of Mexico, initiated negotiations for the establishment of friendly and diplomatic relations with China. A treaty between Mexico and Japan had been arranged four years earlier in 1888.

Subsequently, China signed treaties with Bolivia and Chile.<sup>1</sup> These are primarily treaties of amity and friendship. It is characteristic of them that they contain no detailed sections regarding commerce. Clauses of this type have been replaced by those guaranteeing to Chinese resident in the countries under reference the same treatment accorded subjects of other nations.

Following the treaty with Mexico, Japan entered into agreements with most of the countries of Central and South America.<sup>2</sup> Although the

<sup>1</sup> Bolivia — Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 3, 1919.

Brazil — Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 3, 1881.

Chile — Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Feb. 18, 1915.

Mexico — Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 14, 1899;

Amendment of 1899 Treaty, Sept. 26, 1921 (prohibits labor emigration from one country to other).

Exchange of Notes, Oct.-Nov. 1929 (relinquishment of extraterritoriality).

Peru — Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, June 26, 1874 (regulates Chinese Immigration into Peru).

<sup>2</sup> Some of the most important agreements are:

Argentina — Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 3, 1898, ratified Sept. 18, 1901.)

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, August 16, 1830, ratified Dec. 2, 1931.

Bolivia — Treaty of Commerce, April 3, 1914, ratified Mar. 15, 1916.

Brazil — Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Nov. 5, 1895, ratified Feb. 12, 1897.

[Footnote 2 continued on page 75]

most-favored-nation clause is included in all these agreements, it has been pointed out that they were negotiated before commerce assumed any importance and before any considerable efforts to develop it had been made. However, the status of these agreements is somewhat uncertain since within the last few years most of the countries referred to above have either repudiated the most-favored-nation clause or have asked for new treaty terms in an effort to balance the export and import trade carried on with Japan.

As far as New Zealand and Australia are concerned, the Ottawa Conference and other empire commitments left little scope for direct trade or treaty agreements with the countries of Latin America. Within the last few years, however, there have been noticeable attempts on the part of Australia and New Zealand to extend their foreign markets. Wherever the trade reached any significant total, most-favored-nation agreements were made. Brazil signed a commercial agreement with New Zealand in 1932. Australia in 1939 arranged a commercial *modus vivendi*. In both instances, most-favored-nation provisions were incorporated in the agreements.

Although trans-Pacific influences have thus far not been considerable, Japan has figured in the Latin American news since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. The defeat of Russia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance led to considerable discussion among Latin American writers as to the imminence of a struggle between the United States and Japan for dominance in the Pacific and the danger with which such ambitions threatened the Latin American nations. Newspapers, North American in particular, gave prominence to what they called Japanese plotting

---

Chile — Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Sept. 25, 1897, ratified Sept. 24, 1906. Additional Articles to Aforementioned Treaty, Oct. 16, 1899, ratified Sept. 24, 1906.

Mexico — Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 8, 1924, ratified May 5, 1925.

Exchange of Notes Relating to Treaty, Mar. 6, 1934, promulgated Mar. 16, 1934.

Paraguay — Treaty of Commerce, Nov. 17, 1919, ratified Aug. 25, 1921.

Peru — Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Sept. 30, 1924, ratified Feb. 19, 1930.

Venezuela — Treaty of Commerce, July 1939.

Uruguay — Commercial and Navigation Treaty, May 10, 1940.

against the United States and Japanese attempts to secure naval bases along the western coast of Latin America.

American and Japanese officials denounced these reports and labelled them fabrications originating in Europe; others ascribed them to the schemings of business interests in the United States and in Japan.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the explanation and in spite of the obvious nature of such reports, these stories were not without some effect in Latin America. Writers like Calderon and Ugarte discussed the "Japanese peril".<sup>4</sup> Calderon saw in every Japanese on Latin American soil "an emissary of political design." Count Okuma was quoted as having said "that South America was comprised in the sphere of influence to which the Japanese empire might legitimately pretend and that persevering emigrants might there build up a new Japan." Calderon saw the future war in the Pacific as a clash between the two imperialisms represented by the Okuma idea and by the Monroe doctrine, both of which constituted a threat to Latin American autonomy.

Ugarte, on the other hand, argued that security for the Latin American republics lay in exploiting any hostility existing between the United States and Japan. He ridiculed talk of a Japanese push into South America and saw in the political dislocations which would follow the completion of the Panama Canal a situation that would enable Europe and Japan to oppose the progress of the United States and thus indirectly help along the efforts towards autonomy made within the Latin American nations. It seems apparent from the writings of Calderon, Ugarte and others who thought like them that fear of the United States dwarfed any danger which appeared to threaten the Far East.

Concern over Japanese influence has continued to appear from time to time in the writings of trade groups and of the advocates of restricted immigration in some of the Latin American countries. Japanese inroads in Latin America have, within the last few years, formed the thesis of an increasing number of North American writings. There is, without doubt, some reason to believe that Japanese influence will grow more marked. It is not clear, however, that this need prove disadvantageous

<sup>3</sup> Gulick, Sidney L., *Anti-Japanese War Scare Stories*.

<sup>4</sup> Calderon, Garcia F., *Latin America, Its Rise and Progress*, Chap. 5; Ugarte, Manuel, *El Porvenir de la America Latina*, Chap. 8.

to the republics of Central and South America, for the present at least.

It is apparent that an aggressive campaign is being carried on by Japan not only to gain trade but to promote a favorable opinion for Japan. This has followed the usual preliminary channels of disseminating information "on systems of government, political, economic and social activities and other matters related to the life, customs, culture and progress of Asia which exercises an influence increasingly decisive in world developments." These words were intended to explain the establishment of the Tokyo Agency in Chile organized "for the transmission of news from Japan." There is an increasing number of magazine articles similar to the "Cronica del Japon" appearing in the Colombian *Revista Javeriana* for July 1940, which seeks to lay the same basis of prepared knowledge set forth by the Tokyo Agency.

None of the accustomed avenues of "cultural, political and economic" approach have been left untried. Trade missions, already mentioned, move back and forth across the Pacific from Chile, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, as well as from the smaller Central American republics. In spite of the fact that Japan is heavily involved in war, scholarships and summer tours to Japan and Manchukuo are sponsored by Japanese business groups in Latin America as well as by agencies, official and semi-official, in Japan proper. Within the larger Latin American republics, cultural museums have been designed to stimulate an interest in Japan and to help people to think of it as a sort of go-between in the development of all future intercourse with the continent of Asia. These culture museums do more than sponsor culture contacts. They sponsor investigations and publications which seek to point out the benefits to be derived from a closer relationship with the Orient through Japanese offices. They are perhaps intended to overcome unfavorable impressions left by propaganda agents whose function in the Latin American countries is to keep "Japanese immigrants Japanese."

The question of channels of contact and the resulting political effect is complicated by a crisscross of international dependences of one kind or another. There is the dependence of one Latin American nation upon the good will and trade of a larger and more powerful Latin American neighbor. There is also the dependence of the Latin American trader upon foreign customers and the widespread dependence

throughout most of the republics of Central and South America upon the capital, markets and armaments of the United States, the so-called "colossus" to the north.

In view of the important role that trade plays and in view of the shortage of foreign exchange, further extension of barter dealings such as those already arranged with Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile may in some respects swing the Latin American countries toward the Pacific. The shortage of other shipping facilities has placed the Japanese in a position, immediately strategic and advantageous. To Japanese ships, in a limited measure, has fallen some of the functions performed in the nineteenth century by the Yankee clippers. Since the British blockade has cut off much of the Atlantic trade, the Japanese, acting as carriers, are bringing to Latin American ports cargoes of German goods which are being transported over a circuitous route by way of the trans-Siberian railroad and thence across the Pacific.<sup>5</sup> It has been reported that two-thirds of the ships calling at Manzanilla harbor in Mexico are Japanese with shipments of German manufactures, chiefly electrical equipment, toys, celluloid goods, heavy hardware and chemicals. There is a temptation to speculate on the future of trade in these goods as they are of the kind that Japan would be able to supply once the war in China were ended. Thus, some of the Latin American countries find themselves dependent upon the Japanese for the maintenance of certain necessary supply lines. The transition from carrier to supplier is not, in any case, very great.

The trade needs of Japan and of Latin America in themselves constitute a source from which political influences may develop. The barter arrangement by which Mexico and Italy were to exchange rayon for oil is an illustration in point. The fulfillment of this contract has become uncertain and quite naturally the Japanese have made efforts to replace Italian rayon with their own. But fear of the repercussions that similar arrangements would have in the United States has given pause to Mexican and other groups. On the other hand, fear of the extension of the United States embargo on the shipment of war materials has intensified the Japanese search throughout Latin America for scrap iron, oil, antimony, copper and other minerals. Large quantities of these articles

<sup>5</sup> This traffic was halted by the outbreak of the Russo-German war in the summer of 1941.

have been sent in bond from Mexico, Peru and Chile to Texas and transhipped to Japan. Norwegian and other tankers, according to the *Petroleum World* for October 1940, carried cargoes of crude oil directly from Peru and Mexico. A Chilean report, dated November 11, 1940, mentions an announcement of the Ministry of the Interior, which states that Japanese purchases would keep the Chilean copper production normal in spite of the loss of European markets.

It is not possible to estimate what effect Japan's adherence to the Axis may have upon Latin American attitudes and trade as the United States policy becomes effective. In the press of several of the countries, it has been suggested that this Axis agreement on Japan's part will preclude any future restoration of the most-favored-nation treaty system. In the meantime, Japan has attempted to acquire concessions in the expectation that she would thus be able to procure some necessary supplies, while allowing time for the present antagonism to spend itself.<sup>6</sup> Panama Canal rates, as well as a lack of tankers, have had an adverse effect on the shipment of oil to Japan. Reports are still current of a projected Mexican pipe-line from Tampico to Salina Cruz on the Pacific Coast, of the rehabilitation of the Trans-Isthmian Railway, and of an order for three hundred tank cars to be used in transporting oil over this road. It is highly probable that few of these and other projected schemes will actually be carried out. Hemisphere programs for greater economic as well as military and naval collaboration may preclude certain arrangements with a country that has set herself on the unfavored side. And yet, inasmuch as this collaboration must wait upon Latin American trade needs, it is not clear that the Latin American countries will turn away from agreements that open an immediate market.

There is little need to enlarge on the political implications of the trade and good-will missions, of the concessions or of the new dependence which is enabling Japan partially to fill Germany and Italy's place. It is not surprising to find that Japanese business interests have been urging a lessening of the restrictive trade controls operative in Japan or that some of them are eager for the "liquidation" of the war in China.

<sup>6</sup> This is illustrated by the unsuccessful negotiation for a five-year exploration concession by the Veracruzana Petroleum Company. According to reports, the Veracruzana Company is controlled by the Laguna Company in which Japanese (principally the Mitsui) interests own 51 per cent of the stock.

What the end of the European war will mean to Japanese importance in Latin America is, of course, a moot question. After the War of 1914-18 the victorious European powers recovered much, though not all, of their Latin American trade and influence. German trade developed a prestige even greater than that of pre-War days. Among the newcomers to the field, Japan remained as a factor of minor importance. In the decades that have elapsed since the first World War, internal conditions in Latin America have undergone some change and a new nationalism has sprung from the growing awareness of the dangers inherent in a too great dependence on foreign powers. There is a more vocal insistence that products be sent wherever markets can be found and that loans be accepted from sources that no longer threaten domination. Thus, Japan as a trader nation meets with favorable opinion. Japan as an investor holds as yet little threat in spite of recent rumors that a large proportion of Japanese funds in the United States have been transferred to Latin America. However, Japan as a source of ideological intrusions brings into play a series of unwelcome foreign pressures.

Latin American reaction to Far Eastern happenings is as complicated as are its trade relations. In considering such attitudes to events as they take place across the Pacific, it becomes necessary once again to start from the realistic trade needs of the Latin American nations. Thus, opinions are shot through with considerations prompted by the various degrees of dependence suggested above. They grow in volume or fade into nothingness as the measure of international alignments can be taken. When Japan invaded Manchuria, Latin American press reports an illuminating commentary on foreign political controls. Papers featured the discussions in Geneva and the statements, not of Latin American representatives but of European spokesmen. The condemnation of Japan by some of the more powerful nations awakened echoes in several Latin American countries. El Salvador's recognition of Manchukuo did not follow the general pattern of reactions, which, on the whole, condemned the acts of Japan. However, as time passed and it became apparent that the League intended no definite action, these same papers hesitated to condemn the League for its failure but emphasized the difficulties and realities of the situation. Thus, most of the Latin American nations moved along in the current of events set in motion by the larger and more powerful members of the League.

When war broke out in China, several of the countries made their attitudes somewhat clearer. Mexico, prompted by the liberal policies of her government, asked at the Nine-Power Conference that concrete measures be adopted against Japan for violating the integrity of China. Other nations reacted in ways equally indicative of national and group attitudes. By the end of 1938, twelve of the Latin American republics had either withdrawn from the League of Nations or had given the required two years' notice. They withdrew, of course, for a variety of reasons, some because of the Ethiopian crisis, others because the League seemed impotent to protect the small and the weak among nations. Still others resigned because of their trade ties with Germany, Italy and Japan.

Events of 1940 and 1941 show clearly the same two trends in Latin American opinion. The Mexican press recently spoke of Thailand's demands on Indo-China as but the accustomed Nazi technique, transplanted with the "shady complicity" of Japan. Such terms as the "Hitler of the Far East" appear with increasing frequency in papers that make no editorial comment on the granting of concessions to Japan. There are, however, some small voices heard in yet another direction. An item appearing in Bogotá, in *El Liberal*, (August 28th, 1940) speaks of the plans for an increased trade interchange in the western hemisphere as "American bluff." The writer adds that there is only one hope left to the Latin American nations—the hope that the war will soon end and that it will end with a victory for Hitler since it cannot end soon without it. He gives as his reason the desirability of finding some competition to American imports and, what is even more basic to much Latin American thought, the need for steadiness in export markets.

Such an attitude is not general and, as a rule, is the mark of the few pro-fascist newspapers. Within the last few months, the declared policy of the United States has claimed the headlines and won an increasing expression of approval, particularly in the larger republics. However, the pro-axis papers touch the core of Latin American concerns when they speak of trade as the determinant of political alignments. In view of this, there seems to be little point in over-emphasizing press comment unfavorable to Japan. Until a program of crop and commodity diversification becomes an actuality and until the inter-American plan for increased reciprocal trade is extended, there appears to be a basis for the expansion of Japanese interests and influences.





## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A selected bibliography on Latin American-trans-Pacific relations must appear formidable because of the very nature of the references. Few studies have been made which deal specifically with the problem of Latin American contacts with the western Pacific. It has thus been necessary to compile this bibliography largely from brief references found in general works on individual Latin American countries. Such page references have been indicated by the use of parentheses. However, an increasing number of periodical materials have appeared since 1934. Because of the bulk of the bibliography, a reading list of the most readily accessible materials has been added as Appendix III.

### I. EARLY TRANS-PACIFIC CONTACTS

The Archives of the Indies, the writings of viceroys and the royal decrees found in the Memorial Informatario of the Extracto Historial, and the experiences of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century traders and travellers are a rich repository of the early trade carried on between the countries of the western Pacific and the Spanish colonies in America. Many of these writings are in Spanish. However, the subject is adequately covered in English. The references given below for the most part touch directly on the trans-Pacific relations of the Latin American countries. Wherever the content of the work listed does not specifically deal with this subject matter, those pages pertinent to the present study have been indicated in parentheses.

*Silk Trade Between China and New Spain: Establishment of the Galleon Trade: the Chinese in Manila, their importance in early trans-Pacific trade.*

- Blair & Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Cleveland, Ohio., A. H. Clark & Co., 1903-09, 55 vols.  
Schurz, William Lytle, "Mexico, Peru and the Manila Galleon," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, November 1918, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 389-402.

Schurz, *The Manila Galleon*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939, 453 pp.

———, "The Spanish Lake," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1922, Vol. 5, pp. 181-94.

———, "Acapulco and the Manila Galleon," *Southwest Historical Quarterly*, July 1918, Vol. 22, pp. 18-37.

———, *The Chinese in the Philippines in Pacific Ocean in History*, edited by H. M. Stephens and H. E. Bolton, New York, Macmillan Company, 1917, pp. 214-22.

———, "The Manila Galleon and California," *Southwest Historical Quarterly*, October 1917, Vol. 21, pp. 107-26.

———, "The Philippine Situado," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, December 1918, Vol. 1, pp. 461-4.

———, "The Royal Philippine Company," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, November 1920, Vol. 3, pp. 491-508.

Bancroft, H. H., *History of Mexico*, San Francisco, Bancroft & Co., 1883-88, 3 vols. (Vol. 3, p. 30).

*Documentos Inéditos Relativos al Descubrimiento Conquista y Organización de las Antiguas Posesiones Españolas de America y Oceania, Sacados de los Archivos del Reino y Muy Especialmente del de Indias*, Madrid, Imprenta de Frias y Compañía, 1867, 42 vols.

Read, Benjamin M., *Chronological Digest of Documentos Inéditos de las Indias*, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Albright & Anderson, 1914, 161 pp.

*Indice de Documentos de Nueva España Existentes en el Archivo de Las Indias de Sevilla*, Mexico, Imprenta de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1928-31, 4 vols.

Chapman, C. E., *Catalog of Materials in the Archivo General de las Indias for the History of the Pacific Coast and the American Southwest*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1919, 755 pp.

*Extracto Historial del Expediente que Pende en el Consejo Real, Consejo de las Indias*, Madrid, 1736.

Icazbalceta, Joaquin Garcia, *Bibliografia, Mexicana del Siglo XVI*, formado por Catarina a Janvier, Mexico, Porrúa Hnos y Cia, 1938 (pp. 194-204).

———, *Industria de Seda en Mexico*, Obras Completas, Mexico, 1896, 2 vols. (Vol. 1, pp. 125-61).

- Latourette, Kenneth Scott, *The Development of China*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1937, 333 pp. (p. 66).
- Couling, Samuel, *Encyclopedia Sinica*, Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1917 (p. 524).
- Brinkley, Captain F., *China, Its History, Arts and Literature*, Boston and Tokyo, J. B. Millet, 1902, 4 vols. (Oriental Series, Vols 9-12) (Vol. 10, p. 178).
- Gutzlaff, Chas., *China Opened or a Display of the Topography, History, Customs, Manners, Arts, Manufactures, Commerce, Literature, Religion, Jurisprudence, etc. of the Chinese Empire*, London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1838, 2 vols. (Vol. 2, p. 58).
- Soothill, W. E., *China and the West*, London, Oxford Press, 1925, 216 pp. (p. 83).
- Williams, S. Wells, *The Middle Kingdom*, New York, Scribner, 1883, 2 vols. (Vol. 2, pp. 431, 715).
- Boulger, Demetrius Chas., *The History of China*, London, W. Thacker & Co., 1898, 2 vols. (pp. 490-2).
- Browne, G. Waldo, *The New America and the Far East*, Boston, Marshall Jones & Co., 1910, 2 vols. (Vol. 1, pp. 245-53).

*Organization of the Spanish Colonial System and of Spanish Colonial Trade; its Effect on Trans-Pacific Commerce*

- Haring, Clarence Henry, *Trade & Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of the Hapsburgs*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1918, 371 pp.
- Roscher, Wm., *The Spanish Colonial System*, translated by Edw. Gaylord Bourne, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1904, 48 pp.
- Cappa, Ricardo, *Estudios Criticos Acerca de la Dominacion Española en America*, Madrid, 1889-98, 26 vols.
- Humboldt, Alexander, *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the new continent during the years 1799-1804*, London, 1814-29, 7 Vols. (This has been printed in several editions.)
- Humboldt, Alexander de, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of the New Spain*, New York, I. Riley, 1811, 2 vols.

*Conditions in Philippines and Their Significance for the  
Trans-Pacific Trade*

- Jagor, F. *Travels in the Philippines*, London, Chapman & Hall, 1875, 370 pp.
- Zuñiga, Fr. Joaquin Martinez de, *An Historical View of the Philippine Islands*, London, 1803, 2 vols.
- Morga, Antonio de, *The Philippine Islands Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan and China at the close of the Sixteenth Century*, London, Hakluyt Society, 1868.

*The Buccaneers in the Atlantic and the Pacific.*

- Brown, Vera L., "The Contraband Trade," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1928, Vol. 8., pp. 178-89.
- Wycherley, George, *Buccaneers of the Pacific*, London, Rich & Cowan, Ltd., 1929 and 1935, 271 pp.
- Dampier, William, *A New Voyage Round the World*, London, J. Knapton, 1717, 3 vols. (Vol. 1, pp. 245-7) (Later edition with introduction by Sir Albert Gray, London, The Argonaut Press, 1927, 376 pp.)
- Rogers, Woodes, *A Cruising Voyage Around the World*, London, A. Bell & B. Lintot, 1718, 428 pp.

*Trade Between Japan New Spain*

- Ortega, Nuñez A., *Relaciones Politicas y Comerciales entre Mexico y el Japon durante el Siglo XVII*. Mexico, Archivo Historico Diplomatico Mexicano, 1923-27, Nos. 2-21.
- , *Noticia Historica sobre las Relaciones Politicas y Comerciales Habidas entre Mexico y el Japon durante el Siglo XVII*, Mexico, Impr. del Gobierno en Palacio, 1897, 33 pp.
- Rivera, Manuel Camhas, *Los Gobernantes de Mexico*, Mexico, Impr. de J. M. Aguilar Ortiz, 1872-73, 2 vols. (Vol. 1, p. 96).
- Boxer, C. R., "Some Aspects of Portuguese Influence in Japan 1542-1640," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of*

- London: Transactions and Proceedings*, 1935-37, Vol. 33-34, pp. 13-64.
- Redesdale, Rt. Hon. Lord, "Three Hundred Years Ago," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of London: Transactions and Proceedings*, 1907-08-09, Vol. 8, pp. 3-21.
- Diosy, Arthur, "In Memory of Will Adams, the First Englishman in Japan," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of London: Transactions and Proceedings*, 1901-04, Vol. 6, pp. 325-53.
- Murdoch, James and Yamagata, Isoh, *A History of Japan During the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse 1542-1651*, London, K. Paul, Trubner & Co., 1910, 1926, 3 vols. (Vol. 3 revised and edited by Joseph H. Longford).
- Stiechen, M., *The Christian Daimyos: A Century of Religious and Political History in Japan 1549-1650*, Tokyo, Rikkyo Gakuin Press, 369 pp.
- Nuttall, Zelia, *The Earliest Historical Relations Between Mexico and Japan from Original Documents in Spain and Japan*, Berkeley, University of California Press, American Archaeology and Ethnology Series, 1906, Vol. 4, No. 1, 47 pp.
- Robertson, James A., *Bibliography of Early Spanish Japanese Relations*, Tokyo, Asiatic Society of Japan, 1915.
- Kaempfer, Engelbert, *The History of Japan, 1727*, translated by J. G. Scheuchzer, New York, Macmillan Company, 1906, 3 vols. (Vol. 1, p. 112; Vol. 2, Ch. 5).
- "The Log Book of Will Adams," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of London: Transactions and Proceedings*, 1914-15, Vol. 13, pp. 156-302.
- Thompson, Sir Edward Maunde, ed., *Richard Cock's Diary*, London, Hakluyt Society, 1883, 2 vols.
- Dixon, James Main, "Early Mexican and California Relations with Japan," Los Angeles, *Historical Society of Southern California*, 1911, Part 3, Vol. 8, pp. 217-27.
- Murakami, Naojiro, *Japan's Early Attempts to Establish Commercial Relations With Mexico*, reprinted from *Pacific Ocean in History* edited by H. M. Stephens and H. E. Bolton, New York, Macmillan Company, 1917.

- Saito, Hisho, *A History of Japan*, London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1912, 260 pp (p 158)
- Clement, Ernest W ed, *Huldieth's Japan Is It Was and Is A Handbook of Old Japan*, Chicago, A C McClurg & Co., 1906, 2 vols (Vol 1)
- Sadler, A L, *The Maker of Modern Japan The Life of Tokugawa Iyeyasu*, London, G Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1937, 429 pp (Chaps. 27, 32)
- Cavo, Padre Andres, *Los Tres Siglos de Mexico Durante el Gobierno Español*, Mexico, 1836-38, 4 vols, publ. with notes and supplements.
- Kottenhamp, F J, *Der Unabhängigkeitskampf der Spanisch-Amerikanischen Colonien*, Stuttgart, Literatur Comptoir, 1838, 459 pp
- Boxer, C R, "The Affair of the Madre de Deus," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of London Transactions and Proceedings*, 1928-30, Vol 26-27, pp. 4-87
- , "Portuguese Commercial Voyages to Japan, Three Hundred Years Ago 1630-39," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of London Transactions and Proceedings*, 1932-35, Vol. 30-32, pp. 27-77.
- , "A Portuguese Embassy to Japan 1644-47," London, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., *Japan Society of London, Transactions and Proceedings*, 1927-28, Vol 25, pp. 2-64.
- Nitobe, Inazo Ota, "American Japanese Intercourse Prior to the Advent of Perry," Washington, *Annals, American Historical Assoc.*, 1913, Vol. 1, pp. 129-40.

*Descriptions of the Fairs, Popularity of Oriental Wares in the  
Cities of New Spain and Peru*

- Monografías Históricas Sobre La Ciudad de Lima*, Lima, Peru, Librería e Imprenta, Gil S. A., 1935, 2 vols. (Contains biography of Father Cavo by M Gonzales de la Rosa; History of the Foundation of Lima by Father Bernabe Cavo)
- Agüero, Jose de la Riva, ed, *Descripcion Anonima del Peru y Lima a Principios del Siglo XVI Compuesta por un Judio Portugues y Dirigida a Los Estados de Holanda*, in Congreso de Sevilla, Seville, 1904.

- Mosas, Bernard, *Flush Times at Potosi*, Berkeley, University of California Chronicle, July 1909, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp 217-39.
- , *The Spanish Dependencies in South America*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1914, 2 vols. (Vol. 2, Ch. 1; pp. 128 129).
- Loosely, A. C., "The Puerto Bello Fairs," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, August 1933, Vol 13, pp. 314-35.
- Gemelli, Careri, and Giovanni, Francesco, *A Voyage Round the World*, in Churchill Awnsham, comp., *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1752, Vol. 4, pp. 1-568.
- Gemelli, Careri, and Giovanni, Francesco, *Viaje a La Nueva España*, Mexico, Sociedad de Bibliófilos Mexicanos, 1927, 326 pp.
- Ulloa, Jorge Juan, and Antonio de, *A Voyage to South America Undertaken by Command of the King of Spain*, translated by John Adams, London, 1806, 2 vols.
- Ulloa, Antonio de, and Santacilla, Jorge, *Relacion Historica del Viaje a la America Meridional*, Madrid, 1748, 4 vols.
- , *Noticias Secretas de America*, Madrid, 1826, 2 vols.
- Gage, Thomas, *A New Survey of the West Indies The English-American, His Travel by Sea and Land*, London, A. Clark, 1677, 477 pp
- Riva, Palacio Vicente, *Mexico a Traves de Los Siglos*, Barcelona, Espasa y Cia., 1888-89, 5 vols (Vol. 2, p. 516).

*Franciscans in the Spanish Colonies and in the Orient*

- Medrano, M J, *Historia de la Provincia de España, de la Orden de Predicadores*, Madrid, 1725, 1727, 1729, 1731, 4 vols. (Chronicles of Missions in South America Mexico and Philippines.)
- Fricius, V., *Religionstandi der Ganzen Neuen Welt, Beider Indien Gegen Auf und Nideigang der Sonnen*, Ingolstadt, Wolfgang Eder, 1588. (Contains chapter on Franciscans in the Orient.)

*Spanish and Mexican Dollar in China*

- Lee, F. C., *Currency, Banking and Finance in China*, Washington, 1926, United States Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Series, No. 27, p. 18.



- The China Yearbook*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., London, G. Rutledge & Sons, 1921-22 (pp. 294-5).  
 ———, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., London, G. Rutledge & Sons, 1926, (pp. 527-8).  
 Haring C H, *American Gold and Silver Production in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1915, 47 pp.  
 Darwin, L, "Currency Reform in Mexico and China," *Economic Journal*, September 1904, Vol 7., pp 395-400.  
 Garnett, P, "History of the Trade Dollar," *American Economic Review*, March 1917, Vol. 7, pp. 91-7.

## 2 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

### *The Clipper Ships and the Pacific Trade*

- Dulles, Foster Rhea, *The Old China Trade*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930, 228 pp. (pp 76-80)  
 Bancroft, H H, *History of the Pacific States*, Vol. 3, pp. 5-6.  
 Stevenson, Wm. B, *Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years' Residence in Chile, Peru and Colombia*, London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown & Green, 1825, 3 vols.  
 Lubbock, Alfred Basil, *The China Clippers*, Glasgow, J. Brown & Sons, 1919, 388 pp.  
 ———, *Coolie Ships and Oil Sailers*, Boston, Chas. E. Lauriat Co., 1935, 180 pp (pp. 32-51).

### *Crop Transplanting*

The transplanting of crops from one side of the Pacific to the other is suggested in the following

- Spinden, H. J, "Thank the American Indian for Potatoes, Maize, Beans, the Peanut, Rubber," *Illustrated Scientific American*, April 1928, pp 330-2  
 Cook, O. F, "Debt of Agriculture to Tropical America," *Pan-American Bulletin*, September 1930, pp. 874-87.  
 Brand, D. D., "Origin and Distribution of New World Cultivated Plants," *Agricultural History*, April 1939, pp. 109-17.

- Safford, W. E., "Isolation of Ancient America as Indicated by Its Agriculture and Languages," *Scientific Monthly*, January 1926, pp. 55-9.

### 3. TWENTIETH CENTURY TRANS-PACIFIC RELATIONS: TRADE

The evolution of Latin American institutions and the effect of early Spanish control on present problems fall within the scope of this work only inasmuch as they are the keys to an understanding of present trans-Pacific relations. A comprehensive treatment of this subject will be found in

- Rippy, James Fred, *Historical Evolution of Hispanic America*, New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1932, 580 pp.

The general conditions and problems which confront the Latin American countries are treated in innumerable publications and no attempt will be made to present such a list here. However, a few such surveys are pertinent since they form the basis of present and future Pacific contacts.

- Royal Institute of International Affairs, Study Group, *The Republics of South America*, Oxford University Press, 1938, 372 pp.
- Trueblood, Howard J., "Raw Material Resources of Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 1939.
- Bratter, Herbert M., "Foreign Exchange Control in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 1939.
- Wythe, George, "Manufacturing Development in Argentina and the New Industrialism in Latin America," *Journal of Political Economy*, April 1937, pp. 207-28.
- Trueblood, Howard J., "Trade Rivalries in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 1937.
- Beals, Carleton, *The Economic Struggle for Latin America*, New York & Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938, 401 pp.
- Whittaker, John T., *Americas to the South*, New York, Macmillan, 1939, 300 pp.
- Inman, Samuel Guy, *Latin America, Its Place in the World*, Chicago & New York, Willett, Clark & Co., 1937, 462 pp.
- Normano, J. F., *The Struggle for South America*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931, 249 pp.

Data as they refer to trade with the Pacific countries are presented in the official and semi official yearbooks issued by the countries of the western Pacific as well as in the various statistical annuals published by the departments of statistics which have been set up in the Latin American countries. However, other references of value are the *Far Eastern Survey* published in New York by the Institute of Pacific Relations, the *Commerce Reports* and *Special Circulars* issued by the United States Department of Commerce, the *Oriental Economist*, *Reports on Economic and Commercial Conditions* published by the Department of Overseas Trade, London, and *Pan-America Commercial*, a monthly review published by the Pan American Union.

*Latin American trans Pacific Trade—General*

Harvard University, *The Economic Literature of Latin America*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935, 2 vols.

"Maru Ships on the Trade Lines of the Seven Seas," *Literary Digest*, January 7, 1922, p. 52.

Beals, Carleton, "Japan Invades Latin America," *American Mercury*, March 1935, pp. 299-306.

———, "Totalitarian Inroads in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1938, pp. 78-89.

———, "The Coming Struggle for Latin America," *Readers' Digest*, November 1938, pp. 111-27.

———, "Japan Tiptoes Around the Monroe Doctrine," *Current History*, September 1938, pp. 32-4.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Republics of South America*, Oxford Press, 1937, 374 pp. (pp. 71, 308, 349, 350).

Sawada, Setsuzo, "Observations on South America," *Contemporary Japan*, August 1939, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 723-9.

"Japanese Expansion in Latin America," *Review of Reviews*, September 1910, p. 363.

Japan, Bureau of Commerce, Second Division, *Foreign Trade in Latin America With Special Reference to Japanese Goods*, Tokyo, August 1933, pp. 120-2 (in Japanese).

Arbaiza, G., "Acute Japanese Problem in South America," *Current History Magazine*, (N. Y. Times), February 1925, pp. 735-39.

- Porter, Catherine, "Japan's Penetration of Latin America," *Far Eastern Survey*, May 22, 1935, pp. 73-8.
- Zišchka, Anton, *Japon en el Mundo, la Expansion Japonesa Desde 1854*, Santiago, Chile, Ediciones Ercilla, 1938.
- Arbaiza, Genaro, "Are the Americas safe?" *Current History*, December 1937, pp. 29-34.
- Naft, S., "Who Sells Latin America?" *Business Week*, April 10, 1937, p. 65.
- Tsai Chien, *Trend and Character of China's Foreign Trade, 1912-1931*, China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933, 53 pp.
- Lewandowski, M., "L'Expansion Economique du Japon dans le Monde," *Deux Mondes*, January 15, 1934, pp. 428-442.
- Trans-Pacific, Tokyo (weekly), *Japan Advertiser* weekly edition:  
 Nakajima, K., "Japan Determined to Hold Trade Gain," January 4, 1934, p. 22.  
 Machida, Chuji, "Machida Desea Promocion de Comercio Libre Para el Bienestar de Mundo," September 6, 1934, p. 1.  
 Lopes, Miguel Jimenez, "Latin America," August 21, 1930.  
 "Foreign Trade Gains Marked in Central and South America," June 7, 1934, p. 1.  
 "Government Plans Big Trade Company," October 26, 1933, p. 21.  
 "Wants More Sales in Latin America," October 12, 1933, p. 18.  
 "Want Trade Pacts in South America," July 20, 1933, p. 17.  
 "El Japon Mira Hacia la America Latina," November 2, 1933, p. 3.  
 "Latin American Consuls Explain Regulations," November 2, 1933, pp. 17-19.  
 "Japan Trade Shifts to Central and South America," November 2, 1933, p. 20.
- Bywater, Hector C., *The Great Pacific War*, Boston & New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932 (p. 126).
- Haring, C. H., *South America Looks at the United States*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1928, 243 pp. (p. 131).
- Rippy, J. Fred, *Latin America in World Politics*, New York, F. S. Crofts, 1931, 301 pp. (pp. 224-34).
- American Commerce in South America and the Menace of Japan's Expansionist Plans*, Washington, Second Pan-American Commercial Conference, 1919.

- Sinani, S. G., *Kolonial Problems*, Moscow, 1933, 2 vols. (Vol. 1, p. 201).
- Normano, J. F., "Changes in Latin American Attitudes," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1932, pp. 161-72.
- Recent Trends in Japan's Trade with Latin America*, Washington, U. S. Department of Commerce, Special Circulars Nos. 394, 400.
- Fox, Stark, "Decline Continues in Exports to Japan," *Petroleum World*, October 1940, p. 28.
- Bloch, K., "Poor Prospects for Japan in Latin America," *Asia*, July 1940, pp. 362-3.
- "Oil for the Bombs of China: Japanese Concession," *Time*, October 28, 1940, pp. 22-3.

*Argentina.*

- Montenegro, Arturo Alvarez, "Progress in Argentina," *Trans-Pacific*, November 2, 1933, p. 5.
- Napp, Richard, *The Argentine Republic*, Buenos Aires, 1876, 463 pp. (p. 418).
- Phelps, V. L., *The International Economic Position of Argentina*, London, Oxford Press, 1938, 271 pp. (pp. 147-9).
- Martinez, Albert B., and Lewandowski, Maurice, *The Argentine in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Scribner, 1915, 372 pp. (p. 230).
- "Japan's Commerce Grows in Argentina," *Trans-Pacific*, June 28, 1934, p. 17.
- "Argentine Trade Suffers a Setback," *Trans-Pacific*, November 16, 1933, p. 19.
- Comments on Argentine Trade*, Published by Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. in the Argentine Republic, Buenos Aires, October 1939.
- Randall, Harold M., "Economic Review of Argentina during 1939," *Comments on Argentine Trade*, Buenos Aires, February 1940.
- Denis, Pierre, *The Argentine Republic*, Translated by Joseph McCabe, London, T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1922, 296 pp. (p. 8).
- Garcia, J. Rodriguez, *Japon en la Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Union Industrial Argentina, 1938, 215 pp.

*Brazil.*

- Człogeras, Joao Pandia, *A History of Brazil*, translated and edited by Percy Alvin Martin, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1939, 374 pp.
- Normano, J. C., *Brazil, A Study of Economic Types*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1935, 254 pp.
- Brazil: Statistics, Resources and Possibilities*, Rio de Janeiro, 1932-38 (official publication).
- Mendes, Amando, *Japão Que Avança*, Livraria Editora Record, São Paulo, 1937, 322 pp. (report on possibilities of trade between Japan and Brazil, by a member of an economic mission to Japan).

*Peru.*

- "Basic Agreement of Views Reached Between Peruvians and Japanese," *China Weekly Review*, October 8, 1938, p. 201.
- Bernales, M. Montero, "Cotton Industry in Peru," *Bulletin, Pan American Union*, December 1937, pp. 903-910.
- Paulet, Pedro E. "Peru Has Many Riches," *Trans-Pacific*, November 2, 1933, p. 7.
- "Peruvian Economic & Cultural Good Will Mission Arrived," September 16, 1938, *Trans-Pacific*, September 22, 1938, p. 17.
- "Peruvian Cotton is Main Export Item," *Trans-Pacific*, November 3, 1938, p. 37.
- "Japanese in Peru Try to Sell Cotton," *Trans-Pacific*, June 30, 1938, p. 21.

*Chile.*

- "Chile Would Like to Swap Nitrates for Russian Oil," *Business Week*, September 23, 1931, p. 31.
- Memoria de la Legacion de Chile en el Imperio del Japon, 1900*, San Francisco, Impr. de J. M. Torres, 1900, 43 pp. (Mission to study possibility of nitrate market in Orient.)
- Montt, Sergio, "Chile, Buyer of Cotton," *Trans-Pacific*, September 6, 1934, p. 24.

"Twelve Proposals Given to Chileans," *Trans-Pacific*, April 22, 1937,  
p. 14.

*Mexico.*

- Nieto, R., "Mexico, Japan and the U. S.," *Living Age*, October 3, 1925,  
pp. 26-9.
- Hutton, D. G., "Mexico and the Pacific," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1938,  
pp. 149-58.
- Parkes, Henry B., *A History of Mexico*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.,  
1938, 132 pp.
- Nieto, R. "Mexico, U. S. and Japan," *China Weekly Review*, November  
7, 1925.
- Janeway, E., "Mexico, Tokyo, Berlin and the Oil Axis," *Asia*, Septem-  
ber 1938, pp. 518-20.
- Amador, A. C., "Opportunities in Mexico," *Trans-Pacific* November 2,  
1933, p. 10.
- , "Mexican Finance Strong," *Trans-Pacific*, September 6, 1934,  
p. 20.
- Baldwin, E. F., "Mexico and China," *Outlook*, May 14, 1910, pp. 82-5.
- Americanus, *Mexico-Deutschland-Japan*, Dresden and Leipzig, 1919.
- Norman, H. S. "Mexico Again Seeking Pipe Line to Pacific Coast,"  
*Oil & Gas Journal*, July 25, 1940, p. 70.

*Other Latin American Countries.*

In the case of the smaller countries, the most satisfactory references  
are the official statistical reviews.

- Bastel, W., Yazaki A. "Honduras, Field for Japan," *Trans-Pacific*,  
November 2, 1933, p. 14.
- Briccio, Julio E., "Big Market in Panama," *Trans-Pacific*, November 2,  
1933, p. 6.
- "Uruguay Has Facilities," *Trans-Pacific*, September 6, 1934, p. 22.
- Banda, Francisco, *Posibilidades Agro-Economicas del Ecuador*, Quito,  
Imprenta Nacional, 1937, 416 pp.
- Rodríguez, Dr. Carlos, Jiminez, "Advantages in Venezuela," *Trans-  
Pacific*, November 2, 1933, p. 9.

## 4. COLONIZATION AND IMMIGRATION

The many books written about the individual Latin American countries contain some references, however brief, to Oriental immigration. It would, however, not be particularly helpful to set them down since the space devoted to Asiatic immigration consists generally of but a few sentences.

*The Coolie Trade.*

- Akers, Chas. Edmond, *A History of South America*, London, John Murray, 1904, 696 pp. (pp. 545, 532, 581).
- Campbell, Persia C., *Chinese Coolie Emigration*, London, P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1923, 240 pp. (pp. 94, 96, 97, 117, 131, 156).
- Couling, S., *Encyclopedia Sinica* Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1917 (p. 133).
- Enock, C. Reginald, *Peru*, London, T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1912, 320 pp. (pp. 140, 290).
- Ferenczi, Imré, *International Migrations*, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929, 2 vols., Vol. 1.
- Foster, J. W., *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926, 498 pp. (pp. 274-7).
- Keller, A. G., *Colonization*, Boston and New York, Ginn & Co., 1908, 632 pp. (pp. 334-35).
- McNair, H. F., *The Chinese Abroad*, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1926, 340 pp.
- Michie, Alexander, *The Englishman in China During the Victorian Era As Illustrated by the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock*, Edinburgh, Blackwood & Sons, 1900, 2 vols. (Vol. I, p. 295; Vol. II., pp. 168-74).
- Martin, Percy F., *Peru of the Twentieth Century*, London, Edw. Arnold, 1911, 348 pp. (pp. 42, 125, 242, 256).
- MacNair, H. F., *Modern Chinese History*, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1923, 910 pp. (pp. 409, 411).
- Mayers, Wm. Fred; Dennys, N. B.; King, Chas., *Treaty Ports of China and Japan*, London, Trubner & Co., 1867, 668 pp.
- Seward, Geo. F., *Chinese Immigration in its Social and Economical Aspects*, New York, Scribner & Sons, 1881, 420 pp. (pp. 417-20).



Williams, S. W., *Chinese Immigration*, New York, Scribner & Sons, 1879, 48 pp.

———, *The Middle Kingdom*, New York, Scribner & Sons, 1883, 2 vols. (Vol. 2, p. 663).

Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America*, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1909, 286 pp. (Chaps. 18, 19).

*Relatorio e Documentos Sobre a Abolição de Emigração de Chinas Contratados e Macau Apresentado as Cortes na Sessão Legislativa de 1874 Pelo Ministro e Secretario de Estado Dos Negocios de Merenha e Ultramar*, Lisbon 1874.

#### *Recent Oriental Immigration to Latin America—General*

"South America and Asiatic Labor," *The American Review of Reviews*, November 1907, Vol. 36, No. 5.

Fields, H., "Closing Immigration Throughout the World," *American Journal of International Law*, October 1932, pp. 671-99.

Reid, W. A., "Immigration Situation in Latin America," *Bulletin, Pan-American Union*, March 1931, pp. 264-77.

MacKenzie, Norman, *The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries*, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, 374 pp.

*Migration Laws and Treaties*, Geneva, 1929, International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 3.

*World Statistics of Aliens*, Geneva, 1936, International Labor Office, 251 pp.

*Technical and Financial International Cooperation with Regard to Migration for Settlement*, Geneva, 1930, International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 7, 180 pp.

*Reports on Legislation Concerning the Movement of Labor and Migration in General*, Geneva, 1926, Misc. Publications, 38 pp.

#### *Chinese Immigration into Latin America—General*

Chen, Ta, *Chinese Migration*, Washington, 1923, Bulletin U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 340 (p. 15).

Gottwaldt, H., *Die Ueberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen*, Bremen, 1903 (pp. 39-41).

- MacNair, H. F., *The Chinese Abroad*, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1926, 340 pp.
- Wai Ching Chao, "Chinese Immigration in the Pacific Area," *China Social and Political Science Review*, Jan.-April 1929.
- "Legal Aspects of Asiatic Migration," *Problems of the Pacific*, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927, pp. 451-74.

*Japanese Immigration into Latin America—General*

- Weil, Elsie F., "Training Japanese for Emigration," *Asia*, November 1918, pp. 722-8.
- Hodges, G. Charles, "Japanese Ambitions and Latin America," *Sunset*, October 1916, pp. 16-17.
- Ogishima, Toru, "Japanese Emigration," *International Labor Review*, November 1936, pp. 618-51.
- Iriye, Toraji, *Development of Overseas Japanese*, Tokyo, 1938, 2 vols. (in Japanese).
- Occupational Distribution of Japanese Residents Abroad*, Research Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1936, 107 pp. (in Japanese).
- Hawada, T., *Our Colonies*, Tokyo, 1928 (in Japanese).
- Summary of Overseas Affairs*, Department of Overseas Trade, Tokyo, 1936 (in Japanese).
- Reports on Emigration Studies, Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo (in Japanese).
- Chunambe, *Federacion Japonesa de Asociaciones de Comerciantes con La America Latina*, Tokyo (published monthly).
- "Situation de l'Émigration Japonaise," *Revue Economique Internationale*, June 1933.
- Hehl, R. A., *Die Entwicklung der Einwanderungsgesetzgebung in Brasilien, in Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Bd. LXXII*, Leipzig, 1896, 293 pp.
- Greenbie, S., "Japan and Emigration," *New Republic*, January 26, 1921, pp. 262-3.
- Pinheiro de Vasconcellos, Henrique, *A Maior Crise Mundial, Possibilidade de sua solução Pela Emigração, e Colonização*, Rio

- De Janeiro, Typ do Jornal do Comercio, Rodrigues & Co., 1933, 130 pp.
- "Almost Two Million Japanese Subjects are Located Outside of Japan," *China Weekly Review*, September 21, 1935, pp. 85-6.
- Idei, Seishi, "Japan's Migration Problem," *International Labor Review*, December 1930, pp. 773-89.
- "Census of Japanese Overseas," *Industrial & Labor Information*, March 14, 1938.

*Oriental in Central America.*

- "Chinese on the Canal Zone," *Independent*, October 25, 1906, p. 1009.
- "Coolies for the Canal," *Independent*, November 22, 1906, pp. 1243-4.
- "Chinese Contract Labor in Panama," *Outlook*, October 13, 1906, pp. 343-4.
- Burgos, Antonio, *Panama y Su Inmigracion*, Panama, Imprenta Nacional, 1913, 146 pp. (pp. 83-4).
- Young, Arthur A., "The Progressive Chinese in Trinidad," *China Weekly Review*, December 21, 1929, p. 114.
- Koebel, W. H., *Central America*, London, T. F. Unwin, Ltd., 1917, 382 pp. (p. 201).
- Palmer, Frederick, *Central America and Its Problems*, New York, Moffat Yard & Co., 1910, 347 pp. (p. 78).
- Siewers, Enrique, "Immigration and Land Settlement in Venezuela," *International Labor Review*, June 1939, pp. 764-72.

*Mexico.*

- Stowell, J. S., "Remarkable Chinese Colony in Mexico," *Illustrated Missionary Review*, February 1924, pp. 110-13.
- "Why Mexico Expels the Chinese," *Literary Digest*, September 26, 1931, p. 14.
- Cousins, W. M., "Chinese in the Carribean," *Contemporary*, November 1926, pp. 632-38.
- Enock, C. Reginald, *Mexico*, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1912, 362 pp. (p. 325).

- Ichihashi, Yamato, *Emigration from Japan and Thence their Immigration into the State of California*, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard, 1913.
- "Plight of Chinese in Mexico," *Literary Digest*, June 24, 1933, p. 11.
- Baerlein, Henry, *Mexico, The Land of Unrest*, New York & Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 461 pp. (p. 159).
- Vivanco, Aurelio de, *Lower California Up-to-date*, Mexico, 1924, 580 pp.
- Bogardus, E. S., "Mexican Repatriates," *Sociology & Social Research*, November 1933, pp. 169-76.
- "Migration to and From Mexico in 1930," *International Labor Review*, November 1931.
- Romero, Ingeniero Jose Maria, *Comision de Inmigracion*, Mexico, Impr. A. Caranza e Hijos, 1911, 128 pp.
- "Is Mexico a Land of Despotism or Slavery?" *Review of Reviews*, November 1909, pp. 623-4.
- Turner, John Kenneth, "Slaves of Yucatan," *American*, October 1909, pp. 525-38.
- Culin, Stewart, ed., "A Japanese Log of Mexico," *Asia*, May 1919, pp. 434-40.
- Terui, Ryotaro, "Experiences in Mexico," *Migration Magazine*, 1918, No. 14, (in Japanese).

*Orientalists in South America:  
Brazil.*

- Ukers, William H., *All About Tea*, New York, Tea & Coffee Trade Journal Co., 1935, 2 vols., (p. 215).
- Cameron, C. R., "Colonization of Immigrants in Brazil," *Monthly Labor Review*, October 1931, pp. 784-94.
- Alimação dos Emigrantes Japoneses, Actividades da Kagai Kogyo Kaisha*, Rio de Janeiro, February 1934.
- Lopes, R. Paulo, "Land Settlement in Brazil," *International Labor Review*, February 1936, pp. 152-84.
- "Envoy from Brazil Defends Alien Law," *Trans-Pacific*, August 16, 1934, p. 12.
- "Brazil Moves to Ban Further Japanese Immigration," *China Weekly Review*, April 7, 1934, pp. 197-8.

- Brown, Constantia, "Japanese Activity in Latin America is Watched by 'United States,'" *China Weekly Review*, March 17, 1934, p. 110.
- Kawase, T., "Japanese Residents in Brazil and the Establishment of Cooperatives," *Brazil Magazine*, 1930, Vol. 4, No. 10 (in Japanese).
- Brazil, Nippon Migration Association: Research Section, Toyosha, Tokyo, 1918 (in Japanese).
- Miyazaki, Toru, *The Latest Condition of Japanese Emigrants in São Paulo, Brazil*, Tokyo, Nippon Migration Association, 1920 (in Japanese).
- Tsuji, Kotaro, "Is the Brazilian Intelligentsia's View of Japanese Immigrants, Anti or Pro-Japanese?" *Brazil Magazine*, 1927, Vol. 2, No. 1 (in Japanese).
- Hamada, Kantaro, "First Impressions of 'Coffee Emigrants,'" *Colonization Magazine*, 1926, Vol. 6, No. 7 (in Japanese).
- Young, A. Morgan, "Attitude of Japanese Government Toward Emigration to Other Countries," *Current History Magazine*, New York Times, October 1920, pp. 11-12.
- Hirota, K., "Exclusion Question in Brazil Explored," *Trans-Pacific*, March 29, 1934, p. 17.
- McKee, James Gilbert, "Brazil's Foreign Born," *Pan American Bulletin*, March 1926, pp. 265-73.
- Kobayashi, M., "Japanese Missionary in Brazil," *Illustrated Missionary Review*, October 1925, pp. 760-2.
- "To Send Japanese to Brazil," *Literary Digest*, August 10, 1912, p. 213.
- "Settlement Schemes in Brazil," *Pan American Bulletin*, January 1929, pp. 12-21.
- Haring, C. H., *South American Progress*, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1934, 241 pp. (p. 83).
- Lobo, Bruno, *De Japonês a Brasileiro, Adaptação e Nacionalização do Imigrante*, Rio de Janeiro, Tip. do Departamento Nacional de Estatística, 1932, 268 pp.
- Cruzamento da Ethnia Japonesa: Hypothese de que o Japonês não se cruza com Outra Ethnia*, São Paulo, Jap. Embassy, 1934.
- "O Cruzamento da Japonezes com Brasileiros," *Journal do Comercio*, Rio de Janeiro, September 17, 1935.
- "A Infiltração Japonesa," *Journal do Comercio*, Rio de Janeiro, September 16, 1935.

- Oliveira, Vianna, "E a Imigração Japoneza," *Journal do Comercio*, Rio de Janeiro, September 13, 1935.
- Bogfin, M., *O Brasil Nação*, Rio de Janeiro, 1931, 2 vols.
- Uyetsuka, Tsukasa, "Our Emigrants in Amazonia," *Contemporary Japan*, June 1935, pp. 84-8.
- "Immigration into Brazil in 1930," *International Labor Review*, November 1931, p. 608.
- Nash, Ray, *Conquest of Brazil*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1926, 438 pp. (p. 142).
- "Immigration & Settlement in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, Report of Permanent Migration Committee of I.L.O.," *International Labor Review*, February 1937, March 1937.
- "Japanese Living in Brazil are raising Eastern Crops," *Science*, December 25, 1937, p. 408; *Science Monthly*, February 1938, p. 178.
- "Brazilian Immigration Restriction," *Trans-Pacific*, May 31, 1934, p. 12.
- Fletcher, J. C., and Kidder, D. P., *Brazil and the Brazilians*, Boston, Little, Brown Co., 1868, 640 pp. (pp. 418, 419).
- "Settlement Schemes in Brazil," *Bulletin, Pan American Union*, January 1929, pp. 12-21.
- "Japan in Brazil," *Newsweek*, September 5, 1936.
- James, P. E. "Japanese Colonization in Brazil," *Geog. Review*, January 1937, pp. 145-6.
- Bigley, A. J., "Japanese in Brazil," *Discovery*, December 1936, pp. 374-5.
- "Once More Japan," *Review of Reviews* (London), March 1935, pp. 31-2.
- Normano, J. F., "Japanese Emigration to Brazil," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1934, pp. 42-61.
- , "Japanese Emigration to Latin America," *Genus*, May 1938, Nos. 1-2, 46 pp.
- , "Japanese Emigration to Latin America," *Population*, August 1938, Vol. II, No. 4.
- , "Japão e America Latina," *Revista de Ciencias Economicas*, São Paulo, Nov.-December 1940, Vol. II, No. 6.
- Fujinami, Akita, "Japanese in Brazil," *Trans-Pacific*, August 18, 1928, p. 2.
- "Planting Japanese in Brazil," *Literary Digest*, May 11, 1929, p. 18.

- "Brazil Welcomes Japanese Settlers," *Literary Digest*, February 14, 1931, p. 14.
- "Booming Brazil in Japan," *Literary Digest*, January 8, 1927, p. 20.
- "Japanese Trek to South America," *Literary Digest*, April 28, 1923, p. 20.
- Ariyoshi, Akira, "Brazil as a Possible Outlet," *Trans-Pacific*, August 21, 1930, p. 7.
- "New Brazilian Immigration Regulations," *Monthly Labor Review*, December 1925, pp. 1389-90.
- "Brazil's Provisions for Rural Immigrants," *Monthly Labor Review*, July 1923, pp. 253-4.
- Cameron, C. R., "Colonization of Immigrants in Brazil," *Monthly Labor Review*, October 1931, pp. 784-94.
- Takaoka, K., *Brazil Imin Kenkyu* (Study of Immigration to Brazil), Tokyo, 1925 (in Japanese).
- Callage, Fernando, "As Colonias Japonesas de São Paulo," *Boletim do Departamento do Trabalho Agrícola*, São Paulo, 1933.
- Freise, Friedrich, *Brasilien's Bevölkerungskapazität*, Petermanns Mitt., 1936, Vol. 82, pp. 143-47.
- Lehman, Edgar, *Zur Kulturgeographie der japanischen Siedlungen in Brasilien*, Leipzig, Wiss. Veröffentl. des Museums für Landerkunde zu, 1935, pp. 207-216.
- "Imigração e Colonização," *Geografia*, São Paulo, 1935, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 25-49.

#### *Other South American Countries.*

- Rio, Mario E. del, *La Inmigracion y Su Desarrollo en el Peru*, Lima, Peru, 1929, 62 pp.
- "Japanese Welcome in Peru Is Stressed," *Trans-Pacific*, October 4, 1934, p. 14.
- Thompson, Wallace, *Greater America*, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1932, 275 pp. (p. 154).
- "Japanese in Callao," *The Americas*, December 1920, p. 18.
- Conditions of Japanese Emigrants in Peru*, Kaigaiikogyo Kaishiki Kaisha, Tokyo, 1918 (in Japanese).
- Conditions in Peru*, Tokyo, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1928. (in Japanese).

- Alsino, Juan A., *La Inmigración en el Primer Siglo de la Independencia*, ed. por Felipe Alsino, Buenos Aires, 1910, 231 pp. (pp. 76, 86).
- Reports of Immigration Commission*, Senate Doc. No. 761, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1911 (*The Immigration Situation in Argentina*, pp. 195-206; *The Immigration Situation in Brazil*, pp. 209-29).
- Inouye, Ken, *New Field of Pioneering for Japanese Argentina Opens Her Doors*, Osaka, Asahi Shimbun, June 15, 1923 (in Japanese).
- Siewers, Enrique, "Opening for Settlers in Argentina," *International Labor Review*, October 1934, pp. 457-91.
- Vega, M. de la, "Japanese are Free to Go to Argentina," *Trans-Pacific*, May 31, 1934, p. 12.
- Oshima, Kuchi, *Argentina*, Tokyo, Shokuminsha, 1937 (in Japanese).
- "Agricultural Migration to Chile," *Overseas Commercial News*, 1925, Nos. 6-9 (in Japanese).
- Burr, M., "Russians in Paraguay," *Nineteenth Century*, October 1935, pp. 441-8.
- Forbes, Rosita, *Eight Republics in Search of a Future*, London, Cassell, 1935, 340 pp. (pp. 22, 104).

# 5. OCCUPATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

- Boletín Oficial*, Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 23, 1930.
- Diário Oficial*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, January 29, 1932, July 20, 1934, December 9, 1936.
- Boletín de Ministerio de Trabalho, Industria, e Comercio*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 1936, pp. 35-55; November 1936, pp. 39-52.
- Registro Oficial*, Quito, Ecuador, May 6, 1936.
- Labor Legislation in Mexico*, Washington, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 569, 1932.
- Report of Josephus Daniels*, American Ambassador to Mexico, March 25, 1937.
- Report of R. M. de Lambert*, Secretary, American Embassy, Lima, Peru, April 16, 1937.
- Industria Peruana*, Lima, Peru, August 1934, pp. 351-2; August 1936, pp. 459-61.



- Diario Oficial*, Montivideo, Uruguay, October 31, 1931; December 30, 1931.
- Gaceta Oficial*, Caracas, Venezuela, July 16, 1936; August 10, 1936.
- Report of Meredith Nicholson*, American Minister at Caracas, Venezuela, May 22, 1937.
- Gaceta Oficial*, Habana, Cuba, April 4, 1936, No. 95; May 11, 1936, No. 150.
- La Gaceta*, Managua, Nicaragua, February 25, 1931.
- Gaceta Oficial*, Panama, October 29, 1934; January 9, 1935.
- El Guatemalco*, Guatemala, December 24, 1927; March 15, July 11, August 11, 1928.
- La Gaceta*, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, May 15, 1933; May 16, 1934; April 4, 1936.
- Salvador*, Geneva, International Labor Office, Legislative Series, 1927.
- Peru*, Geneva, International Labor Office, Legislative Series 1932, 1933.
- Chile*, Geneva, International Labor Office, Legislative Series, 1931.
- Diario Oficial*, San Salvador, May 31, 1926; August 26, 1929.
- Monthly Bulletins*, British Chamber of Commerce in Brazil, July 1939, Vol. 21, No. 238.
- Report of T. Muldrup Forsyth*, American Vice-Consul of La Paz, Bolivia, February 8, 1937.
- Report of R. Henry Norweb*, American Minister at La Paz, Bolivia, April 22, 1937.
- Diario Oficial*, Santiago de Chili, January 24, 1934.
- Diario Oficial*, Bogota, Colombia, July 29, 1931; November 24, 1936; January 21, 1937.
- Report of Wm. Dawson*, American Minister at Bogota, Colombia, March 27, 1937.

## 6. EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES

- Ley de Inmigracion y Colonizacion*, Venezuela, 1938.
- Decree No. 397*, (as amending No. 1697 of 1936) Colombia.
- Brazilian Immigration Law*, 1938, Comprising Decree Law No. 406, May 4, 1938, including modifications contained in Decree Law No. 639, dated August 20, 1938 (together with Decree Law No. 3010, August 20, 1938).

- Direccion General De Poblacion*, Mexico, August 29, 1936.  
*Ley de Extranjera, Extradicion y Naturalizacion*, Ecuador, 1938.  
*Ley de Extranjera, Decreto No. 1781*, Guatemala, 1936.  
*Leyes y Reglamento de Inmigracion de la Republica de Cuba*.  
*Immigration & Colonization Act No. 817*, Argentina.

## 7. POLITICAL RELATIONS

- "Exchange of Notes between China and Mexico for the Relinquishment of Extraterritoriality," *China Social and Political Science Review*, April 1930, pp. 19-22.  
 League of Nations, *Treaty Series*.  
 MacMurray, John V. A., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1894-1919*, London, Oxford Press, 1921, 2 vols. (Vol. 1, pp. 214, 781, 1523; Vol. 2, pp. 917, 1190, 1485, 1523).  
 Mayers, Wm. Fredericks, ed., *Treaties Between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers*, Shanghai, 1906, 354 pp. (pp. 192, 193, 260).  
*Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China 1919-29*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet Series No. 50, New York, 1929.  
 Morse, Hosea Ballou, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, London, New York, Longmans Green & Co., 1910-1918, 3 vols., (Vol. 1, pp. 59, 470; Vol. 2, pp. 172, 175, 179, 180, 295, 327).  
 Godoy, Jose F., *Porfirio Diaz*, New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910, 253 pp. (pp. 50, 56, 206).  
 Burton, W., "South American Grab Bag: Italy, Germany and Japan Making Attempts to Spread the Fascist Doctrine," *Current History*, November 1937, pp. 54-8.  
 Hutton, Graham D., "Mexico and the Pacific," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1938, pp. 149-58.  
 Illanes, Benitez Fernando, *Nuestros Tratados de Comercio*, Santiago, Chile, 1933.  
 Whyte, Sir F., *China and the Foreign Powers*, London, Oxford Press, 1927, 78 pp.  
 Angus, Henry Forbes, *Problems of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area*, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, 193 pp.

- Janeway, Eliot, "The Americas and the New Pacific," *Asia*, February 1939, pp. 109-13.
- Scroggs, Wm. O., "Mexican Oil in World Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1938, pp. 172-5.
- Jimenez, Ramon Lopez, *Por Que Reconocio la Republica de El Salvador al Estado de Manchukuo*, San Salvador, Talleres Graficos Cisneros, 1935, 50 pp.
- Shepherd, Wm. R., *Latin America*, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1914, 256 pp. (p. 129).
- Enock, C. R., *The Republics of Central and South America*, New York, Scribner, 1922, 544 pp. (p. 499).
- Denny, H. N., *Dollars for Bullets*, New York, Dial Press, 1929, 411 pp. (p. 33).
- Tyau, T. Z., *The Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relations Between China and Other States*, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1917, 304 pp.
- Halperin, M., "Mexico Shifts Her Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940, pp. 207-21.
- Ugarte, Manuel, *El Porvenir de America Latina*, Valencis, 1911 (Chap. VIII).
- Merigo, Juan, *La Guerra Yanqui-Japonesa y La Actitud de Mexico*, Mexico City, 1932.
- Calderon, Garcia F., *Latin America, Its Rise and Progress*, New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1913 (Chap. V).
- Gulick, Sidney L., *Anti-Japanese War Stories*, New York, Fleming H. Revell Co., 1917.
- Etherton, P. T., & Tiltman, H. Hessel, *The Pacific: A Forecast*, London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1928.
- Aubert, Louis, *Americains et Japonais*, Paris, 1908.
- "In Latin America," *Living Age*, May 1941, pp. 274-7.

# APPENDIX I.

## TRADE STATISTICS

TABLE I.  
TRADE OF ARGENTINA WITH SPECIFIED TRANS-PACIFIC  
COUNTRIES \*  
(1,000 pesos)

Year	Japan		China		Netherlands Indies	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1929	10,823	2,715	1,031	55		
1930	10,824	1,990	1,237	50		
1931	10,229	4,072	998	489		
1932	12,354	1,912	500	729	1,009	39
1933	20,999	5,003	394	9,051	1,605	129
1934	32,038	6,801	896	5,512	3,566	406
1935	60,387	15,359	770	4,776	4,480	133
1936	44,438	25,683	543	646	7,729	413
1937	56,299	24,058	848	890	7,328	346
1938	54,484	16,229	649	490	7,398	223
1939†	10,171	10,214	690	1,068	7,600	347
1940‡	22,930	21,423	763	1,209	10,807	857

\* *Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina*, 1938.

† *Comments on Argentine Trade*, Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. A. in the Argentine Republic, Buenos Aires, Feb. 1940.

‡ *Business Conditions in Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Ernesto Tornquist & Co., Quarterly Report No. 229, Jan. 1941.

TABLE 2.  
TRADE OF MEXICO WITH SPECIFIED TRANS-PACIFIC COUNTRIES\*  
(1,000 pesos)

Year	Japan		China		Australia	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1929	1,387	1,395	374	19	18	
1930	1,095	809	472	151	290	1,599
1931	1,026	1,211	223	27	98	364
1932	650	749	67	269	0.2	1,580
1933	1,482	1,422	261	49		2,657
1934	3,028	7,364	163	38		3,573
1935	4,667	10,272	201	195		4,296
1936	7,325	18,485	205	30	964	4,503
1937	10,769	10,420	375	127	1,914	6,390
1938	8,771	3,591	429	87	2,981	1,538
1939	7,268	9,394	610	210	2,520	773
1940†	11,069‡	13,251‡	797‡	643‡	647‡	689‡

\* *Estadística del Comercio Exterior*, 1928, 1929 *Revista de Estadística*, December 1939, December 1940. *Anuario de Estadística*, 1939

† *Revista de Estadística*, April 1941

‡ January—September 1940.

TABLE 3.  
TRADE OF PERU WITH SPECIFIED TRANS-PACIFIC COUNTRIES\*  
(1,000 sol)

Year	Japan		China		Australia	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1930	2,362	3	20		1,957	0
1931	1,655	24	351		2,551	
1932	1,260	37	280		2,891	
1933	5,277	999	426	24	3,512	0.8
1934	10,226	5,085	643	86	965	
1935	9,392	8,890	570	0.1	58	
1936	7,874	14,060	495	0	126	
1937	8,105	3,887	535	54	1,309	
1938	8,684	1,952	389	45	90	0.9
1939†	8,016	9,111	656	501	37	..

\* *Extracto Estadístico del Perú*, 1938

† *Boletín de Aduanas*, Dec. 1939.

TABLE 4.  
TRADE OF CHILE WITH SPECIFIED TRANS-PACIFIC COUNTRIES \*  
(1,000 pesos)

Year	Japan		China		Netherlands Indies	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1930	11,321	7,884	1,009	17	2,838	3
1931	4,269	13,500			3,531	0.8
1932	1,204	300			2,059	
1933	1,991	1,200	75	4	1,305	
1934	8,504	1,300	1,000		1,900	
1935	11,121	3,800			3,100	
1936	9,937	8,419	138	57	4,126	
1937	11,115	14,949	186	4	6,832	
1938	12,517	10,591	112	57	5,338	
1939†	15,400	11,900	311	45	6,200	
1940‡	20,900	20,500§				

\* *Estadística Chilena*, Jan 1932, Dec 1933, Dec 1935. *Estadística Chilena*, *Sinopsis* 1937, 1939.

† *Pan-America Comercial: Estudio Económico Anual de la América Latina*, Año de 1939, Washington, 1940.

‡ *Monthly Economic Survey of Chile*, Santiago, July-September 1940

§ January—September 1940.

TABLE 5.  
TRADE OF BRAZIL WITH SPECIFIED TRANS-PACIFIC COUNTRIES \*  
(Contos de Reis)

Year	Japan		China	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1931	4,787	3,240	2,371	144
1932	5,542	3,626	1,311	23
1933	12,281	4,269	1,370	70
1934	16,648	10,638	1,862	30
1935	34,878	20,517	2,437	76
1936	49,572	209,846	3,712	9,529
1937	85,626	240,336	1,920	17,539
1938	68,414	233,922	939	25,675
1939	76,074	306,096	1,092	168,742
1940†	121,413	285,244	1,936	154,375

\* *Estatísticas Econômicas* (Publicação Semestral), Rio de Janeiro Ano IV, 1940.

† *Serviço de Estatística Econômica*, Rio de Janeiro, Jan, 1941.

APPENDIX II.  
ASIATICS IN LATIN AMERICA

TABLE I.  
NUMBER OF JAPANESE IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>
Argentina	(a)	1937	6,267	4,650	1,617
Brazil	(a)	1937	197,733	110,043	87,600
Bolivia	(a)	1937	769	527	242
Chile	(a)	1937	682	447	235
Colombia	Census	1939	273	(b)	(b)
Ecuador	Census	1939	8	..	.
Paraguay	(a)	1937	484	275	209
Peru	Census	1938	22,728	(b)	(b)
Uruguay	(a)	1937	74	48	26
Venezuela	(a)	1937	25	20	5
Cuba	(a)	1937	714	513	20
El Salvador	(a)	1937	7	5	2
Honduras	Census	1935	2		.
Mexico	(a)	1937	4,631	2,747	1,884
Panama	(a)	1937	358	256	102

(a) *Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook*, 1940, pp. 56-7.

(b) *Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook*, 1940, p. 57, gives the following figures:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Peru	22,150	13,845	8,305
Colombia	294	176	118

## APPENDIX II

TABLE 2.

## NUMBER OF CHINESE IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

<i>Country</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>
Argentina	Census	1936	125
Chile	Census	1930	1,605
Colombia	Census	1939	271
Ecuador	Census	1939	819
Peru	Census	1938	15,356
Venezuela	Census	1930	420
Cuba	Census	1931	24,480
El Salvador	†	1934	12
Costa Rica	Census	1930	215
Honduras	Census	1935	315
Mexico	Census	1930	18,965
Nicaragua	Census	1920	462
Panama	Census	1930	2,742
Trinidad	Census	1930	2,027

\* Chinese resident in the city of Buenos Aires.

† *Anuario de Estadística*, 1934, p. 15.



### APPENDIX III.

#### READING LIST

The following is a reading list of accessible and pertinent materials.

The documents of the Archives of the Indies and the accounts of traders, travellers and freebooters represent a source of valuable information on Latin American-Pacific relations in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Many of these writings are in Spanish. However, the subject is adequately covered by publications in English.

Two publications which may be considered background surveys of this early intercourse are:

Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Cleveland, Ohio, A. H. Clark & Co., 1903-09, 55 vols.

Murdoch, James, and Yamagata, Isoh, *A History of Japan During the Century of Early Intercourse 1542-1651*, London, Paul, Trubner & Co., 1910-26, 3 vols. (Vol. 3 revised and edited by Joseph H. Longford).

Additional readings of more recent publications include:

Dixon, James Main, "Early Mexican and California Relations with Japan," *Historical Society of Southern California*, 1911, Part 3, Vol. 8, pp. 217-27.

Nutall, Zelia, "The Earliest Historical Relations Between Mexico and Japan from Original Documents in Spain and Japan," Berkeley, University of California Press, 1906, *American Archaeology and Ethnology Series*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 47 pp.

Sadler, A. L., *The Maker of Modern Japan: The Life of Tokugawa Iyeyasu*, London, G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1937, 429 pp. (Chaps. 27, 32).

Schurz, William Lytle, *The Manila Galleon*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939, 453 pp.

———, "Acapulco and the Manila Galleon," *Southwest Historical Quarterly*, July 1918, Vol. 22, pp. 18-37.

———, "The Manila Galleon and California," *Southwest Historical Quarterly*, October 1917, Vol. 21, pp. 107-26.

———, *The Chinese in the Philippines*, in *The Pacific Ocean in History*, edited by H. M. Stephens and H. E. Bolton, New York, Macmillan Co., 1917, pp. 214-22.

———, "The Royal Philippine Company," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, November 1920, Vol. 3, pp. 491-508.

———, "The Philippine Situado," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, December 1918, Vol. 1, pp. 461-4.

Browne, G. Waldo, *The New America and the Far East*, Boston, Marshall Jones & Co., 1910, 2 vols.

Morga, Antonio de, *The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan and China at the Close of the Sixteenth Century*, London, Hakluyt Society, 1868.

The trade policies of Spain as they affected the colonies and the attempts to isolate the American colonies are described in the books and articles listed in the preceding section. However, a more comprehensive treatment will be found in:

Haring, Clarence Henry, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1918, 371 pp.

Conditions within the colonies, the Spanish Colonial System as well as the effect of the galleon trade upon the life of the people are treated in:

Roscher, Wm., *The Spanish Colonial System*, translated by Edward Gaylord Bourne, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1904, 48 pp.

Bourne, E. G., *Spain in America*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1904, 350 pp.

Simpson, Lesley Byrd, *The Encomienda in New Spain: Forced Labor in the Spanish Colonies, 1492-1550*, Berkeley, University of California Publications in History, 1929, Vol. 19.

Humboldt, Alexander de, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, New York, I. Riley, 1811, 2 vols.

Moses, Bernard, *Flush Times at Potosi*, Berkeley, University of California Chronicle, July 1909, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 217-39.

——, *The Spanish Dependencies in South America*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1914, 2 vols.

Gage, Thomas, *A New Survey of the West Indies: The English-American, His Travel by Sea and Land*, London, A. Clark, 1677, 477 pp.

Humboldt, Alexander de, *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent During the Years 1799-1804*, London, 1814-29, 7 vols. (This has been printed in several editions.)

Ulloa, Jorge Juan and Antonio de, *A Voyage to South America Undertaken by Command of the King of Spain*, translated by John Adams, London, 1806, 2 vols.

Rogers, Woodes, *A Cruising Voyage Round the World*, London, A. Bell & B. Lintot, 1718, 428 pp.

The transplanting of crops from one side of the Pacific to the other is discussed in the following:

Spinden, H. J., "Thank the American Indian for Potatoes, Maize, Beans, the Peanut, Rubber," *Illustrated Scientific American*, April 1928, pp. 330-2.

Cook, O. F., "Debt of Agriculture to Tropical America," *Pan-American Bulletin*, September 1930, pp. 874-87.

Brand, D. D., "Origin and Distribution of New World Cultivated Plants," *Agricultural History*, April 1939, pp. 109-17.

Safford, W. E., "Isolation of Ancient America as Indicated by Its Agriculture and Languages," *Scientific Monthly*, January 1926, pp. 55-9.

While some of the following references do not refer exclusively to the Pacific, some discussion will be found on the trade of the nineteenth century, the clipper ships and the coolie traffic:

Campbell, Persia C., *Chinese Coolie Emigration*, London, P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1923, 240 pp.

Lubbock, Alfred Basil, *The China Clippers*, Glasgow, J. Brown & Sons, 1919, 388 pp.

Lubbock, Alfred Basil, *Coolie Ships and Oil Sailers*, Boston, Chas. E. Lauriat Co., 1935, 180 pp.

- Mayers, Wm. Fred; Dennys, N. B.; King, Chas, *Treaty Ports of China and Japan*, London, Trubner & Co., 1867, 668 pp.
- Brown, Vera L., "The Contraband Trade," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1928, Vol. 8, pp. 178-89.
- Wycherley, George, *Buccaneers of the Pacific*, London, Rich & Cowan, Ltd., 1929 and 1935, 271 pp.
- Dulles, Foster Rhea, *The Old China Trade*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1930, 228 pp.
- Stevenson, Wm. B., *Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years' Residence in Chile, Peru and Colombia*, London, 1825, 3 vols.

The evolution of Latin American institutions and the effect of early Spanish control on present day problems are presented in:

- Rippy, James Fred, *Historical Evolution of Hispanic America*, New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1932, 580 pp.
- Moses, Bernard, *Spain's Declining Power in South America*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1919.
- , *Spanish Colonial Literature in South America*, New York & London, Hispanic Society of America, 1922, 661 pp.

The general conditions and problems which confront the Latin American countries are treated in innumerable publications. However, the following books present general and comprehensive surveys:

- Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Republics of South America*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, 372 pp.
- Trueblood, Howard J., "Raw Material Resources of Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 1939.
- Bratter, Herbert M., "Foreign Exchange Control in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 1939.
- Wythe, George, "Manufacturing Development in Argentina and the New Industrialism in Latin America," *Journal of Political Economy*, April 1937, pp. 207-28.
- Inman, Samuel Guy, *Latin America, Its Place in the World*, Chicago and New York, Willett Clark & Co., 1937, 462 pp.
- Whittaker, John T., *Americas to the South*, New York, Macmillan, 1939, 300 pp.

The many books written about the individual Latin American countries contain some references, however brief, to Oriental immig

gration. It would, however, not be particularly helpful to set them down in a reading list of this type. The numbers of such volumes are considerable and are usually to be found in reference lists dealing exclusively with Latin American internal problems. However, the chief reason for not including them here is the fact that the space devoted to Asiatic immigration consists most often of only a few sentences. The following books treat the matter in more detail.

- McNair, H. F., *The Chinese Abroad*, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1926, 340 pp.
- Williams, S. W., *Chinese Immigration*, New York, Scribner & Sons, 1879, 48 pp.
- Bogardus, E. S., "Mexican Repatriates," *Sociology and Social Research*, November 1933, pp. 169-76.
- Cousins, W. M., "Chinese in the Caribbean," *Contemporary Review*, November 1926, pp. 632-8.
- Ferenczi, Imre, *International Migrations*, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929, 2 vols. (Vol. 1.).
- "Legal Aspects of Asiatic Migration," *Problems of the Pacific*, University of Chicago Press, 1927.
- World Statistics of Aliens*, Geneva, International Labor Office, 1936.
- Ogishima, Toru, "Japanese Emigration," *International Labor Review*, November 1936, pp. 618-51.
- Weil, Elsie F., "Training Japanese for Emigration," *Asia*, November 1918, pp. 722-8.
- Lopes, R. Paulo, "Land Settlement in Brazil," *International Labor Review*, February 1936, pp. 152-84.
- Idei, Seishi, "Japan's Migration Problem," *International Labor Review*, December 1930, pp. 773-89.
- Normano, J. F., "Japanese Emigration to Brazil," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1934, pp. 42-61.

The present trade problems as they refer to some of the Pacific countries are treated in the following publications. A reference of value in this connection is the *Far Eastern Survey*, published in New York by the Institute of Pacific Relations. There are, of course, the official and semi-official publications, among which are the *Japan Year Book*, the *Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book*, the *China Year Book* and the various statistical annuals, published by the departments of statistics of the

Latin American countries. The *Commerce Reports* and *Special Circulars* issued by the United States Department of Commerce, the *Reports on Economic and Commercial Conditions*, published by the Department of Overseas Trade, London, and *Pan-America Commercial*, a monthly review published by the Pan-American Union, are useful references.

Pratt, Edward Ewing, "Trade Conditions in Latin America as Affected by the European War," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1915, Vol. 60.

Janeway, Eliot, "The Americas and the New Pacific," *Asia*, February 1939, pp. 109-13.

——, "Mexico, Tokyo, Berlin and the Oil Axis," *Asia*, September 1938, pp. 518-20.

Beals, Carleton, *The Economic Struggle for Latin America*, New York and Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938, 401 pp.

——, "Totalitarian Inroads in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1938, pp. 78-89.

Sawada, Setauzo, "Observations on South America," *Contemporary Japan*, August 1939, pp. 723-9.

Porter, Catherine, "Japan's Penetration of Latin America," *Far Eastern Survey*, May 22, 1935, pp. 73-8.

Rippy, J. Fred, *Latin America in World Politics*, New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1931, 301 pp.

*Recent Trends in Japan's Trade With Latin America*, Washington, United States Department of Commerce, Special Circulars, Nos. 394, 400.

Fox, Stark, "Decline Continues in Exports to Japan," *Petroleum World*, October 1940, p. 28.

Bloch, K., "Poor Prospects for Japan in Latin America," *Asia*, July 1940, pp. 362-3.

"Oil for the Bombs of China: Japanese Concession," *Time*, October 28, 1940, pp. 22-3.

Norman, H. S., "Mexico Again Seeking Pipe Line to Pacific Coast," *Oil and Gas Journal*, July 25, 1940, p. 70.

Some of the treaty agreements entered into by the governments of Latin America and those of the western Pacific are listed in the *Treaty Series* published in Geneva by the League of Nations. They may also

be found in the Japan and China yearbooks and in Latin American government publications as well as in books dealing with the politics of the Far East and of Latin America. A background book which does not deal specifically with the Pacific but indicates the recent role that Latin America has played in world politics is

Kelchner, W. H., *Latin American Relations With the League of Nations*, Boston, Warren H. Kelchner, 1930, 207 pp.

Other references are:

"Exchange of Notes Between China and Mexico for the Relinquishment of Extra-territoriality," *China Social and Political Science Review*, April 1930, pp. 19-22.

Morse, Hosea Ballou, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, London, New York, Longmans Green & Co., 1910-18, 3 vols.

MacMurray, John V. A., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1894-1919*, London, Oxford Press, 1921, 2 vols.

*Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1919-1929*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet Series No. 50, New York, 1929.

Burton, W., "South American Grab Bag: Italy, Germany and Japan Making Attempts to Spread the Fascist Doctrine," *Current History*, November 1937, pp. 54-8.

Hutton, Graham D., "Mexico and the Pacific," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1938, pp. 149-58.

Scroggs, Wm. O., "Mexican Oil in World Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1938, pp. 172-5.

Halperin, M., "Mexico Shifts Her Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940, pp. 207-21.

Calderon, Garcia F., *Latin America, Its Rise and Progress*, New York, Scribner's & Sons, 1917.

Gulick, Sidney L., *Anti-Japanese War Stories*, New York, Fleming H. Revell Co., 1917.

"In Latin America," *Living Age*, May 1941, pp. 274-7.

